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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare and assess the mobilization processes leading up to 
the referendum bids for independence in Scotland and Catalonia. Minority nationalist regions 
have over the latter decades emerged on the European political playing field as influential 
actors. However, although demands for self-rule widely have been articulated and pursued, 
mobilization for independence in democratic and forceful manners have been absent. As such, 
I argue that the processes in Catalonia and Scotland, despite obvious internal differences, are 
unique. In understanding them, I further hold that they together can be treated within a limited 
empirical scope inside the encompassing literature on minority nationalism and secessionism. 
The thesis establishes a novel theoretical framework for understanding democratic 
secessionist mobilization and applies it on the ‘positive’ cases of Scotland and Catalonia, 
together with the ‘negative’ cases of Wales and the Basque Country, where the outcome of 
secessionist mobilization has not occurred. The aim is to assess whether common casual 
mechanisms can be revealed with regards to democratic secessionist mobilization. Hence, it 
seeks to contribute to the mapping out of a novel theory of the phenomenon. Through a 
qualitative holistic analysis based on expert interviews and supplemented by secondary 
source, I find that that the variation of the explanatory factors in each of the cases are too vast 
for casual inference to be invoked. More broadly, however, I find that the Scottish and 
Catalan mobilization processes reflect a common dynamic between region and central 
government. Although it is triggered through divergent factors, I argue that mobilization in 
both cases have emerged as a consequence of dissatisfaction with statewide parties and state 
government that accelerates popular democratic support for the independence project. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction  
1.1 Background  
On September 18
th 
last year, the Scots turned to the ballots to decide their future relationship 
with the United Kingdom (UK). After an intense lead up which can be depicted as a practical 
example of participatory democracy drawing in most of the electorate to meetings, debates 
and discussions in town halls all over Scotland, the process culminated in the ‘yes’-side losing 
by a marginal 45 percent in the referendum. Simultaneously in Catalonia, political actors have 
for recent years been trying to pave way for referendum on independence. Independence-
seekers have been mobilizing fiercely through sharp political rhetoric and massive street 
rallies, in the battle against an obstructive Madrid-government, and a rigid interpretation of 
the Spanish constitution. In the Scottish case where an agreement over the formalities was 
reached with the UK through the Edinburgh-Agreement
1
, the referendum was proclaimed to 
represent “(…)the strongest threat to state integrity in Western Europe Since World War Two 
(Massetti and Schakel 2013: 2).” In Catalonia the process has progressed far less smoothly. 
Although holding referendum was agreed upon in the Catalan parliament and the date was set 
to November 9
th 
last year, the Spanish government has throughout the course of events 
maintained their strict stand – a referendum is unconstitutional and illegal. The Catalans 
ended up voting in what was rebranded as an ‘unofficial poll’ to express a political opinion. 
Although an overwhelmingly majority voted for independence, the turnout was low, and the 
result regarded as illegitimate and insignificant. By Spanish officials it was depicted as a “(…) 
day of political propaganda (The Guardian 2014a).” 
With the Scots saying no and with the Spanish government’s seemingly successful 
quelling of the Catalan referendum ambitions, the formal referendum processes can be 
regarded as having come to an end. However, the secessionist agenda facing the European 
Union (EU) and its member states is far from settled. On the contrary, it can be argued that it 
just has begun. Following the 2015 general elections in the UK, the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) –the main political driver of Scottish independence, is on the rise in UK-politics like 
never before.
2
 Whereas in Catalonia, the incumbent nationalist party, Convergència i Unió 
                                                 
1
 The Edinburgh-Agreement: The Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Moore, and the Prime Minister of the 
UK, David Cameron, signed an agreement with Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, which gave the 
Scottish Parliament the power to hold a referendum on independence (UK Government 2012). 
2
 The SNP won 56 out of 59 seats in the Scottish constituency (The Telegraph 2015). 
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(CiU) and its allies, are planning new pathways to independence
3
. Furthermore, similar 
regions with similar agendas are lurking in the background observing developments closely.  
Thus, regarding the unfolding events I hold that it is not solely the mere potential 
secessionist outcome of the referendums bids that are of interest. I argue that the salience of 
the secessionist issue and the vast popular support the mobilization processes have managed 
to attract, from a social scientific perspective is equally intriguing. In other words, it is not 
secessions per se that this thesis seek to explore, but rather the unified and powerful 
democratic mobilization the Scots and the Catalans have managed to challenge the state with 
– a common challenge which itself must be regarded as a victory to minority nationalism.  
1.2 The puzzle 
My interest in this project, and also the work with it in itself, started at a time when the 
Scottish referendum debate still was ongoing and the prospect of the Catalan referendum was 
much more uncertain than at present, where it seems as the Spanish government has 
succeeded in strangling the plans. My fascination with the topic was first and foremost 
motivated by two interrelated and puzzling agendas. The first is highly theoretically anchored, 
and is related to concepts such as internationalization, globalization, and economic and 
political integration, which widely is seen as a fundamental challenges to the nation state 
(Goldmann 2001; Held 1991; Hoffmann 1966), and even by some, seen as processes 
ultimately making the nation state redundant as the prime political unit of politics (Ohmae 
1995; Guéhenno 1995).Thus, assuming that the functions of the nation state is being eroded, 
and it indeed is becoming obsolete, can the secessionist bids in Scotland and Catalonia 
fundamentally be regarded as cases putting such hypothesis’ to the test?  Relatedly, and rather 
paradoxically, my second puzzlement was more of empirical interest as it relates to the more 
testable implications of the political demands minority nationalists pose. Again, if the role of 
the nation state indeed is diminishing, what is then the purpose of forming a new one? 
I argue that the mobilization processes in Scotland and Catalonia in the wider 
literature of minority nationalism and secessionism qualifies as extremely rare, and thus far 
unprecedented events, insofar as they play out in a contextual environment new to 
secessionist bids of this magnitude. This is so for three reasons. First, fundamentally, and in 
correspondence with the puzzle laid out above; they represent a threat to our normative 
understanding of the nation state. Leaving the post-communist dissolutions of the Soviet 
                                                 
3
 CiU have called for early elections in September hoping to secure the secessionist coalition in the Catalan 
parliament, whereupon a unilateral declaration of independence can be called (EU Observer 2015) 
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Union, Yugoslavia
4
, and Czechoslovakia aside, post-war Europe is yet to experience a region 
seceding from a nation state. Moreover, aside from the last sixty years of EU-stability, the 
history of Europe has been one of turmoil which has seen the continuous re-shaping of state 
constellations. The result is a geopolitical map containing a large assortment of minority 
nationalist groups. Hence, separatist issues, either they are claims for more autonomy or 
straight forward secessionism, have a long practice in Europe. However, on the expense of 
becoming increasingly more decentralized (Hooghe et al. 2010), the modern European nation 
states have in terms of formal sovereignty until now remained extremely resilient against 
inside pressures. The Scottish and Catalan mobilization processes, however, are perhaps the 
clear empirical signs of that this resilience is weakening.  
Secondly, secessionism is traditionally associated with violence and often 
accompanied by ethnic conflict (Brancati 2006: 654). However, in the Scottish and Catalan 
case, secessionist mobilization is carried out according to the democratic playing rules – on 
the one hand, it is free of violent connotations, internally, on the other hand, it is free from the 
threat of military retaliation, externally. Considering the European historical experiences with 
secessionism, which in most cases are associated with armed conflict and even civil war
5
, the 
success of Scottish and Catalan mobilization is quite remarkable. Even though Dion’s  (1996: 
269-270) declaration that “(…)secessionists never have managed to split a well-established 
democracy through a referendum or an electoral victory (Dion 1996: 269-270)” still is valid 
today, the forceful mobilization processes of Catalonia and Scotland might foreshadow the 
disproval of the statement. 
Thirdly, on the sidelines carefully observing the Scottish and Catalan developments 
are political actors representing European regions with similar claims and aims for self-
government. These demands are articulated with various degrees of substance and intensity. 
Many movements do not wish a state on traditional lines at all, but seek other expressions of 
self-determination (Keating 2001c: 8). However, their basic rationale is fundamentally the 
same – they seek increased self-determination and recognition. Massetti and Schakel, 
underscores this by pointing to the ‘threating’ nature of regionalist parties; 
“The threat posed to the integrity of the state is not only due to regionalist parties’ 
‘threatening capacity’ (i.e. their electoral strength) but, in the first place, to their ‘threatening 
                                                 
4
 This includes the more recent Kosovar case which still has its formal political status widely disputed. For 
discussion see Tansey (2009) and JIA (2009). 
5
 On the 1
st
 of January 1993, in what has later been termed the ‘Velvet Divorce’, Czechoslovakia split into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia without any shots being fired or lives being lost in the process. For more, see Hilde 
(1999) and McLean (2001).  
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intention’ (i.e. their secessionist ideological stance). Therefore, it is crucial to understand 
why and under which circumstances regionalist parties develop moderate or radical 
ideologies in regard to self-government claims (Massetti and Schakel 2013: 2).” 
Moreover, given the fact that the agendas of political parties representing minority 
nationalist interests prove to be very flexible and are adapted according to contextual factors 
(Dandoy 2010: 214; De Winter 1998: 208; Massetti and Schakel 2013), the spin-off effects of 
Scottish and Catalan mobilization are potentially vast. A novel empirical illustration of this 
point, is the unofficial referendum organized in Venice and the surrounding region in March 
last year on whether to break away from Italy, which explicitly was inspired by the Scottish 
and Catalan processes (BBC News 2014d).  
Furthermore, by presenting a quick snapshot of the national salience of regional issues 
and the influence of regional parties across a large variety of countries in Europe, the 
argument is further reinforced. In Italy, Lega Nord has for decades advocated autonomy for 
the Northern-Italian region of ‘Padania’(Giordano 2000), and at times it has also promoted 
secessionism (Massetti and Schakel 2013). In the Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia 
regional parties, most prominently the Volksunie and Rassemblement Wallon, have 
historically been influential players in shaping the federal framework (Deschouwer 2009). In 
the German region of Bavaria the territorial cleavage is forcefully held salient by the 
Christian Social Union (Hepburn 2008a). More peripheral examples are Faroe Island where 
the secessionist discourse emphasizing a formal parting from Denmark in recent years have 
gained momentum and support (Adler-Nissen 2014). Moreover, the relevance of Kärntner 
Wahlgemeinschaft in the Austrian region of Kärnten, Svenska Folkepartiet, in several Finnish 
mainland regions and Åland, and the Saami People’s List in the Norwegian region of 
Finnmark (Massetti and Schakel 2013: 11), further contributes to illustrate the vast diversity 
of regional articulation and mobilization of political demands. Worth noting is also that in the 
regions of the Basque Country, Bavaria, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Eastern Germany, 
Flanders, Galicia, Lombardy, Quebec, Sardinia, Scotland, South Tyrol, Valle d’Aosta, 
Veneto, and Wales, regional parties have gained control of sub-state regional governments, 
either through majority, minority or coalition governments (Hepburn 2009a: 477-488).   
1.3 Research Question, research approach and the scope of thesis 
With this rather broad perspective as my point of departure, I set out on a quest to describe 
and more generally interpret the secessionist mobilization processes in Scotland and 
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Catalonia. On the basis of the puzzle laid out above and the broader implications that derive 
from it, I pose the following research question: 
Compared to minority nationalist regions with similar basic features, what factors explain the 
successful minority nationalist mobilization for a referendum on secession in Scotland and 
Catalonia within the political framework of the EU?  
Deriving from the research question are three practical considerations that needs to be 
accounted for. The first relates to the complex theoretical field of which the research project 
aspires to contribute to. The broader political research field of minority nationalism and 
secessionism has been covered with lengthy extend. However, although there are certain 
agreements over which factors that are involved and interplay when speaking about the 
abovementioned terms, there is established little consensus over to which degree factors affect 
given outcomes. Thus, there generally lacks a common coherent and systematically way of 
analyzing secessions (Wood 1981: 107). The varieties of the contextual backdrops in each 
empirical case respectively, have just seemed too complex for any meaningful causal 
statements to be drawn. Looking at the literature as whole, it is tempting to simply conclude 
that various preconditions and conducive circumstances can result in the emergence of 
secessionist tendencies (Navaratna-Bandara 1995: 11). Nonetheless, driven by the aspiration 
of explaining a broader phenomenon which I refer to as democratic secessionist mobilization, 
rather than solely offering two separate case-specific presentations, I seek to investigate 
whether common casual inferences can be drawn on the basis of the cases. However, in so 
doing, I regard it as imperative to clearly de-limit and define an empirical scope for which my 
theoretical arguments are relevant. Specifically, and as I thoroughly will establish in the 
subsequent chapter, this scope implies the EU. More practically, the delimitation also entails 
constructing a theoretical framework of which my empirical cases can be applied. 
 Secondly, as reflected in the research question, I regard it as insufficient to base a 
casual assessment exclusively on the basis of two cases. However, as I argue that Scotland 
and Catalonia are unique cases and thus are the only cases representing the investigated 
‘outcome’, the empirical leverage is rather scarce. As a means to deal with this I have also 
introduced two additional cases representing negative ‘outcomes’ – that is minority nationalist 
regions where secessionist mobilization not has occurred. The cases which I have selected are 
Wales and the Basque Country. 
 Thirdly, derived from the research question is a research design that reflects both a 
deductive and an inductive dimension. Deductively, the empirical analysis is driven by a 
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theoretical framework emphasizing certain theoretical expectations. However, the framework 
itself must be regarded as novel in so far as it is constructed to be applied on cases which I 
argue reflect a new phenomenon, and that thus far have received little scholarly attention. 
Therefore I also find it necessary to stress the inductive and explorative nature of the research 
approach. Whereas the empirical analysis will be guided by some initial agendas established 
from the existing literature, the explorative dimension of revealing potentially new 
explanatory variables and mechanism is equally important.  
In sum the aims of my research approach can be summed up by following three steps. 
The first aim is to elaborate a theoretical framework for understanding democratic 
secessionist mobilization based on the existing literature on secessionism and minority 
nationalism. Second, I can apply the two ‘positive’ cases of Scotland and Catalonia and the 
two ‘negative’ on the theoretical framework with the aim to assess whether  any casual 
inferences can be made with regards to understanding the phenomenon of democratic 
secessionist mobilization. More practically, this multiple case study approach allows me to 
assess the cases from a holistic perspective by applying a qualitative logic based on a 
combination of procedures borrowed from the methodological frameworks of historical 
explanations and process tracing. Following these frameworks, the empirical data will be 
gathered from various sources. The bedrock of the data is based on in-depth interviews with 
experts (academics and journalists). This information will be substantiated by both primary 
and secondary sources of literature.  
With this my thesis aims to contribute to the wider social scientific field of minority 
nationalism and secessionism primarily in two ways. First, by narrowing down the scope of a 
wide-ranging theoretical phenomenon which thus far has proved to be very incoherent, I aim 
at presenting an analytical framework for understanding democratic secessionist mobilization 
within the EU. Second, by applying two ‘positive’ and ‘two’ negative cases on the 
framework, I aspire to assess whether any general casual inference with regards to the 
phenomenon as a whole can be drawn, whereupon some initial empirical reflections with 
regards to a novel theory of democratic secessionist mobilization, can be made.  
1.4 The dependent variable  
As I argue that Scotland and Catalonia are unique cases representing a broader phenomenon 
of democratic secessionist mobilization I regard it as necessary to give an initial clarification 
of the independent variable of the analysis. Although this aspect further will be treated in the 
subsequent chapter, some initial remarks are necessary to be presented already here. The 
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independent variable is defined as having put a referendum on secession on the political 
agenda. On the agenda implies that a political agreement on organizing a referendum has 
been passed in the regional parliament. Following this I am aware of that similar processes in 
the formal sense have occurred elsewhere, more specifically in Quebec and the Basque 
Country. In fact, the Québécois have voted no to independence in referendums on two 
occasions (Pammett and LeDuc 2001), and is as such relevant to the theoretical framework 
put forward. However, as I am concerned with the contextual backdrop of the EU and its 
unique characteristics in terms of economic and political integration, I have omitted the 
Quebec case from the empirical domain of the thesis. In the Basque country an attempt to put 
forward a referendum on renegotiating its formal status with Spain was put on the political 
agenda in 2004, but soon rejected by the Spanish government (Pérez-Nievas 2006: 47-48). At 
first glance it might thus seem quite similar to the political process in Catalonia. However, as 
I will elaborate in chapter two, I argue that neither the explicit content of the referendum 
questions, nor the general dynamics of processes are compatible with qualifying as a positive 
case. 
1.5 Case selection   
As noted above, the selection of cases includes the ‘positive’ cases Scotland and Catalonia, 
and the ‘negative’ cases of Wales and the Basque Country.  The case selections follows a 
Most Similar System Design (MSSD) where the key principle is to select generally similar 
cases, but which represent different outcomes. The case selection procedure, does not follow 
very strict criteria as this would be difficult to apply on a universe of cases generally depicted 
for its great diversity. I nevertheless argue that the selected cases in the broader sense portray 
similar pictures. Most prominently is that they are all part of the same opportunity structure of 
mobilization which the EU offers. Of the more specific internal attributes, the main common 
characteristics are that that they all have a strong sense of regional identity; that they all have 
devolved political systems, that they all constituted by fairly small populations, and that they 
all have influential regionalist parties representing their interests – parties that all have been in 
some form of government at the region level. 
 Furthermore, by selecting two ‘negative’ cases that, respectively, are part of the same 
overarching national political system as the two ‘positive’ cases, I argue that the basis for 
comparison is strengthened.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two serve to contextualize and operationalize the phenomenon of democratic 
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minority nationalist mobilization. First, a conceptual clarification is given on four central 
aspects the thesis refers to, and I regard as imperative in understanding the phenomenon at 
hand. These are: (1) minority nationalism, (2) social movement and the interrelated process of 
mobilization, (3) secessionism, and (4) regionalist parties. Following this, I elaborate on the 
dependent variable of the thesis, whereupon a discussion serving to justify its applicability is 
offered. I thereafter turn to defining and de-limiting the empirical scope of the thesis. This 
serves as a de-limitation of the broader phenomenon of secessionist processes into the 
democratic and globalized context of the EU – a nuancing which I regard as imperative prior 
the assessing the empirical cases. This includes a section on globalization generally, and is 
followed by a section assessing how these aspects more specifically are reflected in the EU-
framework.  
In chapter three I represent the analytical framework of which the analysis of the 
empirical cases is based on. The framework follows six broad agendas which I have further 
been articulated into theoretical expectations emphasizing the presupposed dynamics of 
democratic secessionist mobilization. Each expectation is followed by a review of the relevant 
theoretical aspects which constitutes it. 
Chapter four present the methodological framework of the thesis. The first emphasis is 
on a general discussion relating the tradeoffs between qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches. Thereafter I turn to laying out the methodological research design of the thesis. 
Towards the end of the chapter I evaluate the quality of the research design, before I close by 
sketching out its practical application in the analysis.   
In chapter five and six the descriptive empirical presentation of the cases are laid out. 
Chapter five concerns the Scottish secessionist mobilization processes, followed by a 
comparative assessment of the ‘negative’ case of Welsh nationalism. Chapter six presents the 
Catalan and subsequently the Basque case in the same fashion.  
In the seventh and final chapter the four cases are first summarized whereupon a 
theoretical discussion bridging the empirical presentation with the analytical framework 
follows. This is divided into two parts. Part one assesses the ‘negative’ cases of Wales and the 
Basque Country, whereas part two focuses on the ‘positive’ cases of Scotland and Catalonia. 
Following this initial case-oriented assessment, a discussion emphasizing the broader 
implications of the more wide-ranging agenda set out in the introduction of the thesis, is 
presented.    
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CHAPTER TWO: Conceptualization, contextualization and the dependent variable 
The literature on the interrelated topics of secessionism and minority nationalism has over the 
years become extensive. However, the main challenge concerning the topic in general is the 
lack of coherence. Both with regards to the definition of the concept of secessionism itself, 
and how mobilization by minority nationalists should be placed and interpreted in a broader 
political context the theoretical and empirical implications of a wide field of contributions 
have been and are highly inconsistent. As summed up by Wood (1981) several decades back; 
“Despite the vital importance of the outcome of current secessionist attempts for both 
the wide array of states in which they are occurring and international politics at large, 
there is at present no coherent, systematic way of analyzing the origins of secession, 
the conditions which make it succeed or fail, or the consequences of various 
secessionist strategies or governmental responses (Wood 1981: 107).” 
Looking at the various political, cultural, psychological, territorial, ethnic and 
sociological principles underlying the numerous definitions and analysis’ on the matter 
(Guibernau 1999: 13), practitioners of this social scientific discipline are undoubtedly facing 
an extremely complex phenomenon. Fundamentally, Wood’s stark summary thus stands just 
as precise today as it did over thirty years ago. No wonder it is tempting to simply conclude 
that various preconditions and conducive circumstances can result in the emergence of 
secessionist tendencies (Navaratna-Bandara 1995: 11), and that every case tells nothing more 
than a separate story. Nevertheless, the quest for understanding the phenomenon and its 
implications continues. The main lesson to be drawn is perhaps that the empirical scope 
relating to any assessment of secessionism has to be sufficiently narrowed down in order to 
reveal causal mechanisms that are validly generalizable to a broader set of cases. The 
explanatory factors in each case, both in nature and effect, simply seems to be too varied to be 
applicable across a large population of cases. Context does matter, and I argue that any 
generalizations referring to secessionism requires a de-limitation to a contextual scope where 
cases are comparable. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a presentation of the dependent variable and to 
establish the appropriate empirical scope for my research question. This contextual 
clarification emphasizing globalization, and more specifically the EU, serves to illustrate the 
particular, and historical unique, opportunity structure I argue has been opened to minority 
nations in Europe. Moreover, it helps sketching out the premises for the analytical framework 
which will be presented in the chapter to follow. First, I will give a clarification of a handful 
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of central concepts which I refer to throughout the thesis. Thereafter, I will give a definition 
of the dependent variable which then is followed by an assessment of the logic defining it. 
This will be followed by an account of the contextual aspects of globalization and the EU. I 
will in a first section elaborate on how the contextual veil of globalization relates to minority 
nationalist mobilization more broadly. For many theorists the simultaneous processes of 
economic and political integration and the flourishing of minority nationalist movements is a 
puzzling paradox. This is especially relevant within the domain of the EU where the effects of 
globalization are particularly strong. The second section will thus assess how the mechanisms 
of globalization more practically affect the EU.  
2.1 Conceptual background 
In the following section I will emphasize four essential concepts of my study: (1) minority 
nationalism, (2) social movement and the interrelated process of mobilization, (3) 
secessionism, and (4) regionalist parties. These concepts are all in their own sense 
comprehensive and fuzzy in terms of definable characteristics. The purpose of this conceptual 
background is to give the reader an account of how key concepts are understood and relate in 
my thesis. 
2.1.1 Minority nationalism 
Fundamentally, what this study aims is to shed light on the phenomenon of secessionist 
mobilization of minority nations within a delimited and well-defined empirical context. Being 
the unit of analysis of the research approach it is imperative to break down this concept of 
minority nationalism so that the reader can get a clear sense of what I am essentially referring 
to. In doing so it is inescapable to draw the parallel to its mother concept, namely, 
nationalism, and in the next step, when adding the territorial aspect – the nation state. These 
two notions arguably among the most frequently disputed phenomena containing a wide array 
of underlying dimensions, which numerous scholars throughout history of political science 
have attempted to shed light on. It is not my purpose to enter this debate. However, in 
defining minority nationalism it is inevitable to dwell a little bit on the notion of the nation 
state – the primary building blocks of our understanding of contemporary politics – and on the 
synthesis between nationalism and territory, which mainly constitutes these building blocks. 
Basically, it is in the intersection between nationalism and territory the “problem” of what is 
referred to as the survival, or the re-emergence of minority nations, derives from. 
A common way of understanding the nation state is as the product of a process where 
a center assimilates surrounding peripheries into a shared territory and identity. Following this 
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the nation state is by many viewed synonymous with nationalism. Hobsbawn for example 
claims that a nation “(…)is a social entity only insofar as it is related to a certain kind of 
modern territorial state, ‘the nation state’, and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality 
expect insofar as they both relate to it (Hobsbawn 1990: 9-10).” This understanding is 
reasonable taking into consideration the state-centric perspective which has been dominant 
for the latter centuries. However, to understand and accept the notion of minority nations one 
has to detach the aspects of sovereign territory and identity from each other. Following this 
the minority nation can be defined as “(…)cultural communities sharing a common past, 
attached to a clearly demarcated territory, and wishing to decide upon their future which lack 
a state of their own (Guibernau 1999: 1).” As such, I hold that the minority nation essentially 
contains the same two basic elements as the nation state; a dimension of identity, and a 
dimension of territory. On the one hand, the idea of identity means “(…)the existence of 
communities with bonds of ‘blood and belonging’ arising from sharing a common homeland, 
cultural myths, symbols and historical memories, economic resources, and legal-political 
rights and duties (Norris 2011: 25-26).” On the other hand, the minority nation also contains 
a clear connection to the territory dimension. This can be formal in the sense of a territory 
with clearly set existing outside borders, as the case is with the regions of Scotland, Catalonia 
and Flanders, for example. It can also be more diffuse, spanning over parts of regions, several 
regions
6
, or even several countries.
7
 The main point is that a minority nation relates to a 
perceived sovereign territory that is politically interlocked into a larger territory where they do 
not feel a sense of belonging. Hence, they are a member of a nation or several nations, but 
lack a state of their own and regard the state or states containing them as alien. They thus 
uphold a different sense of national identity (Guibernau 2013: 269). To keep matters clear the 
territory aspect of minority nations will in this paper be treated as being equal to the political 
sub-units of regions.
8
  
2.1.1.1 The ethnic- and civic discourse of minority nationalism 
In the literature on minority nationalism an important distinction is made between civic and 
ethnic nationalism. The civic form of nationalism refers to community ties grounded on 
“(…)citizenship within a shared territory and boundaries delineated by the nation state 
(Norris 2011: 25)”, and “(…)based upon common values and institutions, and patterns of 
                                                 
6
 The Basque Country is an example of the all three illustrating the complexity of the territorial claims of many 
minority nations.  Basque nationalism in the widest understanding claims the right to the two Spanish regions of 
the Basque country and Navarre in Spain, in addition to the western part of the region of Aquitaine in France. 
7
 Exemplified by the Roma and the Kurds. 
8
 The Basque Country refers to the Spanish region. 
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social interaction (Keating 2001a: 6).” The ethnic form draws on ethnic particularism and 
has its base in more diffuse bonds of language, religion, and ethnicity (Norris 2011: 25). It is 
the latter this thesis aim to assess. As spelled out by Keating and McGarry (2001):  “There is 
no doubt that the new conditions of world society give greater legitimacy to nationalisms 
based on civic rather than ethnic principles (Keating and McGarry 2001: 6).” The civic sense 
of nationalism is as such crucial in understanding the forceful mobilization by minority 
nations we experience today. First emphasized in the works of Guibernau (1999) and Keating 
(2001a), the civic orientation views minority nationalism as a process of nation building 
independently and outside the framework of the nation state. Traditionally, minority 
nationalism has been depicted as being inherently based on ethnic exclusiveness, and hence 
stands in stark contrast to multiculturalism, which represents the nationalism of modern 
liberal democracies today. Minority nationalism for long received limited scholarly attention, 
and the attention it did receive was frugal in terms of significance. Minority nations were 
consensually depreciated as ‘revolts to modernity’ (Lipset 1985), and as ‘remnants of the 
past’ (Hobsbawn 1990).  In most cases they originate from a past prior to the emergence of 
the nation state system where they enjoyed some form of political sovereignty (Guibernau 
1999: 2). Moreover, the foundations of these identities thus stems from a time when what 
Smith (1986) refers to as when “(…)the core of ethnicity was established.” Thus, one cannot 
look past the fact that minority nationalism in general has a strong link to some sort of ethnic 
element. 
However, over the last couple decades, as advocates of minority nationalism gradually 
have established themselves as both reputable and influential political players in most 
Western European democracies (Hepburn 2009a: 477), the awareness and interest in the 
academic field has flourished. It is noteworthy that nearly all minority nationalist movements 
in Western Europe have gone from a doctrine of ethnic particularism to a civic discourse 
based on territorial nationalism (Keating 2001b: 28). This sort of nationalism is distanced 
from myths of common ancestry and open for anyone irrespective of birth or ethnic origins, 
and, “(…)based upon common values and institutions, and patterns of social interaction 
(Keating 2001a: 6).” Moreover, “(…) minority nations open up the possibility for individuals 
to play a more active part in the political life of their communities through participation in 
autonomous institutions. In so doing they contribute to the dynamization of civil society and 
encourage civil coherence (Guibernau 1999: 8-9).” This shift has especially been linked to 
the effects of globalization (see section below). It now seems to be a growing acceptance for 
the principle that national minorities are entitled to some sort of distinctive political status, 
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which includes territorial self-government where that is feasible (Kymlicka 2001: 64). Thus, 
in stark contrast to the past were minority nationalism was judged as representing a 
primitiveness that in most cases originated in various elements of ethnicity, it has become an 
important part of understanding the broader political trends of decentralization of power and 
fragmentation of political territory.  
2.1.2 Movements and mobilization 
In this thesis I will frequently be referring to the mobilization of minority nationalists. The 
term mobilization is closely linked to the concept of social movements, which in itself is a 
vast social scientific field. Many would argue that the unit of analysis in my study, minority 
nations, itself can be defined as a social movement. However, with this in in mind it is 
important to note that this study is not about social movements per se and can thus not be 
placed in such a theoretical framework. Rather, with a broader outlook it aims to assess the 
external factors which set the grounds for minority nationalist mobilization, while also 
accounting for how these play out in the mobilization process. Hence, the study aspires to 
explain the entirety of a process and outcome, where social movements of course play an 
inevitable and important part. I stress that this is part of the explanation more than it is what is 
being explained itself. Nevertheless, a brief clarification of what I mean when referring to 
movements and mobilization is necessary.  
In defining social movements Tarrow (2011) draws a parallel to what he refers to as 
contentious politics. This is a broader concept encompassing political conflicts more generally 
than that of social movements’ theory which Tarrow claim is sub-category of contentious 
politics. He understands social movements as specific “(…)sequences of contentious politics 
based on underlying social networks, on resonant collective action frames, and on the 
capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents (Tarrow 2011: 7).” I 
find the concept of contentious politics compelling in theoretically framing the process of 
movement and mobilization which I am referring to in my thesis. Tarrow explains that 
contentious politics occurs “(…)when ordinary people – often in alliance with more 
influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in confrontation with elites, 
authorities, and opponents (Tarrow 2011: 6).” Furthermore, social movements have through 
history often been closely linked to extremism, deprivation and the exertion of violence. 
Tarrow argues that they are better defined as “(…)collective challenges, based on common 
purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and 
authorities (Tarrow 2011: 9).” This definition embracing a wider interpretation of social 
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movements emphasizing that they need not, and in most cases are not, extremist or violent in 
their orientation, is important with regards to the empirical scope of my study. This scope 
assumes that mobilization by peaceful means in a democratic framework is crucial in 
legitimizing and broadening the support for a secessionist cause. 
2.1.2.1 Understanding mobilization 
Mobilization is understood as the most basic feature of social movements. It is through 
mobilization collective action takes places. Without mobilization, there would be no 
collective action, and in turn no social movement (Tarrow 2011: 188). Mobilization within in 
the framework I am suggesting can, echoing the work of McAdam and collaborators (1996), 
be depicted as a synthesis between political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes. Political opportunities refer to the institutional framework setting the opportunity 
structure within which the movement can maneuver. Mobilizing structures imply the formal 
and informal collective vehicles through which people engage in collective action within the 
institutional opportunity structures. It is these two proponents which grant a group a certain 
potential for action (McAdam et al. 1996: 2-4). Framing processes are referred to as the 
psychological collective aspects that unite people in a social movement in the first place. It is 
defined as the “(…)conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared 
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action 
together in acting collectively in the first place (McAdam et al. 1996: 6).” 
Lastly, when a process of mobilization tips over in being a political process is when 
the former process become manifest. That is when both the group challenging and its 
counterpart recognize there is a field of contentions; when they perceive opportunities and 
threats in the processes at hand; when they create or appropriate resources, organizations, and 
institutions to take advantage of opportunities and handle threats; when challengers engage in 
collective action to broaden support to impress or threaten authorities and authorities organize 
to oppose or appease them (Tarrow 2011: 188-189). 
2.1.3 Secessionism 
In defining secessionism in the broad and general sense it suffices to phrase Wood (1981) 
who states that secessionism refers “(…)to a demand for formal withdrawal from a central 
political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign 
status (Wood 1981: 110).” Moreover, Wood emphasizes that secessionism not should be 
analyzed as a condition, but is best treated as a process which occurs via different stages. The 
key is therefore to “(…)focus on the dynamic interaction and the cumulative effect of a 
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number of conditions and developments which may or may not lead to a secessionist outcome 
(Wood 1981: 109).” The outcome itself has to date never been effectuated in a well-
established democracy. A secession can described as fulfilled and successful when a 
“(…)withdrawal is accorded recognition by the host state and by other in the international 
community (Hechter 1992: 267).  
Furthermore, it may be useful to distinguish secessionism from separatism. While the 
former is clear-cut in emphasizing a specific goal for a group, the latter term refers to the 
more general unwillingness of a group or of a region to feel an integral part of the community 
or of the state of which it belongs. Thus, it implies a political alienation or lack of national 
identity and loyalty to a host state (Abedin 1989: 223), but the political goals that derives 
from this alienation covers the whole spectrum of self-determination policies. Separatism may 
thus be expressed through the demands for provincial rights or local or regional autonomy in 
certain decision spheres. By contrast, a secessionist movement is by definition characterized 
by claiming and struggling to attain self-sovereignty through independent statehood. The 
crucial distinction of the two concepts thus lies in the willingness of a group to recognize the 
sovereignty of the political authority they are part of (Wood 1981: 110).  
2.1.3.1 Why secessions are rare 
In the words of Hecther (1992); “(…)land is the pillar of states; it provides tax revenue, a 
labor force, mineral and other geographically based resources, and it is often vital for 
defense (Hechter 1992: 277).” For these reasons states are naturally extremely reluctant to 
give away parts of their land, and secessions have thus proved to be historically rare events. 
Cases of successful secessions have in most cases occurred in contexts where the host-state is 
weakened through some sort of defeat in war.
9
 The problem from the secessionist’s point of 
view is that this is a state of emergency. Normally, the seceding part faces a fully functional 
and powerful counterpart who possesses the resources and a willingness to use them in order 
to dampen the movement.  Secessionist forces can for instance be met and dealt with through 
accommodational constitutional reforms or through the more adverse means of repression 
(Hechter 1992: 278). Moreover, leaving aside external constraint, secessions in well-
established democracies imply that such the decision within the seceding region is made via a 
                                                 
9
 Many new states have been formed as a consequence of fragmentations of multinational empires (for example 
the Soviet Union and Austria-Hungary) and in the wake of decolonization (Hechter 1992: 277).    
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decisive election or a referendum – a vote that requires majority support.10 In a modern 
society where political preferences are heterogeneous, achieving and maintaining the magic 
number of 50 percent support is extremely difficult (Dion 1996: 270). Consequentially, 
Hechter states that secessions in the ‘pure’ form, “(…)when a highly effective state permits a 
secessionist territory to withdraw from its embrace (Hechter 1992: 277)”, only have occurred 
twice. This was when Norway broke away from Sweden in 1905, and when Ireland parted 
with the UK in 1922. However, even though both cases involved democratic states, it is 
nonetheless argued that these democracies hardly can be depicted as well-established as the 
secessions were carried out only few years after the introduction or significant expansion of 
universal suffrage. Moreover, in the case of Norway and Sweden it can plausibly be argued 
that it was not a real secessions since the ties between the political entities involved were very 
loose in the first place (Dion 1996: 269-270). Thus, I argue that Dion’s declaration that 
“(…)secessionist never managed to split a well-established democracy through a referendum 
or an electoral victory (Dion 1996: 270)”, still is valid today.  
2.1.4 Regionalist parties 
In the context of advanced democracies in the EU the dominant organization representing 
minority nationalist identities are political parties, and their strategies are democratic and 
peaceful (Türsan 1998: 5). In such a framework regional parties can be seen as the hub and 
catalyst of minority nationalist mobilization, and are therefore a crucial element in 
understanding the dynamics of secessionist mobilization.  
These types of parties have been the subject of numerous definitions. To mention 
some, they have been labeled as, peripheral regionalist, subnational regionalist, peripheral 
nationalist, sub-state nationalist, ethnonationalist and ethnoregionalist (Türsan 1998: 5). 
Under many of the labels lies a clear ethnic link – an assumption that regionalist parties by 
definition are based on ethnicity. I argue that this no longer can be used as a common 
denominator, and that influential regionalist parties today represent the civic nationalism 
outlined above. Furthermore, successful and influential regionalist parties function like 
mainstream parties, however within regions. I will emphasize this point in greater detail in the 
analytical framework presented below. For now it suffices to state that I have, among a large 
array of options, chosen the ‘ethnicity neutral’ term, regionalist parties, when referring to the 
political parties portrayed in this study. 
                                                 
10
 A scenario like one which led to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, where the leaders in each camp decided on 
secession almost conspiratorially, while surveys showed that two-thirds of the population in both regions wanted 
to keep the country united, is unimaginable in European democracies of today (Dion 1996: 270). 
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Borrowing from Brancati (2008) regionalist parties are defined as “(…)parties that 
compete and win votes in only one region of a country (…)[and], tend to focus their agendas 
on issues affecting only these regions.” Brancati further holds that “(…) regional parties may 
participate in national or regional elections so long as they only compete in one region of a 
country at either level of government”. Moreover, they “(…)stand in stark contrast to 
statewide-parties, which compete and win votes in every region of a country and tend to focus 
their agendas on issues affecting groups throughout the country (Brancati 2008: 138).”  
The core theoretical problem relating to defining regionalist parties relates to the 
complexity of the dimensions of cleavages and issues that usually are applied when 
classifying political parties into typologies (Klingemann et al. 1994: 24). There is therefore a 
lack of a commonly shared definition of what a regionalist party actually is (Dandoy 2010: 
197). Referring to regionalist parties as one party group is problematic because the parties 
show a great deal of variation on the above-mentioned dimensions. However, what is agreed 
upon is that the concept entails two basic denominators; that they operate within in a 
subnational territorial border, and, that they fundamentally represent and reflect the interests 
of a certain exclusive group (Türsan 1998: 5). Beyond this, regionalist parties are described as 
more incongruent in their policy demands than any other party family (Urwin 1983: 227).
11
 
They also vary a great deal with regards to more traditional cleavages. Portraying where they 
belong on the basic right-left spectrum for example, De Winter (1998) finds a quite 
heterogeneous picture. Moreover, it must also be emphasized that regionalist parties are more 
a lot more flexible than other party families in the sense that the latter are reluctant to altering 
their main political objectives to large extents, fearing that this may baffle their very identity 
and disillusion voters. Regionalist parties, on the other hand, are empirically characterized by 
moving their positions on central issues. The main general characterization for regional 
parties is their aim for political reorganization of the existing national power structure – a 
demand for some kind of self-government (De Winter 1998: 204).  However, it is empirically 
impossible to place regionalist parties on any permanent and fixed category of the type, or 
‘severity’, of such claims. Like nationalist movements, regionalist parties, which I argue play 
the most prominent role as catalyst of the movement, also must be treated dynamically. Their 
relative importance within a given party system can change quite drastically over time (De 
Winter 1998: 212). Their party positions and visions for the future of their regions have often 
                                                 
11
 Religious affiliations have for example been important for regionalist parties in Northern Ireland, but no so 
much in other Western-European countries. Language has similarly been a traditional rallying point for 
regionalist parties in Catalonia, The Basque country and some Italian regions, but is insignificant in most other 
regions (Müller-Rommel 1998: 19). 
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moved between categories (i.e. protectionist, autonomist, secessionist) as they tend to adapt 
their strategy, their ideology, and their discourses depending on contextual factors (Dandoy 
2010: 214-215). 
2.2 Explaining the dependent variable 
The dependent variable of the research approach is defined as ‘having put a referendum on 
seceding on the political agenda’. Regarding this, a necessary first clarification is between the 
terms referendum and consultation. While the Scottish vote for secession commonly is 
referred to as a referendum, the terminology used with reference to the Catalan case is a 
consultation. The obvious difference between the notions is that the former is perceived as 
legitimate and the result thus of direct political significance, while the latter more is a way of 
formally presenting a popular demand, however, without any direct political implications. The 
nature of the two terminologies naturally lies in how the central governments in Scotland and 
Catalonia have responded in the respective mobilization processes. This is a central theme in 
understanding the two cases and will be treated thoroughly in the analysis. For now it suffices 
to state that I for practical reasons I refer to both cases as mobilization processes for a 
referendum. 
A second necessary clarification is an elaboration of term political agenda. I define 
this as having reached a formal political agreement on holding a referendum on independence 
at the sub-governmental level. In Scotland agreements have been reached both on the sub-
national and the national level. In Catalonia the matter is thus far only been formally agreed 
upon in the Catalan parliament and hence figures as the minimum for qualifying.  
Furthermore, I depict Scotland and Catalonia as unique cases in the sense that they are the 
only two cases that represent this ‘outcome’ within the empirical scope of the thesis. In 
establishing and phrasing this variable several considerations have been made, which I will 
now elaborate on. 
The first point to be stressed relates to the temporal aspect of the processes under 
consideration. As Geddes (2003) bluntly underlines;   
“There is no way to test causal arguments if the outcome being explained has not yet 
happened at the time the study is done. Becoming embroiled in controversies over the 
causes of something that has not happened is like arguing about what the angels 
dancing on the head of a pin look like without first having made sure that at least one 
angel really performs there (Geddes 2003: 42).” 
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The developments in Scotland and Catalonia are from a social scientist’s point of view 
fresh, and in the Catalan case the outcome of the referendum bid is yet to be seen. Moreover, 
the two processes have reached very different stages. While the Scots in November 2014 by a 
small majority voted no to independence, Catalan mobilization is still fueled by the demand 
for a referendum and the Spanish government’s indocility in granting them one. Assessing 
these two cases in a comparative perspective may to the reader thus seem unwarranted and 
premature. Therefore, it is important to stress the temporal clarification that it is not the 
referendum per se I am concerned with, but the processes leading up to them. The outcome I 
want to explain is thus not the result of the referendums, but the outcome of minority 
nationalists mobilizing for secession within in a democratic playing field. Relatedly, although 
I characterize the mobilization processes as mobilizing for secession, it is relevant to note that 
it is not the outcome of independence itself that is the primary component fueling 
mobilization. Rather, for Scotland and Catalonia the mere act of holding a referendum is a 
victory in itself (King 2012: 117). It is the opportunity for the population to decide their own 
future by themselves that constitutes the basic justification behind this sort of mobilization.  
Ultimately, it is centered around, and must be pursued via popular vote and the democratic 
rules of the game – making the concept of referendum an inevitable center-piece of my 
research question.  
It is thus the process leading up to a referendum on secession being put on the political 
agenda that is my point of focus and that I argue makes a comparative analysis of Scotland 
and Catalonia warranted. Moreover, I argue that these two cases are very rare in the sense that 
they represent processes that are new within the empirical scope of the thesis, and therefore 
also to an extent history as a whole. Democratic mobilization for secession has indeed 
unfolded earlier. Most notable are the cases of Quebec and The Basque Country, where 
referendums on the matter in both cases have been pursued. I nevertheless argue that these 
examples must be distinguished from the ones seen in Scotland and Catalonia. 
Regarding Quebec, the case is in the literature frequently referred to as one of the 
classical cases of successful minority mobilization (Keating 1997). Not only do the processes 
bear resemblance to the ones in Catalonia and Scotland, but referendums on secession have 
indeed been carried out twice. Initiated by the Parti Qubecois (PQ) and the Bloc Quebecois 
(BQ), the first one was held already in 1980, and the second one where the secession camp 
came extremely close to winning the majority of votes, was held in 1995 (Pammett and 
LeDuc 2001).  These processes were both carried out in a democratic environment initially 
coherent with the dependent variable identified above. However, the theoretical arguments 
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presented in this thesis are made within a contextual framework unique within the EU. The 
case of Quebec is thus irrelevant for my empirical domain and has not been considered in the 
case selection process. Although Quebec are part of the North American Free Trade 
Organization (NAFTA), an international regime some theorist proclaim to fundamentally 
have the same basic functions as the EU, there can be no doubt that the EU now has expanded 
its competences beyond the original goal of securing peace through economic cooperation and 
now affects the policies and the interdependency of its member states vastly. As such, the EU 
can validly be characterized as the area in the world where globalization is at its densest. This 
has opened up for a whole new playing field for minority nationalist regions to maneuver in 
which predictably involves mechanisms and interactions which hardly is relevant to the 
Quebec case. 
The Basque case of mobilization is well-known for its hostility towards the Spanish 
government and for its attempts and methods in addressing the question of separatism. The 
various terror strikes of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) throughout the end of the last century 
have received much attention. Less emphasized, however, are the legitimate and democratic 
routes Basque government officials attempted in pursuing the cause. Not only has there been 
political agreement in Basque parliament on addressing the independence question, but plans 
to hold a consultation clarifying the matter have also been proposed. Formally, the process 
was quite similar in character as in Catalonia. To get the Spanish state to recognize a right of 
self-determination of the Basques, a plan was in 2002 launched by Basque regional 
government, constituted by Basque National Party (PNV) and Eusko Alaktasuna (EA) 
(Massetti and Schakel 2013: 1). The plan, referred to as the Ibarretxe-plan
 12
, was approved 
by the regional parliament in late 2004, but rejected by the Spanish parliament the following 
year (Pérez-Nievas 2006: 47-48).
 13
 I argue, however, that there are two significant differences 
making the Basque bid for a referendum much more modest than what is the case for the 
Catalan and Scottish mobilization processes and thus incompatible with the dependent 
variable put forward above. 
First, the plan was initiated by the Basque regional government, but was mainly a 
personal initiative from president Ibarretxe. The main motivation behind the plan has been 
described as being an offer to the terrorist division of Basque nationalism, as a way to silence 
these forces. Thus, there was no particular popular demand for the initiative. This might 
                                                 
12
 The plan was put forward by Basque President Juan José Ibarretxe, of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). 
13
 The referendum was blocked after the Spanish government asked the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal to 
review the Basque referendum legislation, and Spain’s highest court found that the Autonomous Community of 
the Basque Country did not have the authority to hold a referendum  (Lecours 2011: 278). 
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explain why the plan quickly fizzled out once it was rejected by Spanish officials. Later 
Ibarretxe had to end his career as a consequence of what was perceived by the PNV-electorate 
as a political failure. 
Second, while the clear goal was achieving a new constitutional settlement (Lecours 
2011: 278), what characterized the plan and also PNV’s jargon when speaking about self-
determination in general, was its vagueness on specifics, and especially on the independence 
question (see table 1).Thus, rather than calling for a secession from Spain, the project has 
been portrayed as a challenge to the basis of Spanish state sovereignty as outlined in the 
constitution of 1978 by claiming the right for the Basques’ to vote on their relationship with 
the Spanish state (Keating and Bray 2006: 348). 
Table 1: The questions of the proposed Basque- and Catalan referendums  
The Basque questions The Catalan questions 
(1) Do you agree to supporting a process of dialogued end 
to the violence, if ETA previously declares unmistakably 
their will to end it once and for all?  
(2) Do you agree that the Basque parties, without 
exceptions, start a process of negotiation to reach a 
democratic agreement about the right to decide of the 
Basque People, and that the aforementioned agreement 
will be submitted to referendum before the end of the year 
2010? 
(1) Do you want Catalonia to be a state?   
(2) Do you want that state to be independent? 
 
The questioning in the Basque referendum was quite indirect in its nature and about 
supporting inter-party negotiations on the political future of the Basque Country so that a 
positive vote consequently could have led the Basque government presenting a proposal for 
constitutional change to the Spanish Government (Lecours 2011: 273 and 278). In the 
proposed Catalan referendum by contrast, the question phrasing has a clear secessionist 
agenda. The Basque bid for national recognition has been portrayed as an effort to formulate a 
‘third way’ between secessionism and unionism (Keating and Bray 2006), and must due to its 
vagueness on the proposed outcome be treated as a case of mobilization for increased self-rule 
within the Spanish state. 
14
 On the contrary, although as emphasized above, Catalan 
mobilization also fundamentally is based on the principle of the right to decide, the question 
                                                 
14
 “the capacity of a regional government to exercise authority autonomously over those who live in the territory 
(…) [and] refers to the authority of a regional government over those living in the region (Hooghe et al. 2010: 6 
and 13).” 
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phrasing specially addresses the issue of independence and is as such compatible with what I 
define as mobilization for secession. Thus, following Wood’s definition of secessionism there 
can be no doubt that the Catalans are mobilizing for a referendum on secession.  
2.3 Defining the empirical scope: Globalization and the EU 
I define the empirical scope relating to my research question as nation states that are members 
of the EU. In this way the two main motivating dimensions relating to what I want to explain 
can clearly be limited to a distinct set of cases. First, I am concerned with the puzzling 
phenomenon of secessionist mobilization within an advanced democratic framework. 
Although not all EU-members are vulnerable to the forces of minority nationalism, they all 
can be depicted as being advanced democracies by virtue of qualifying for the membership 
criteria. Second, on the back of the literature I argue that globalization is an imperative 
contextual feature and an important premise for explaining successful mobilization of 
minority nations within this population of cases. Globalization is here defined as “(…)a 
process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, 
technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence 
(Norris 2000: 155).” In Europe, the EU integration project has catalyzed and accelerated 
globalization effects. Consequentially, according to the KOF Index
15
, it is here we find the 
most densely globalized area on the globe (see figure 1). Although the processes of 
globalization also are relevant for minority nationalism in other parts of the world, it is the 
contextual dimensions of advanced democracy and of high degrees of globalization in 
combination that I am concerned with. This thus makes the EU a feasible empirical scope for 
the arguments put forward in the thesis. The process of integration in Europe is historically 
unique with regards to both societal intertwining and political institution-building, hence 
making the challenges globalization brings with it to the nation state and democracy 
particularly profound (Goldmann 2001: 7-8).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The KOF index of globalization is aggregated measure of globalization based on three main dimensions: 
economic, social, and political. These dimensions refer to actual economic flows, economic restrictions, data on 
information flows, data on personal contact, and, data on cultural proximity. The index runs on a scale from one 
to hundred where higher values denote greater globalization. See KOF Index (2012a) for measurement details. 
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Figure 1: Globalization index for 2012 by continent 
 
Source: (KOF Index 2012b) Notes: The graph is elaborated by the author based on aggregated index data from 
countries. 
However, it is important to note that globalization per se is not treated as an 
explanatory factor for secessionism regarding the individual cases. This is because the 
variation within the empirical scope is too small for an explanatory power to be attributed (see 
figure 2). Instead I refer to globalization, or level of globalization, as a denominator to define 
the population of my research approach. The point then is that the cases at hand together are 
subject to high levels of globalization compared to cases outside the population. I argue that 
this constitutes a specific and independent context that can contribute to understanding one 
part of the broader phenomenon of secessions.   
Figure 2: Globalization index 2015: UK and Spain 
 
Source: (KOF Index 2015) Notes: The rankings are based on the raw data from 2012. 
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In the following section I will further elaborate the more specific effects globalization, 
and more specifically the EU, has on minority nations and the nation states containing them.  
2.3.1 The impact of Globalization 
The Westphalian state-model implying that states hold absolute sovereignty over their own 
territory and domestic affairs, has for centuries been the centerpiece for our geopolitical 
understanding of the world we live in. However, for the last couple of decades the notion of 
globalization and its’ effects has ignited a debate about whether the model is obsolete and in 
need of theoretical modifications. Thus, it is central to students theorizing the notion of 
globalization, that it fosters processes which erodes the basis of existence for the nation state 
as we know it. Looking to the basic components defining the nation state emphasized above: 
territory and identity, it can be concluded that the literature basically focuses on two types of 
pressures – one to the national territorial independence, and one to the common identity 
constituting nationalism (Goldmann 2001: 74). The former refers to the functioning 
competences of the nation state. Keating portrays these pressures as being caused by an 
integrating economy and the establishment of regimes in trade, defense and politics, and the 
institutional decentralization that has been occurring in most contemporary democracies 
(Keating 2001b: 20). Pressures to national identity are not as straightforward because they 
come as a consequence of the functional pressures. Economic integration fosters expanding 
networks of interdependence that span beyond national borders and follow the increasingly 
rapid movement of ideas, money, goods, services, ecology, and people across country borders 
(Norris 2011: 25-26). Additionally, due to big business, a wave of ‘Americanization’ – the 
spreading of a global American consumer culture – is by some claimed to be eroding local 
identities (Goldmann 2001: 74; Keating 2001b: 20). Moreover, a more homogenous and a 
thriving civil society has derived from the deregulation of the economy and the 
decentralization of politics in nation states, which in turn is disintegrating the common sense 
of identity and solidarity previously sustained by a more centralized state economically and 
politically (Keating 2001b: 21). 
The diminishment of national identities is in the literature often related to the 
emergence of cosmopolitan identities. The two are considered to be theoretically oppositional. 
Contrary to nationalism, cosmopolitanism typically promotes a tolerance for diverse cultural 
outlooks and practices, values differences among humans rather than similarities, cultural 
pluralism rather than convergence, and de-emphasizes territorial ties and attachments (Norris 
2011: 26). In light of this, the emergence, or re-emergence of minority nationalism is 
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frequently described as an abnormal phenomenon contradicting the expected effects of 
globalization. Keating and McGarry (2001) disagree, and emphasize that globalization, 
instead of undermining minority nations, have brought about change that gives them the room 
and the tools to maneuver. Various international regimes (e.g. EU, NATO, and NAFTA) have 
helped reduce the risks associated with independence. International law and human rights 
have created an awareness of basic and common liberties, such as the right of self-
determination. The spread of global culture, the state’s weakening ability to redistribute 
resources, and the swift movement of capital and goods, has encourage a response from 
minority nations who fear the results of these changes. Moreover, technological advancements 
have equipped them with the tools to effectively communicate and mobilize (McGarry and 
Keating 2001: 7). As such, the dual processes of the nation state weakening, and of minority 
nations awakening, are looked upon as two natural effects of the same phenomenon. In fact, 
the former reinforces the latter. Thus, it is perfectly valid assumption that the decreasing 
functional nature of the nation state and the advancement of some notion of cosmopolitanism 
indeed cause thriving minority nations. 
The crux of this link lies perhaps in the recognition of that there is a long distance 
between the rather vague cosmopolitan culture and a cosmopolitan identity. Looking at the 
EU, where a common identity is absent and where strong local and national identities indeed 
are the prime proponents stagnating further integration, this point becomes clear. In the 
subsequent section I will highlight this aspect further by discussing how minority nations 
relate to the supranational nature of the EU.  
2.3.2 The EU and the post-sovereign state 
The European integration project has gone a long way beyond its original goal of enforcing 
peace, security and a common market in Europe (Alesina and Spolaore 2003: 203). European 
institutions have obtained, in many aspects, attributions that traditionally have been the 
domain of national governments, forcing states to relinquish powers associated with nation 
state sovereignty. The transfers of some powers to supranational institutions and the 
devolvement of others to sub-state units are often characterized as a model of multi-level 
governance (Marks 1996), where power dispersion between the EU, the member-states, and 
regions is fluid. In turn, this makes the notion of absolute sovereignty in the traditional sense, 
understood as the“(…)right for nation states to enjoy independence of others (Goldmann 
2001: 78)”, highly disputable. I identify the four spheres the traditional nation state engages 
in as spheres of security, economy, policy and culture. These spheres are feasible to apply 
26 
 
when unpacking a complex picture of actors and better illustrate the nature of the power 
dispersion flowing out from the nation state. 
The sphere of security can be divided into two dimension of external and domestic 
affairs. The former is perhaps the single most important element in sustaining a stable state 
framework. Most powers in this domain have already been transferred to other supranational 
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations 
(UN). The latter has primarily been a responsibility for the nation state. However, since the 
1990s the EU has engaged in the task of expanding its’ competences into both of these areas 
implementing the pillars of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home 
Affairs into its charters through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 (Börzel 2005). 
16
 Regarding 
the first, national defense is still primarily a matter of transnational cooperation organized 
around NATO rather than supranational institutions of the EU. However, the need for 
common policies on internal security especially due to the principle of the free flow of capital, 
goods, services and people within in the union has made the latter pillar much more 
institutionalized. With regards to agendas such as immigration, asylum, criminal prosecution 
and law enforcements, there now exists a well-established supranational framework (Börzel 
2005: 230). Additionally, in a democratic era, where a war between democracies in the 
predicted future seems very unlikely and any military action is dependent on the blessing of 
the international community, the necessity for investments in defense is limited compared to 
some decades ago when the geopolitical climate was far tenser.  
Second, we have the economic sphere, the most emphasized and thus perhaps the most 
important sphere seen in relation with Globalization. This entails global economic integration, 
the increasing mobility of capital and technology, trade flows, and, the rise of big 
transnational businesses is eroding the state framework for economic activity. The general 
argument, is that nation states are having difficulties with managing their insertions into the 
international trading order, which in turn has contributed to shift the balance between political 
power and market in favor of the latter (Keating and McGarry 2001: 3). The EU is looked 
upon as the prime proponent of these developments as it can no longer be seen solely as a 
framework for international economic cooperation, but has evolved into itself being economic 
system.  Originally started as an economic cooperation scheme between six countries 
interlocking the coal- and steel industry to make war between the European superpowers 
technically impossible, the EU has gradually evolved and institutionalized its economic role 
                                                 
16
 The structure of pillars was abandoned with the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. 
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to wide set of functions. Starting with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 a forty-year period 
followed where the European developed from a simple customs union to a single market for 
its 28 member-states (Farrows and Grindheim 2003: 60). Fundamentally, the EU-single 
marked aspires to secure the free movement of capital, goods, service and people without 
being obstructed by state borders and barriers. The principle is that an EU-citizen can study, 
live, shop, work and retire in any EU member-state (European Union 2015).  
One can look to Ohmae’s (1995) seminal work to explain the how these functional 
mechanisms play out in relation to the role of the nation state. Ohmae introduces the concept 
of the ‘borderless economy’ and neatly argues how this hardly can be compatible with the 
functioning of the nation state.  He illustrates this through pointing to the flows of the four 
‘I’s’ – investment, industry, information technology and individual consumers, which in his 
view are the components defining the global economy, or in my case, the single marked of the 
EU. While cross-border investment some decades back primarily was from government to 
government, or from multi-lateral lending agency to government, there is to today no 
geographical constraints. Because most of the money today crossing borders is private, there 
is no need for governments being involved at either end. Ohmae argues that the “(…) the 
money will go where the good opportunities are.” Industry is also massively more global in 
orientation. According to Ohmae, “(…) the strategies of modern multinational corporations 
are no longer shaped and conditioned by reasons of states but, rather, by the desire – and the 
need – to serve attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap attractive pools of resources 
wherever they sit.” The third I, information technology, has greatly facilitated the movement 
of the two abovementioned I’s. It has knocked back the obstacles of cross national 
participation, cooperation and expansion, and has made it possible for a company to operate 
in various parts of the world without having to build up business infrastructure in each of the 
countries where it has a presence. Thus, “(…) capability can reside in the network and be 
made available – virtually anywhere – as needed.” As a consequence of these first three I’s, 
the last I – individual consumers, have widened their orientation scope. With access to 
information about lifestyles, merchandise and trends all around the world, consumers are 
prone to buy products independent of their national associations. Ohmae explains that “(…) 
consumers increasingly want the best and cheapest products, no matter where they come 
from.” In sum, he underscores that it is “(…) the unfettered movement of these I’s that makes 
the role of the nation state as a middleman obsolete (Ohmae 1995: 2-5).” 
Third, in the political sphere, here delimited and referred to as the basic institutional 
framework of a political entity, the supranational features of the EU institutions have clearly 
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taken a shape resembling the characteristics of a federal state. With the simultaneous 
challenge of driving further integration and at the same time honor and accommodate the 
requirements of the now 28 sovereign member-states, the framework has taken a complex and 
unique form. Two of the main political institutions consist of a bi-cameral structure in the 
fashion of any democratic country – it has a legislature and an executive branch trough the 
European Parliament and European Commission. This is a system where powers are 
distributed from member state, primarily through common EU-elections, and is designed to be 
independent of national interests. Furthermore, the bi-cameral framework is counterbalanced 
by two additional institutions. The Council of the European Union is a second half of the 
legislative body of the EU and represents the governments of the member states. The council 
meets regularly to assess relevant political topics. The composition of the council varies 
according to the topic under consideration.  If the topic for instance is agriculture, the 28 
national ministers who are responsible for this policy area will assemble. The European 
Council is the highest meeting of the Council of the European Union and meets four times a 
year. It is constituted by the heads of state of the member states. Its main function is to outline 
the main strategic agendas of further European integration (Hix and Høyland 2011: 8-9).  
This system is subject to a huge debate concerning where the effective power of the 
EU lies, and to what extend the EU functions has general democratic entity. For my purpose it 
suffices to underscore that the political system of the union undoubtedly is transgressing the 
competencies of the national frameworks which compounds it. Effectively, this implies that 
member-states, either indirectly by a community peer-pressure, or directly through EU-
directives, more or less are forced to implement politics they in many cases would not have 
done in a non-EU context (Marks et al. 1996; Pollack 1997; Pierson 1996). 
An additional and more overarching aspect is the role of the EU as a promoter of 
democracy and human rights. As Tesón points out, “(…)it is ‘indisputable’ that human rights 
are no longer a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, and even political systems are now 
considered a matter of lawful international concern insofar as a principle of democracy is 
today part of international law (Tesón 1997: 139).”  Thus, I have above focused on how the 
EU framework directly impedes the political functions of the nation states. Another 
perspective is how the democratic political ‘culture’ of the EU indirectly shapes the political 
institutions of the member-states. Firstly, member states have to fulfill certain democratic 
criteria to be part of the union. Secondly, the general democratic playing field to certain 
degree limits the scope of action of member-states in their domestic affairs because their 
actions are under the constant surveillance of the international community. This is thus an 
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aspect limiting the scope of coercive action central governments have in dealing with tensions 
caused by minority nationalist regions. 
Fourth, perhaps mostly as consequence of the upheaval in the economic sphere, 
changes are also emerging in the cultural sphere. This, however, cannot directly be linked to 
the EU. Rather it is generally depicted as being a consequence of the process of 
‘Americanization’. In Keating’s words; “Americanization may undermine popular cultures 
and it has succeeded almost in defining mass culture. National governments fight against this 
trend with greater or lesser success (Keating 2001a: 34).” An additional aspect affecting the 
cultural sphere is migration. Multicultural challenges are being created in wake of a 
significant increase in migration, both within and between states (Keating and McGarry 2001: 
3). 
Although talks about a new global culture may be exaggerated, there can be no doubt 
that the globalization of the economy has ignited changes in certain domains of national 
cultural spheres everywhere including EU-countries. If one assesses EU-influence on the 
member-state’s cultural sphere, however, the question of a whether a common European 
culture is emerging is far more disputable. EU-integration is frequently described as suffering 
from a democratic deficit, and that this is the main obstacle for it to make further federalist 
progress. A main cause for the problem is laid on the strong national identities of the member 
states. As long as no European identity exists, or a European demos, there can hardly exist a 
European democracy. The EU has responded to this challenge through launching a number of 
institutions, programs and bodies with the goal of addressing and promoting the cultural 
dimension of European integration. The Erasmus program is perhaps the most prominent 
example. However, compared to the national culture of the member states, these initiatives are 
of course novel and modest. Whether they in time can contribute to a sense of European 
identity is yet to be seen. However, for now it must be concluded that the cultural sphere is 
where the penetration of the EU is weakest.   
2.3.2.1 Post-sovereign independence 
A puzzling question derives from the simultaneous processes of EU-integration and national 
minority mobilization. In short, some form of sovereignty is the main motivational factor for a 
secessionist movement. However, seeking to form a new state might seem paradoxical when 
globalization is eroding state-functionality and ultimately sovereignty. A natural question is 
then; if the nation state is becoming ever more redundant, what motivates forming a new state 
that once it is established will be dependent on the organizations, networks and mechanisms 
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emphasized above and thus by far will be sovereign in a the definable sense of the word? It is 
widely recognized that regions escaping dependence from the central state may entail 
increased dependence on the international market and politics (Keating 2001a: 65). For 
minority nationalists seeking secession the equation is of course not as simple as that. From 
their perspective there are two aspects to assess. First, in practical terms it may be questioned 
how real the functional reductions of nation state competences are in terms of grinding down 
its role as chief political actor. Although the worldwide trend of political decentralization and 
economic interdependency in nation states is an empirical fact, it cannot be disputed that 
nation states still are strongly recognized as the prime legitimate political authority. It is 
recognition that is the paramount objective of minority nationalists – in first instance by the 
state, and second by the international community. When based upon democratic principles 
they seek the recognition of themselves making up a distinct community that has the right to 
rule itself (Guibernau 1999: 25). In this sense the ultimate token of recognition for a group of 
people is governing their own state. Second, few progressive minority nations today aspire to 
state-sovereignty in the classical sense. As I have stated above, they recognize the effects of 
globalization and use these circumstances to strengthen and promote their cause. As such, it is 
plausible to presume that civic minority nationalist movements does not seek state 
sovereignty in the traditional sense, but rather some sort of constrained sovereignty inside a 
wider structure of authorities. Within the new opportunity structure globalization and the EU 
offers they are perhaps likely to achieve greater political autonomy within the transnational 
political institutions as region of a state, than as an independent state of its own.  
This was also a trending perception among regional parties during the heydays of 
European integration – a time when most regional parties generally were depicted as 
‘europhile’(Lynch and De Winter 2008: 603-604). A popular term during the 1980s and early 
1990s was the ‘Europe of the Regions’ which implied a vision of Europe driven by the 
empowerment of regional sub-units of the member states.  Regional actors saw developments 
such as the building of an internal market, the reform of the European Structural Funds in 
1988, several innovations contained in the Maastricht Treaty such as the creation of a 
Committee of the Regions, access for regional representatives to the Council of Ministers, and 
the principle of subsidiarity (Elias 2008: 557), as evidence that a new Europe was forming 
where the regions would be key political components (Hooghe and Marks 1996). However, 
this all changed during the course of the 1990s due to a change in direction of the integration 
project which entailed an apparent neglect of regional interest. This is a development which 
several scholars stress have reverted many regional parties into more euro-skeptical positions 
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(De Winter et al. 2006; Hepburn 2008b). Hepburn argues that according to differences in 
domestic institutional factors some regional parties view Europe as an alternative framework 
to the state for advancing their autonomy, whereas others see integrations as a threat, and 
pursue to strengthening the state to prevent Europe from infringing their competences 
(Hepburn 2008b: 552). 
Nevertheless, regardless of their positions towards the EU, minority nationalist 
mobilization does in most cases not imply a push for secession. In the few where it does, it is 
clear that the cause is framed around a notion of ‘post-sovereign’ political arrangements 
which recognizes the limitations to the nation state. Further unraveling why secessionist 
mobilization yet occurs is thus necessary.   
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CHAPTER THREE: The analytical framework 
The aim of the preceding chapter was to define a delimited empirical scope of which to 
understand secessionist mobilization. As noted, secessions in well-established democracies 
are extremely rare events. Although regionalist parties by definition are depicted by their 
claims for some of increased independence, which also frequently implies the threat of 
secessions, the challenge of even getting near to majority support for the cause is so immense 
that serious bids for secessions rarely occur. Probably because the phenomenon is so rare, 
there exists no theoretical framework that explains the systemic stability of democratic states 
(Dion 1996: 270). Hence, a general framework that precisely explains successful mobilization 
in such political contexts is also lacking.  
My approach in attempting to construct such a framework has been to scrutinize the 
general literature on secessionism and apply theoretical perspectives which I consider to be 
relevant for the empirical context at hand. This work culminates into six empirical 
expectations of which my analysis can be guided by.  
3.1 A theoretical basis for the analytical framework 
A practical point of departure is Wood’s (1981) influential attempt to deal with the 
complexity of secessionism, by introducing a general sketch for how the movements 
representing it should be analyzed. Although his account perhaps is too general to be directly 
applicable on specific cases and thus stands as convincing assessment of the problem rather 
than a solution to it, he nevertheless offers compelling insights with regards to how the 
phenomenon should be approached and which agendas that should be focused upon. 
Fundamentally, Wood stresses that secessionism should be treated as a process rather than as 
a condition. This entails that the analysis should “(…)focus on the dynamic interaction and 
the cumulative effect of a number of conditions and developments which may or may not lead 
to a secessionist outcome (Wood 1981: 109).” This argument is fruitful for the research 
approach presented in this thesis, which seek to explain why secessionist mobilization has 
succeeded in Scotland and Catalonia whereas it has not gained the same momentum in cases 
with similar potential. Wood suggests that an analysis on secessionist, or potentially 
secessionist movements, should focus on five aspects (Wood 1981: 109):  
(1)The preconditions of secessions: that is the conditions for which the secessionist alienation 
emerged in the first place.  
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(2) The rise of secessionist movements: that is how the movement established itself and how 
the goal of sovereign independence has been pursued. For my purpose this agenda is concerns 
the factors that have caused the tip-over from an autonomist agenda on to a secessionist path 
in Scotland and Catalonia. 
(3) The response of central government: that is how the state has responded to the secessionist 
claims, in preventing the movement to gain support and, above all, in maintaining the 
integrity of the state.  
(4)The direct precipitants of secession: that is the confrontational developments between the 
state and region which lead to the manifested conflict.  
(5)The resolution of secessionist crises by armed conflict: it must be noted that this last point 
is relevant for a contemporary context prior to the proliferation of minority nationalist 
movements across European democracies and thus does not appear to be directly relevant for 
my analysis. I argue that the very absence of a potentially armed conflict is an important 
element of democratic secessions in so far as it contributes to make these movements flourish. 
Moreover, it is not the resolution, or the outcome, of the process I am concerned with, but 
how and why the “crisis” arises. Nevertheless, as stated by Wood, the agenda refers to 
“(…)domestic and international factors affecting the outcome (Wood 1981: 109)”, and can in 
this sense be applied to the different stakeholders that have interests in affecting the outcome 
of the process and who for that reason will be directly involved. Most notably this implies the 
EU as an external actor which has great influence on the debates in Scotland and Catalonia. 
Moreover, the explanatory factors examined in assessing secessionism are usually 
sorted into a cultural, economic and political dimension of minority nationalist mobilization 
(Keating 2001b:25). It is in between these dimensions my empirical focus will be centered.  
3.2 Remote and proximate factors 
To fully comprehend minority nationalist movements, and in my case explain why certain 
movements move on to a path of secessionism, one must examine both the origin of the 
movement and the nature of its demands. These will of course be intertwined, but one cannot 
be explained without explaining the other. Building on the agenda of Wood (1981) they key is 
thus to identify the basis of the movement, and then examine how this interplay with the 
factors triggering the tip over on the secessionist course.  A feasible technique for singling out 
and structuring variables in this vein, is by introducing and utilizing the concepts of remote 
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and proximate factors. These concepts are for my purpose extracted from qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987). However, it is worth noting that the 
methodological relationship between QCA and this thesis ends there. Schneider and 
Wagemann (2006) states that remote factors are referred to as structural, or contextual factors. 
They are relatively stable over time, and their origin is often also remote on the time and/or 
space dimension from the outcome to be explained. Remote factors are therefore nearly 
completely outside the reach of the conscious influence of contemporary actors. Thus, in 
relationship to the actors, context and historical legacies are treated exogenously.  Proximate 
factors vary over time, and more importantly, are susceptible to changes introduced by actors. 
They do not originate from the distant past, but are subjects of actions by human agency, if 
not by human action itself. Moreover, being closer connected in time and space, proximate 
factors are more closely linked to the outcome being explained (Schneider and Wagemann 
2006: 760).  
The remote and proximate factors are useful primarily for two purposes. First, clearly 
distinguishing between structural and triggering factors in this sense is helpful in defining my 
research approach in comparison to others. In political science it can indeed be very difficult 
to establish whether essential variables are structural or subject to the direct influence of 
actors. Political institutions are perhaps the most prominent examples of this. Simply stated, 
one can claim that policy outcomes are the product of two factors – the preference of the 
actors involved and the prevailing institutions (Tsebelis 2002: 17). All institutions are at one 
point a consequence of the actions of actors; however the same institutions can at present be 
well beyond the reach of contemporary actors. Whether to treat the institutions as proximate 
or remote will therefore depend on factors such as the research design, the research question 
or how the dependent variable is framed. Hence, it is possible that institutions are seen as 
remote factors in one study and are perceived as proximate in another (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2006: 760). 
Second, having sorted out the remote and proximate factors, the premises for the 
further analysis should be clear, and the clear distinction between the dimensions of origin 
and outcome should make the task of convincingly explain how they interplay much easier.   
3.3 Theoretical expectations  
Inspired by the analytical sketch of Wood, the analytical framework presented below 
emphasizes six agendas which aim to capture the dynamic process of democratic secessionist 
mobilization; (1) a strong national identity, (2) the viability of the proposed state, (3) a 
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dissatisfaction with the central government, (4) popular democratic support, (5) response of 
the central government, and, (6) the role of the EU. These have been articulated into 
preliminary expectations which each contain a theoretical elaboration. The former two 
expectations can be regarded to reflect the remote factors as outlined above. In that sense they 
can be looked upon as preconditions that are necessary to be present in order for the 
proximate factors to emerge. Correspondingly, the latter four expectations reflect the 
proximate dimension of secessionist mobilization. Expectations number three and four are 
where the factors which tip over the political discourse to a secessionist path are found. The 
fifth and sixth expectation is linked to the resolution of the secessionist conflict. However, as 
my thesis is not concerned with the outcome, these expectations must rather be seen as 
reflecting the factors that contributes to manifesting the conflict – that is the part of the 
process where it calls for reactions, both internally by the state, and externally by the 
international community.    
3.3.1 Regional identity 
(1) Successful democratic mobilization for secession presupposes that there exists a strong 
form of regional identity. 
The first theoretical expectation relates to the pre-conditions of secessionism emphasized by 
Wood (1981). Self-evidently this aspect is vital part of minority nationalist mobilization. 
Without the perception of a collective self, there can be no self-determination, let alone self-
government (Jolly 2005). Identity can be defined a as a sense of belonging to a distinct group 
sharing a set of common values. Exactly what these values are, and what they are based upon, 
however, has proved more difficult to pin down theoretically, and can vary a great deal from 
community to community.  
What is clear is that that national identity is strongly linked to culture where the two 
concepts are frequently used interchangeably in the literature. The three main traditional 
identity markers on the cultural dimension in the literature is history of independence, 
language, and religion. These three cultural determinants have proven their relevance because 
they are relatively easy to operationalize on a vague concept. The two former have been 
described as constituting the ‘base model’ secessionism (Sorens 2005: 309). Religion, 
however, has weakened as a relevant political cleavage over the past generations in the 
advanced democracies of Europe (Dalton 1996: 319). Political demands based on religion 
have thus naturally also lessened significantly in the political discourse in minority nations. 
Even in Northern Ireland where the religious backdrop for decades has influenced the 
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academic debate over regional identity, it has now become the prevailing view that religion 
only plays a minor part. It is generally thought of as simply a social marker and a symbol of 
difference that by itself is insignificant for explaining minority nationalist mobilization 
(Mitchell 2006: 1-2).  
The history of independence is often a vital part of the myth that constitutes many 
minority national identities in the first place. Such historical myths contribute to reinforce 
minority nationalism by providing it with a clear reference to the combination of identity and 
territory which I have argued constitutes nationalism. It has also directly been linked with the 
evolution of civic nationalism (Sorens 2005: 309). The idea is that having experience with 
being a state of its own, and having practiced challenges dealing with and accommodating a 
plurality of people, constitutes a basis for a civic orientation. However, taking into account a 
democratic political context where borders are interlocked on the basis of mutual recognition 
through international law, it is difficult to treat history of independence as a basis for political 
demands per se. As the political borders of Europe always has been a subject of alternations 
and modifications, few would today claim that legitimate demands of independence can be 
made on the back of earlier, and in most cases historically distant, political configurations. 
Regardless, Scotland and Catalonia both have a history independence which today plays an 
important part of legitimizing themselves as being nations, and not merely regions.  
Language is perhaps the sole most important ingredient of nationalism and most 
nations are today tied together at least to certain extend by a common language. It is therefore 
no surprise that language, being closely linked to culture, also is among the strongest 
predictors of strong minority nationalist identities (Fitjar 2010: 523). Thus, demands on the 
cultural dimension of minority nationalism have mainly been focused on language, where this 
is seen as endangered to disappearing or downgraded to low-status uses (Keating 2001b: 25). 
With reference to the aspect, Catalan identity is arch-typical. Although nationalism in 
Catalonia is complex, and encompasses a wide range of traditions covering multiple social 
bases (Keating 2001a: 151), language is indisputably the factor fundamentally constituting the 
core of its identity today. Especially in the democratic era, following almost 40 years of 
suppression of Catalan culture and language under the Franco-regime, has the promotion and 
the restoration of the Catalan language been a main concern in the nation-building project 
(Guibernau 2013: 374). Thus, a-long-side of a history of independence, language can be 
depicted as the most important factor in understanding Catalan identity where the struggle for 
recognition by the Spanish state is an imperative aspect. By carving and clarifying the 
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, it triggers and reinforces the very essence of identity.  
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In the Scottish case the nation-status has never been contested by the British 
government, and their status as a nation is formally recognized. They entered the UK as an act 
of unionism in 1707, and in many respects as a fully functional state. This makes the Scottish 
case one of the least disputed examples of minority nationalism (Leruez 1983). Striving for 
recognition has thus never been relevant for the Scottish nationalism. Moreover, and perhaps 
because of this recognition, language plays a minimal part of Scottish Identity ,where English 
for long has been the dominant language. Scottish identity is therefore instead frequently 
linked to a dimension combining social, economic and political aspects. Scottish national 
identity as such, is grounded in more practical claims about institutions, accountability and 
policy (Keating 2001a: 221). These are claims that are based in a common perception of being 
more democratic, oriented towards social solidarity and in general more egalitarian. It thus 
opposes British identity which is associated with a political conservatism based on 
individualistic values. Relatedly, the Scots feel politically locked into a system which holds 
back the potential for Scotland to prosper according to its true values (Keating 2001a: 210, 
222). Theoretically then, perhaps Scottish nationalism best is linked to what Wood (1981) 
refers to as the social pre-conditions of secessionism. He describes this as “(…) the original 
circumstances which created social relationships among various territorially-based ethnic 
groups and the original perception of the roles to be played by each in a society (Wood 1981: 
115-116).” This social dimension has a clear link to and is reinforced by a history of 
independence as it often reflects a relationship of segmentation with 
superordinate/subordinate statues which dates from a past conquest or colonial past 
(Lieberson 1961). Although Scottish entry into the Union does not represent conquest or 
colonialism directly, the superordinate/subordinate relationship with the UK-superpower is 
highly relevant. Thus, there may be latent grievances that later may be nursed when linked to 
the distribution of public goods that is perceived as unjust, and in turn provide much of the 
driving force behind later secessionist attempts (Wood 1981: 115-116).  
Scottish and Catalan nationalism can thus be traced to quite different basic 
determinants. What they have in common, obviously, is that they both represent an identity 
which is clearly different from the British and Spanish, but more importantly that this identity 
has a broad popular appeal. De Winter introduces the proxy of feeling of belonging as an 
empirical measure of the sentiments representing the cultural dimension of minority 
nationalism (De Winter 1998: 216). Several surveys have been carried out investigating these 
sentiments with relation to minority nationalism through surveys based on the Moreno-
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question
17
 where respondents are asked to express their feelings of self-identification on a 
scale containing relevant categories.
18
 Such surveys have led to the academic terms ‘dual 
identity’ or ‘compound nationality’ (Moreno 2006: 6) which often are used to describe the 
nature of national identity in Scotland and Catalonia.
19
 Furthermore, this can be linked to the 
notion of political demos in bridging identity with political support for minority nationalist 
claims.  Demos can in that respect be understood as the political center of which a community 
serves its loyalty.  
I have in this section drawn attention on the literature of the cultural dimension of 
minority nationalism. It is in this dimension the factors fundamentally constituting the essence 
of minority nationalist identity can be found, factors which thus represents the pre-conditions 
for secessionist mobilization. From this I expect that a strong sense of national identity is a 
necessary cause for secessionist mobilization and that factors triggering the tip over to a 
secessionist path can be traced to these origins.    
3.3.2 The viability of the independence project 
(2) Successful democratic mobilization presupposes that the proposed new state is perceived 
as viable.  
The next issue I will treat as a presupposition to secessionist mobilization is the perceived 
viability of the region as an independent state. Theoretically, the expectation is attached to 
two dimensions. First, there is the economic dimension; that implies that the region can 
sustain itself as an independent state. Second, there is the geographical dimension; that 
implies the territory that is proposing to secede is agreed upon and defined.   
3.3.2.1 Economic deprivation of the rich  
The ‘theory of relative economic deprivation’ is a generic term referring to scholarly 
contributions focusing on economic differences between center and periphery in order to 
explain minority nationalist mobilization. This is a popular approach within in the field of 
research on minority – and for good reason. Indeed, it is a central aspect of explaining 
grievances among minority nations. As pointed out by Alesina and colleagues (1995);  
“Fiscal issues in general and redistributive issues in particular are important determinants of 
decisions concerning secessions, confederations and border re-drawing. In fact, the definition 
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 First conducted by Professor Luis Moreno in 1986. 
18
 Example of categories for Moreno-question: 1.Scottish, not British 2.More Scottish than British 3.Equally 
Scottish and British 4.More British than Scottish 5.British, not Scottish. 
19
 See (Gagnon 2009: 28; Keating 2001a: 160).  
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of borders and the political mechanisms which lead to fiscal decisions within given borders 
greatly influences the final distribution of the fiscal burden and of the fiscal benefits (Alesina 
et al. 1995: 752).”  
In addition, as Wood (1981) points out that economic disadvantages very often are tied 
to other preconditions for secessionism, for example ethnicity. Secessionists believe they are 
being denied their rightful share of materiel benefits by some alien group and that they will 
gain through secession (Wood 1981: 118). 
It was earlier believed that secessionist mobilization is most common among 
‘backward groups in backward regions’. These cases are referred to as ‘early seceders’, in so 
far as they rapidly conclude that they have little benefit in preserving the undivided state of 
which they are part of and that they often pursue secession rather shortly after the rejection of 
the claims they advanced. Secessionism among ‘advanced groups in advanced regions’ were 
on the contrary portrayed as rare. Although they are likely to have economic grievances 
because they usually generate more income and contribute more revenue to the state than they 
get back and thus see themselves as subsidizing poorer regions, the benefits of being rich in a 
state framework at the same time counterweighs these incentives – hence making these 
instances of secessionism rare (Horowitz 1985: 236 and 249-250). However, more recently 
and in the context of advanced democracies such claims have been widely criticized. Sorens 
(2005), for example, turns the table and claims that regions that receive more in expenditures 
than what they contribute with in taxes are “poor ground for secessionism,” because this 
implies relinquishing subsidies. Conversely, when a region looks upon itself as a ‘net loser’ 
within the Union, it is likely to present demands for fiscal autonomy and as a next step 
possibly secession it these demands are not met (Sorens 2005: 310). The view of rich regions 
as the most likely seceders can be seen in relation to the deepening of democracy in Europe – 
referring both to expansion of democratic regimes and the further decentralization of already 
consolidated democracies over the past decades. Since the ideological political goals in most 
cases have been reached, or at least have come a lot closer, the focus of minority nationalist 
actors are rather centered on the catalyst of most politics – namely economy.  Or put in 
another way, when participation has been granted, pursuing prosperity becomes a natural next 
step.  
Sambanis and Milanovic (2014) argue that regional demands for self-determination is 
dependent on the likely costs of policy autonomy. Their logic is that because self-
determination involves the production of costly public goods, richer groups or regions are 
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more likely to make such demands because they can afford to cover the costs. They find that 
richer, more populous, and, more resource-endowed regions are more likely to enjoy higher 
degrees of autonomy. This is because of their relative power compared with other regions in 
the country gives them the opportunity to advance more credible threats of exiting. Brancati  
(2014) argues that the advantages of economic integration not are sufficiently uniform across 
cases nor substantial enough for most regions to provide themselves with the defense structure 
necessary to sustain an independent state. Her argument implies that secessionist mobilization 
is reserved to cases with strong independent economies. Thus, resources are important; either 
they are human resources in the form of business or special competences, or natural 
resources. Both sorts are of significance if they are perceived to be exploited by the central 
government. While the former relates to exploitation of regional resources in the form of 
disadvantageous policies hampering regional development, the latter refers to valuable natural 
resources which minority nationalists perceive to not get a fair share of. The typical example 
of the latter is the discovery of North Seal-oil in Scottish waters, which boosted nationalism is 
Scotland as it paved way for the vision of a economically viable independent Scottish state 
(De Winter 1998: 221). Thus, the probability of secession increases when ‘outsiders’ are 
perceived to extract ‘local’ resources without sharing the wealth (Le Billon 2001: 574).   
3.3.2.2 Territorially separable unit     
Geography is an essential premise for the very existence of minority nationalism, and thus an 
element with little variation across cases. Generally speaking and in light of fundamental 
center-periphery theories
20
, the crux in presupposing the emergence of minority nationalism 
lies in the very tension between the center and the periphery. Without some degree of this 
tension, minority nationalism would simply not exist. It is therefore taken for granted that a 
national minority operates in some sort of geographical periphery. However, this territorial 
periphery does not necessarily coincide with formally established and recognized border 
drawings. Naturally, however, if secession is to be perceived as preferable it must be 
practically realistic. Looking at various minority nationalist groups in Europe the concurrence 
between political ideology and goals, and the formal territory in which this is being pursued, 
is always obvious. Many minority nations’ territorial claims cross regional borders, and some 
cases even national borders. I argue that for a secessionist project to be perceived as 
territorially viable it necessitates that the project is linked to a separable area which also 
contains the main part of the potentially secessionist group (Wood 1981: 121). From this it 
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 For an introduction of the basic center-periphery theory of Stein Rokkan, see: (Flora et al. 1999). 
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follows that the secessionist project is based in a common agreement of what the seceding 
territory in practice is.   
3.3.3 Dissatisfaction with state-wide politics   
(3) Successful democratic mobilization presupposes a political dissatisfaction with central 
government and the state-wide parties representing them. 
In a modern European democratic context, which depending on the necessity to appease 
heterogenic tensions, decentralization is practically by definition a characteristic feature. Gurr 
(2000) identifies two important principles behind what he refers to as regime of managed 
ethnic heterogeneity
21
 of which basically all European democracies have implemented. The 
first is the recognition and active protection of the rights of minority peoples including 
freedom from discrimination based or race, national origin, language, or religion (Gurr 2000: 
277-278). The second principle comes as a consequence of the first; the right of national 
peoples to exercise some extent of autonomy within the existing state to govern their own 
affairs. Following these principles it is today widely recognized that by integrating- and 
responding positively to demands of minorities, secessionist tendencies are best prevented. In 
practice this is done through some sort of decentralizing or power-sharing arrangement which, 
at least intuitively, should discourage potentially secessionist groups by making them feel 
confident of representation and protections of their most vital concerns (Lustick et al. 2004: 
209-210).  However, scholars have also pointed out that such arrangements have proved to 
have varying degree of success across countries. This gave leeway for academic terms such as 
the paradox of federalization (Erk and Anderson 2009) or the empowerment versus 
accommodation thesis (Massetti and Schakel 2013), to be born. By decentralizing central 
governments are strengthening regional parties through granting them the opportunities to win 
elections in regional legislatures and influence policy. Furthermore, it grants regional parties 
the potential to increase ethnic conflict by reinforcing regionally based ethnic identities and 
mobilize to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism (Brancati 2006: 652-653), or even 
create and ignite conflict between center and region that might otherwise not exist (Erk and 
Anderson 2009: 192).  
Theoretically, this can be linked to the territorial cleavage approach. The core of 
territorial cleavage theory lies in sociological approaches which explain dissimilarity of party 
systems derived from territorial cleavages being politicized (Lijphart 1977). Thus, with 
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 Used as shorthand for a number of doctrines and practices to mitigate conflict. 
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decentralization territorial cleavages are given the potential for being exploited. Hence, an 
incentive for parties in the regional arena to deviate their politics from the statewide parties is 
created. Discontent with statewide policies and parties can thus be expressed (Maddens and 
Libbrecht 2009). In sum, when regional elections are held in regions with distinctive 
territorial identities, voters are more likely to disconnect themselves from the national arena 
and make different choices in the regional arena (Jeffery and Hough 2009). This is especially 
the case when a distinctive identity is mobilized by a regional party (Dandoy and Schakel 
2013: 15), as opposed to regional branch of a statewide party.  
The authority exercised by regional government is portrayed to be a key institutional 
factor capable of influencing regional electorates and regional party strategies (Swenden 
2006). In the Scottish and Catalan case where regional authority is relatively powerful the 
politicization of territorial cleavages and party-competition between statewide parties and 
regional parties at the regional level is an important element. In the Scottish case, I will in the 
analysis emphasize the decline of the Scottish Labour Party as an imperative factor in 
explaining the progress of the SNP. In the Catalan case, I will show how the secessionist 
movement above all is derived from a general dissatisfaction with the Spanish government, 
but also how the performances of the two main statewide parties in Spain, Partido Popular 
(PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in Catalonia can be linked to 
secessionist movement.  
3.3.4 Popular support of the secessionist project 
(4) Successful democratic mobilization presupposes an increased popular support for the 
secessionist project. 
Hechter (1992) holds that secession can be thought of as a comprising two elements: first, that 
the population of the seceding territory must make a collective decision to secede; second, 
that the government of the host-state must make a collective decision that the net cost of 
letting the territory go is negative (Hechter 1992: 267). In a democracy, both elements are 
unlikely to occur. Thus, the two occurring in combination have proved extremely rare. 
Regarding the first element, few central governments find it feasible to cede a piece of land 
and will, as in the Catalan case, brand any secessionist attempt as unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, given that the central government, in fact, is willing to relinquish territory, the 
element of collective decision implies that a majority of the people within the potentially 
seceding region votes for it in an election dealing with the issue. As I touched upon in the 
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preceding chapter rallying that kind of support for the project is extremely difficult and is 
probably the main reason for why secessions never have occurred in well-established 
democracies. Dion has theorized the difficulty of attaining the majority support needed to 
carry out a secessionist project by pointing to the antithetical effects of fear and confidence. 
Fear he explains as the “(…) sense among members of a regional group that their cultural, 
economic or political situation will deteriorate within the existing union.” Confidence he 
describes “(…) as the sense among the group that it can perform better on its own and that 
secession is not too risky.” Because high degrees of fear and confidence are unlikely to exist 
simultaneously in a modern democracy with a plurality of preferences, he argues that 
secessions in this context are highly improbable (Dion 1996: 271-272). Thus, because of the 
contrary effects of fear and confidence, secessionist leaders face an extremely difficult task in 
advancing and getting broad support for the secessionist cause. 
 In the case of Scotland and Catalonia support for independence proves persistently 
stable over the latter decades; hovering around thirty percent in Scotland, and between fifteen 
and twenty percent in Catalonia. In both cases the issue of independence has of course always 
been present in the political discourse, but representing a clear minority, and thus not have 
been a priority on the political agenda. In both cases has increased regional powers within a 
state framework been the main target for the nationalist camps.  In a historical perspective, it 
is thus not until very recently the figures have shown a sharp increase in support for secession 
– a support that in both cases came very close to the majority threshold of 50 percent. Thus, a 
central aim in explaining minority nationalist mobilization is to unpack the factors triggering 
the substantial jump in popular support. Dion’s dichotomy can in these terms be a good 
theoretical point of departure for doing this.  
3.3.4.1 Support-boosting catalysts  
From a theoretical perspective it can be concluded that the existence of a strong nationalist 
minority identity not is sufficient to explain broad support for independence in a democratic 
playing field. Thus, to boost support some sort of short-term catalysts are likely to be 
necessary. Such catalysts are of course difficult to pre-specify, as they unfold within an 
internally unique context. It is such factors Wood refers to as the precipitants of secessionism; 
that is, the factors accelerating a push to the point of no return – or “(…)where the 
secessionist attempt is actually carried out (Wood 1981: 128).” Dion suggests such unusual 
conditions for example can be; a charismatic and a clever secessionist leadership facing weak 
and divided pro-union forces, a period of confusion, or the unexpected acrimony of 
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constitutional negotiations. This can be looked upon as a source of fear or confidence, either it 
is cultural, economic or political, that suddenly emerges at the top of the political agenda, to 
the point that fear-confidence antithetical effects are overcome (Dion 1996: 275). It follows 
from this that popular support for secession must transcend traditional political cleavages and 
appeal to a broad spectrum of political preferences. In the Catalan case, I expect such catalysts 
to be of vital importance as Catalan nationalism must be viewed as a response to the lacking 
recognition from the Spanish central government. As I will show in the analysis, the 
secessionist mobilization process in Catalonia can be traced to a handful of specific events 
that represents the ‘last straw’ in a long lasting state of grievance. These events spurred the 
nationalist project over from an autonomist trajectory and on to a secessionist pathway.  
In the Scottish case, where clear grievances are much less visible and explicit, linking 
the secessionist mobilization process to critical events is more complicated. As opposed to the 
Catalan case, where the secessionist movement can be seen as political response to popular 
demands, the Scottish case is strongly linked to the electoral success of one party – the SNP. 
However, as the analysis will further emphasize, their electoral success did not come because 
of their secessionist agenda, but rather despite of it. The SNP did extraordinarily well as a 
governing party in Scotland which granted them the opportunity to form a majority 
government. They then used their favorable political position to put the secessionist issue on 
the agenda, which in turn kicked-off a debate that increased support for independence quite 
drastically.  
3.3.4.2 Evolution of regional parties    
The Scottish case is perhaps then better seen in relation to a theoretical perspective that 
emphasizes the evolution of regional parties from niche parties to catch-all parties. This 
implies that regional parties today should have a catch-all profile within its domain in order to 
be electorally successful, and must then move beyond the terms defining niche parties. 
Harmel and Svåsand (1993) present three phases for, what they refer to as, ‘entrepreneurial 
issue parties’ on the path from birth to institutionalization. These are the phases of 
identification, organization, and stabilization. Regional parties have historically often been 
characterized by the importance of their leadership, spearheaded by a charismatic figure – 
indeed a typical trademark of niche parties. In fact, most regionalist parties have been led by a 
single charismatic leader, who often, either solely or amongst others, was the founding father 
of the party. This is important for the first phase in establishing and effectively 
communicating the party’s message. In phase two, which often implies that the reign of the 
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charismatic leader is coming to an end, the strong leadership resource might become a 
problem. The new leadership is often less charismatic and may have different approaches, 
objectives and tactics which might involve a setback for the party. However, if the party by 
that time has made it into the second or third phase, and thus is organized and stabilized, it 
can electorally survive the leadership alternations (De Winter 1998: 222-223). Although 
Harmel and Svåsand’s phases may reflect a general trend in the developments of regional 
parties all together, there are of course substantial differences in how successful these parties 
are in playing out this party role. I thus argue that the professionalization and the 
institutionalization of the SNP are particularly significant factors in explaining Scottish 
secessionist mobilization.  
3.3.4.3 Civic nationalism – the issue of immigration   
Nearly all nationalist movements have moved from a doctrine of ethnic particularism to a 
civic discourse based on territorial nationalism which explicitly includes all citizens 
inhabiting the territory as members of the nation (Keating 2001b: 28). The civic discourse is 
of course important in broadening the electoral potential for regional parties. An aspect which 
underscores this point is the issue of immigration. The question of to what extent immigration 
weakens national identities has been widely covered in academic circles, however, it has been 
much less emphasized concerning minority national identities. This is somewhat surprising as 
the issue of immigration should be particularly relevant for such identities given their links to 
ethnicity. In theory, immigration may be thought of as a direct peril to minority nationalism, 
as it has the potential to water down the cultural and linguistic basis of national minorities. It 
may thus upset the historic balances between the regional minority and the majority in the 
country as a whole, and in turn affect the potential for nationalist mobilization (Banting and 
Soroka 2012: 157). On the other hand, another theoretical assessment is that, rather than being 
a peril to regional identity, immigration might contribute to strengthening of the regional 
culture vis-à-vis the majority culture of the state. Minority nationalities with big flows of 
foreign immigration might for instance view themselves as cosmopolitan melting pots, and in 
this way produce an identity opposing the one of the state (Fitjar 2010: 527). The empirical 
research on the matter underpins the dilemma national minorities’ face. Hepburn (2009b) 
argues that the way regionalist parties use the element of immigration, and link this to their 
territorial projects, varies substantially from country to country. She points to Catalonia and 
Scotland, to illustrate that “(…) some parties have welcomed immigration as a way of 
boosting their economies and expanding and diversifying national population.” In contrast, in 
46 
 
Bavaria and Northern-Italy the parties have “(…) rejected immigration as a threat to the 
labor market, and argue that it will undermine and fragment the national community 
(Hepburn 2009b: 22).” From this it should be further explored to what extent the 
accommodation of immigrants plays a part in explaining the increased support for secession 
in Scotland and Catalonia.  
3.3.5. Response of central government 
(5) Successful democratic mobilization presupposes a reaction from the central government.  
As spelled out by Wood; “(…)despite propitious preconditions for secession and the 
successful rise of a secessionist movement, the central government’s response will have an 
important, possibly conclusive effect on the outcome of a secessionist attempt (Wood 1981: 
125).” Theoretical accounts generally emphasize that central governments have two basic 
options in responding to a secessionist threat. One is through coercive repression. The other is 
through assimilation, which most often implies an attempt to rebuild the state in a manner that 
more fully recognizes existing plural division trough constitutional reform (Wood 1981: 125-
126; Hechter 1992; Lijphart 1977). In a well-established democratic framework the latter is in 
sense already implemented through devolved political arrangements and coercive repression 
is hardly an applicable reaction in a democratic context. Moreover, the abovementioned 
theoretical accounts assess government response with an emphasis on how secessionist 
conflicts are resolved. From my analytical perspective the question is how the government 
response affects secessionist mobilization. With regards to this, the Scottish case and the 
Catalan case are fundamentally different. While the British government reacted in a 
cooperative fashion which ensured that a referendum settling the conflict was carried out, the 
Spanish response has, at least from a Catalan perspective, been highly adverse and applying a 
categorical and rigid interpretation of the Spanish constitution. I will in the analysis argue that 
both reactions have instigated secessionist demands. In the Scottish case it provided an arena 
for the secessionist mobilization to flourish. In the Catalan case it further fueled an already 
tense situation.     
3.3.6 Perception of the EU 
(6) Successful democratic mobilization presupposes a general perception of the EU as an 
ally. 
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Another expectation that needs to be pursued is the role of the EU in shaping the agenda of 
regional parties. This is important primarily for two reasons. First, the EU as an integration 
project has greatly influenced the very identity and ideology of regional parties. Second, as 
emphasized in the previous chapter, the EU represents a political backdrop which regional 
parties have to relate to and interact with in one way or another in order to be successful in 
pursuing their goals. What the EU essentially is, or by political actors, the public, and scholars 
is viewed to be, has shifted substantially over the course of the latter seven decades. 
Historically, the integration process has reached several milestones, which have transformed 
the original economic imperatives of the ‘European Economic Community’ into a ‘European 
Union’ much more politically focused (Farrows and Grindheim 2003). Theoretically, the 
academic debate was for long largely centered on the dichotomous camps of neofunctionalists 
and intergovernmentalists which sprung out from the initial working of Stanley Hoffman and 
Ernst Haas. While neofunctionalism theorize EU integration as a gradual and self-sustaining 
process, intergovernmentalism emphasize the persistent role of national governments as 
catalyzers of integration (Pollack 2001: 222). In the wake of this, and as the EU gradually has 
expanded its competences, these theoretical camps have developed and fragmented into a 
rather large array of different approaches, 
22
 which Pollack argues generally has established a 
new and redefined dichotomy of what he refers to as the rational and constructivist school. 
23
 
For my purpose it is interesting to assess how these basic views on the EU correspond 
to the identity of regional parties. Keating (2001c) has argued that the EU first and foremost is 
an external support system for minority nationalist regions. Nagel (2004) expands on this by 
stating that the EU-integration itself is of secondary concern to regional parties, and that their 
success primarily depends on their ability to mobilize at home. The influence of the EU on 
regions thus varies according to this ability. The EU, then, is more of symbolic value – 
however an important one. Independence, for example, becomes more attractive if the 
economic and social costs seem lower inside the EU (Nagel 2004: 75). A basic question is 
thus whether regional parties view the EU as positive or negative in the sense that it indeed is 
a process towards something like a ‘United states of Europe’, or if it’s doomed to remain 
essentially as nothing more than a refined framework of transnational cooperation. Corollary, 
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Governance theory (See Hooghe and Marks 1996), and Rational-choice institutionalism (See Garrett and 
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 The former depict “(…) European institutions as the products of conscious Member State design”. The latter 
“(…)posit a more profound role for EU institutions in socializing and constituting the actors within them 
(Pollack 2001: 237).” 
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it raises the question of whether the EU is looked upon as an ally or an enemy of regional 
parties – an ally decreasing the necessity for traditional large states, and making smaller more 
homogenous states more viably, or an another foreign enemy encroaching on local 
sovereignty and identity (Jolly 2007: 110). This is an important aspect of secessionist 
mobilization because it sets the terms of what kind of world successfully seceded states 
expect to enter. As the EU to date never has been faced with the challenge, the empirical 
evidence relating to how it in fact will respond to a territory of a member state seceding is 
scarce. In the debates unfolding in Catalonia and Scotland, the EU generally took a passive 
stance and referred to the matter as a domestic affair up to the respective member states to sort 
out. However, and rather surprisingly, the European Commission President at the time, Jose 
Manuel Barroso, in an interview stated that it would be “(…)extremely difficult, if not 
impossible (BBC News 2014c)”, for an independent Scotland to join the EU. 
Whether Barroso’s statements reflect the attitudes of the EU as a political actor is of 
course difficult to assess, but they nonetheless highlight the practical complexity and 
uncertainty the electorate in secessionist regions face. It is therefore relevant in the analysis to 
assess to what extent the perceptions of EU as a positive or negative force affects general 
support for the secessionist projects.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Methodology  
The purpose of this study is to explain Scotland’s and Catalonia’s shift from mobilizing for 
autonomy within the state framework to secession. This is a complex task containing various 
research routes and a large array of potential explanation factors. The research design I have 
chosen, which I believe will best function to achieve the aims set for the thesis, is a multiple 
case study. In the following chapter I will present the research design in greater detail and 
elaborate on the underlying justifications and priorities made in choosing this methodological 
approach. I will also evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the research design.  
4.1 The tradeoff between qualitative and quantitative research 
Quantitative research approaches are typically praised for having the ability to analyze several 
variables across numerous cases. Qualitative approaches on the other hand are generally 
described for their advantages in treating one or a few cases in a thorough and holistic 
manner. The everlasting and at times heated debate between the two methodological camps is 
originated in the tradeoff between generalizability and complexity. As Ragin (1987) points 
out: 
“The goal of most comparative social science is to produce explanations of 
macrosocial phenomena that are general but also show an appreciation of complexity. 
This, generality and complexity often compete with each other, even in a single study. 
An appreciation of complexity sacrifices generality; an emphasis on generality 
encourages a neglect of complexity. It is difficult to have both (Ragin 1987: 54).”  
Furthermore, Ragin describes the quantitative approach as predominantly being 
variable-oriented, while the qualitative approach is case-oriented. While the former 
approaches by nature are defined by the utilization of well-established formalized statistical 
methods, the qualitative methods are far less standardized and rigid in their application. Their 
research designs can, as opposed to what the predominant view often suggests, be either 
qualitative or quantitative, or a mix. Furthermore, the case-oriented method tends to be 
centered on evidence, while the variable-oriented strategy is first and foremost centered on 
theory (Ragin 1987: 53). This opens up for another distinction between the quantitative and 
qualitative approach; namely, that the former typically is hypothesis testing and thus 
deductive in nature, while the latter is hypothesis generating and inductive (Gerring 2007: 39). 
This is an important distinction regarding the development of my research design, as my 
approach lies somewhere in between the two. The main chunk of my theoretical framework 
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builds on an already established literature which gives me the opportunity to test certain 
underlying empirical expectations. The crux in my research question, however, aims to 
explore a much less developed landscape concerning the leap from the traditional struggle for 
some sort of deepened autonomy seen in most cases, to the forceful secessionist mobilization 
that is being played out in Scotland and Catalonia. I will elaborate further on this point below.  
4.2 Choosing the case study approach 
A natural starting point in outlining the logic behind the choice of my research design is with 
the definition of a case study. In the following sections I will elaborate on a couple of 
definitions of the case study – a methodological approach that has been exposed to enormous 
critical firepower in methodological debate over the latter decades. On the basis of this 
understanding of the case study I can progress to the more practical task of outlining my 
specific research design. Before doing that, however, I will also elaborate on three main 
reasons of why I believe the case study to be the most suitable methodological path to pursue 
in answering my research question.   
4.2.1 Defining the case study 
The case study has been defined in numerous ways up through the history of social science. 
Many definitions are rather definitions of specific types of case studies rather than definitions 
of the concept itself. The point of this section is to give a brief account of what a case study as 
an overarching concept is.  
My research design, which I will outline below, builds on two general definitions of 
the case study. First, Gerring (2007) defines it in the following way; “the case study approach 
to research is most usefully defined as an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of 
units (the cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (a 
population of cases) (Gerring 2007: 37).” 
The case study is often mistreated as being a subject of a study of solely one unit. 
However, what Gerring’s definition provides is that a case study research design can be 
comprised of several case studies, and thus an element of cross-case analysis which 
undoubtedly strengthens the study with regards to generalizing the sample to a larger 
population.    
Yin (2009) defines the case study in two dimension; a dimension of scope and a dimension of 
technicality. Regarding the first, he states that; “a case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
51 
 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 2009: 
18).” 
This part of the definition is valuable in the sense that it hits the nail on the head in 
terms of the nature of the topic of my study. Above all, what my study aims to achieve is to 
contribute to a broader understanding of a contemporary phenomenon which potentially can 
have vast implications for the way we understand politics. Moreover, precisely because of the 
complexity between ‘phenomenon’ and ‘context’, it is my belief that our understanding of the 
topic, generally is more superficial than what its importance should imply. Proceeding with 
the technical definition of Yin, he writes that;  
“The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions 
to guide data collections and analysis (Yin 2009: 18).” 
On the path to developing a valid answer to my research question, numerous aspects 
have to be accounted for and evaluated. While my theoretical framework is built upon 
previous scholarly work and empirical expectations will derive from this, the decisive part of 
my project is likely to rest upon the explorative part where surveying multiple sources of 
empirical evidence will be essential. These less explored routes will, of course, in line with 
the definition of Yin, be guided by already developed theoretical propositions as these lay the 
foundation of what aspects that needs to be pursued in addition to already relative solid 
established explanatory factors.    
4.2.2 Opting for the case study 
My first task is to explain why I have chosen a qualitative research approach over a 
quantitative one. This is primarily done for three reasons. The first and obvious reason is, as 
mentioned above, that my research question entails an essential exploratory element. The 
theoretical framework I have designed to apply on my cases is anchored in already well 
established literature, and hypotheses of what affects minority nationalist mobilization. 
However, the defined outcome I aim to explain – a referendum on the political agenda being 
put forward – I argue is a new phenomenon that has not yet matured sufficiently to attract 
much attention in academic circles. Hence, the challenge for my approach is to evaluate the 
relative importance of different explanatory factors and more importantly establish how they 
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interplay. In addition I will be on the lookout for potentially new explanatory factors. My 
research design thus has features that are both hypothesis testing and hypothesis generating. I 
argue that this in itself is reason enough to opt for qualitative means. Without overestimating 
the innovative  aspect of my paper, Gerring is in my view correct in emphasizing that case 
studies usually is better than quantitative cross-case studies when “(…) a subject is being 
encountered for the first time or is being considered in a fundamentally new way.” The fuzzy 
nature of the research design grants such designs an advantage at the exploratory level 
because it allows the researcher to pursue a multitude of hypotheses in an ‘rough-and-ready’ 
way (Gerring 2007: 40-41). 
Case studies are often by definition portrayed as being methodological qualitative in 
design. This view is however widely criticized by scholars defending the values of the case 
studies. Looking at the fact that case studies may indeed also very well be quantitative, or 
partly quantitative in design, this simply is wrong (Yin 2009: 19). Gerring (2004: 341), for 
instance, argues that the correct way of understanding the case study as a method is as a 
“(…)particular way of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of modeling 
causal relations.” (Gerring 2004: 341). A second reason for my qualitative choice thus needs 
to be accounted for. Accounting for what drives minority nationalist mobilization has been 
thoroughly examined in the literature as a whole.  However, as I have established in the 
literature review little coherence can be identified with regards to which factors lead to a 
certain outcome in assessing minority nationalist mobilization. Evidence proves that the same 
factors can lead to very different outcomes in similar cases, and therefore that causal 
relationships are so complex that they cannot be social scientifically absorbed or that the 
phenomenon is so unpredictable that no causal generalization can be made. Perhaps each case 
indeed above all is unique. This assumption, however, would be a meaningless point of 
departure for my project and in fact questioning the purpose of practicing comparative politics 
at all as an important defining characteristic of good social science is precisely the goal of 
‘making inference’ (King et al. 1994: 7). Despite the at times blurry and complex theoretical 
field my research question builds upon, my project nevertheless aspires to draw causal 
inferences of the phenomena being studied. 
It is this theoretical field that constitutes the bedrock of my theoretical framework, and 
it could probably have been better suited as basis for a theory driven quantitative research 
approach if my research question did not have the exploratory element. However, precisely 
because of my research question, I argue that that these rough theoretical waters are far from 
ideal for a quantitative statistical analysis as identifying the relevant variables and in the next 
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step operationalizing them would be extremely difficult. Although there is no lack of potential 
variables being introduced in the literature, their relative importance varies substantially 
across cases and also within cases. With the outlook towards generalizing my argument to a 
larger population, the key is to make an assessment of the value of the variables relative to the 
outcome I want to explain. I have to determine their relative importance singularly. More 
importantly, this has to be done by also evaluating how they interplay. In addition I have to be 
on the search of new explanatory factors. In so doing, I thus believe the best chance to find 
convincing answers is through the thorough and flexible manners of case study research 
which gives me the possibility to turn and evaluate all the pieces in the puzzle. 
The last reason is related to the first. One of the common rationales for conducting a 
case study is when the case or cases represents something extreme or unique (Yin 2009: 47). 
In my study the goal is to explain not so much the rarity of the cases themselves, but the 
unique outcome from what normally judged as a ‘normal’ cases. This fact provides me with 
two incentives for steering clear of quantitative techniques. First, that the cases in the 
population basically are pretty similar in characteristics. Identifying the decisive mechanisms 
is thus a matter of revealing relationships between variables that a rigid statistical analysis 
probably cannot pick up. Second, because there exists only two cases representing the 
outcome of interest, and the variation on the dependent variable across the population hence is 
small, a large-N study, even though well specified, would probably not give very clear results.    
4.3 Research design: the multiple case study design 
In the two previous sections I have focused on the tradeoffs between quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches, and with the definition of the case study in general. I have 
argued why I find the case study and qualitative research techniques in particular feasible for 
the research question I have at hand. I will now part ways with this general discussion, and 
turn to the specific outline of my research design. Taking advantage of the flexible nature of 
case study entrepreneurship, I have gathered inspiration and borrowed features from several 
methodological sub-branches.  
First of all I have to highlight that the formal methodological branch of which my 
research design belongs, is a multiple case study. The multiple case study has occasionally 
been identified as a separate method distinctive from the case study. This is due to the fact 
that adding more cases naturally gives the study a comparative dimension. Introducing 
specific techniques of sampling and analysis, and using terms such as the comparative case 
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method,
24
 some scholars have opted for refining the multiple case study as an independent 
methodological approach. However, the multiple case study and the case study, are probably 
better seen as being two variants of case study designs. Simply put, a multiple case study 
usually consists of several holistic cases. Then only substantial difference from the traditional 
single case study design then, is that several single cases are being treated simultaneously. 
This is of course much more resource and time-consuming, which makes a well-founded 
selection of cases particularly important (Yin 2009: 19, 59-60).  
4.3.1 Most Similar System Design 
In selecting the cases I have opted for a MSSD. The reasoning behind the MSSD-approach is 
fairly straightforward as it aims to identify ‘intersystemic’ differences through the selection of 
cases with ‘intersystemic’ similarities. The ‘system’ in my study is minority nationalist 
regions. As spelled out by Przeworski and Teune, the logic is that “(…)common systemic 
characteristics are conceived of as ‘controlled for’, whereas intersystemic differences are 
viewed as explanatory variables. The number of common characteristics sought is maximal 
and the number of not shared characteristics sought, minimal (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 
33).” Assuming that the basis for minority nationalist mobilization in the population of the 
study are fairly similar, the MSSD provides me the opportunity to follow this logic in order to 
identify deviating explanatory variables which in the next step can be further looked into.  
4.4 Case selection 
The reason why I have opted for this design is two-fold. Both reasons are related to an 
inherent problem case study practitioner’s face, namely dealing with case selection bias. 
Selection bias refers to selection of a case or cases which fits the outcome the researcher 
wants to explain, not paying attention to all the other cases in the universe which does not. 
First, I have decided to research both cases corresponding with the defined outcome of the 
study. Although these two cases obviously also are all the cases in this category, it 
nevertheless strengthens my project in terms of proposing causal relationships as opposed to if 
I only investigated one of the cases. A common advice in widening the scope of 
generalizability regarding case studies is to expand the sample of cases, as long as it does not 
affect the holistic nature of each case. Applying Scotland and Catalonia as my two main 
cases, which I refer to as positive cases, I consider a manageable task considering time- and 
resource frame of my project. 
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Second, Geddes (2003) emphasizes that without also including a sample of cases 
which does not represents the outcome, one cannot know whether the explanatory factors 
identified really vary with the outcome under investigation (Geddes 2003: 91). For dealing 
with this I have also added a sample of negative cases which is constituted by Wales and The 
Basque Country. Wales and The Basque Country, respectively, are both within the same 
national political framework as the two main cases and thus figures cases ideal for 
comparison within the MSSD. This design corresponds to the emphasis of Snyder (2001) and 
Lijphart (1971), who advances the technique of breaking up the common case unit of 
countries, and instead focus on regions. This can bring advantages in the study of both with-in 
nation and between-nation comparisons. While subnational units within a single country often 
are good comparable match because of their contextual dimension in terms of their similarity 
on cultural, historical, ecological, and socioeconomic aspects, the comparison of similar 
subnational units across countries may be a more powerful strategy for making meaningful 
causal inferences (Snyder 2001: 96-97).Moreover, it is essential to note that it is the main 
cases that is the principal point of attention in the study, and thus that the negative cases for 
practical reasons cannot receive the same amount of attention as the two. The negative cases 
can thus be labeled as shadow cases; which are less intense case studies which serve the 
purpose of complementing or cross-validating findings derived via the main case studies. To 
expand on this it is useful to introduce  Gerring’s (2004) conceptual wrapping of informal and 
formal units. He states that “(…) the formal unit is the unit chosen for intensive analysis – the 
person, group, organization, country, region, country, or other bounded phenomenon of 
which the writer has in-depth knowledge. Informal units consist of all other units that are 
brought into the analysis in a peripheral way. (…) they are always more superficially 
surveyed than the formal unit under study (Gerring 2004: 344). However, Gerring also 
emphasizes that the distinction of formal- and informal units is a matter of degree, and that the 
more equality of treatment granted to the informal units, the more the project leans toward a 
cross-unit style of analysis. As I have argued that the negative units in my study are treated as 
cases in a multiple case study, dubbing them as informal units with peripheral importance will 
be to discredit their significance in the study. I hence argue that framing them as shadow 
cases is a more precise term.   
4.5 Data collection 
An imperative characteristic of case studies is that data is collected from multiple sources of 
evidence (Creswell 2013). This is a major strength in two senses. First, it provides the 
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researcher with the opportunity to “(…) address a broad range of historical and behavioral 
issues (Yin 2009: 115).” For my study this is crucial because of the necessity to combine a set 
of remote factors (contextual factors), which are typically drawn up in previous literature, 
with proximate factors (triggering factors), which often are less clear cut and to a larger 
degree are revealed through the scrutiny of  alternative sources of evidence. Second, and more 
importantly, multiple sources of evidence open up for the development of converging lines of 
inquiry where several independent sources of evidence are triangulated, making the findings 
of the study much more convincing and accurate to the reader (Yin 2009: 115-116).  
With this is in my mind, I set out with a broad and flexible perspective in the searching and 
identification of potential evidence. Generally speaking, these are extracted from two sources; 
semi-structured interviews and documentation, which I will elaborate on in the following two 
sub-sections.  
4.5.1 Interviewing experts – Semi structured interviews 
As the most important part of my data collection procedure I have carried out a field work 
project in Edinburgh and Barcelona where I have conducted a number of interviews with 
experts on the topic and cases assessed in the thesis. The interviews were carried out in a 
semi-structured vein where the goal was to accumulate in-depth knowledge about my cases in 
relation to my research topic. Semi-structural interviews are typically characterized by being 
organized around a set of predetermined open-ended questions, with additional questions 
emerging during the course of the conversation (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006: 315). A 
copy of the interview-guide which my interviews were built around can be found in the 
appendix in the back. 
In the literature the term expert and elite is frequently used interchangeably referring 
to the same sort of respondent. Although some nuances occasionally are made, the underlying 
logic in conducting such interviews is more or less the same, and as Littig (2009) states; “no 
systematic differences can be determined as far as access to the field and actual interaction in 
the interview are concerned (Littig 2009: 106).” Furthermore, Littig states that experts- and 
elites are distinguished by two key criteria: the knowledge and the power they possess (Littig 
2009: 106). While an elite arguably also by large is connoted by the power aspect, I chose to 
use the term expert as I perceive this to be a more fitting characterization of the individuals I 
have interviewed. Meuser and Nagel (2009) supplements the definition of the expert role by 
emphasizing that it must be understood by the distinction between expert knowledge and 
common-sense knowledge – that an expert possesses some form of specialized knowledge 
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which the expert interview is designed to discover. Furthermore, this knowledge is exclusive 
and highly potential “(…)because and in so far it is linked with the power of defining the 
situation (Meuser and Nagel 2009: 18).”  Pfadenhauer (2009) makes a further distinction 
between the specialist and the expert that is relevant for my purposes. While the specialist has 
a task-related, well-defined and partial knowledge within a special field, the expert knowledge 
is more of a good overview of the overall knowledge in the relevant field. The expert is 
signified by holding a more comprehensive knowledge and having the capability to solve 
problems, but also to identify and account for problem causes as well as for solution 
principles (Pfadenhauer 2009: 82).  
Bogner and Menz (2009) suggest a threefold categorization of the purposes an expert 
interview; exploratory, theory generating and systematizing. The exploratory interview serves 
to provide the researcher to “(…)establish an initial orientation in a field that is either 
substantively new or poorly defined (Bogner and Menz 2009: 46).” This implies that the 
interviewing is done in an early stage of the research to help identify or clarify a problem for 
further research. In the theory generating interview the respondent is no longer a means by 
which the researcher can obtain useful information and elucidation of a topic under 
investigation. Rather he or she is a source of information from which the researcher aims to 
generate theory through the interpretive generalization of a typology. The goal is an 
“(…)analytical reconstruction of the subjective dimension of expert knowledge (Bogner and 
Menz 2009: 48).” The systematizing interview, where I place my approach, is the most 
common. This is related to the exploratory interview in the sense that it seeks to access the 
exclusive knowledge of the respondent. However, here the information is gathered as 
empirical evidence. The interview thus seek to obtain systematic and complete information on 
‘objective’ matters (Bogner and Menz 2009: 47).  
This element of the expert role is crucial in the underlying reasoning behind my 
selection of interviewees. Altogether I have interviewed twelve experts of whom eight are 
scholars and four are political journalists; four scholars and two journalists where the 
interviews were focused on Scotland and with a comparative perspective on Wales , and 
correspondingly four scholars and two journalists where the center of attention was on 
Catalonia, and a comparison to The Basque Country. What signifies the scholars is that they 
all are prominent in their general field of study. Although their specialized field naturally 
varies somewhat, they are all experts in the sense reflected by Pfadenhauer above; that they 
have good overview over my field interest and they can contribute to shed light on the 
problems my research approach poses.  
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According to DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree semi-structured interviews are often the 
sole data source for a qualitative research project  (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006: 315). 
Although my aim is to supplement the interviews with other sources of information, the 
interviews nevertheless serve as the bedrock of my empirical findings. The interviews do not 
primarily serve to generate empirical knowledge per se, but more importantly to help knit 
together and understand already ‘visible’ knowledge in order to reveal complex causal 
relationships. Hence, as interviewing scholars representing parts of the theoretical framework 
the study builds on may seemingly be regarded as gathering superfluous information, this is a 
crucial remark to make. The four journalists I have interviewed serve to nuance the bigger 
picture. While scholars might restrict their evaluations within theory and formal empirical 
evidence, and thus be careful in discussing themes which they not have formal knowledge of, 
journalists are usually more freely spoken and public-minded in their orientation.            
4.5.2 Documentation  
The documentation dimension of my data collection is relative to the expert interviews of 
secondary importance, and is in the thesis primarily used to supplement and cross-check 
evidence derived from the interviews. This hierarchy of sources is reflected in the empirical 
presentation which predominantly is built on and guided by information gathered through the 
interviews. Nevertheless, using documents as a source is especially valuable in studies of 
aspiring to asses developmental dynamics and processes of change over longer time periods 
(Grønmo 2004: 120). Moreover, they are recommended to be utilized in combination with 
other sources (Yin 2009: 103). The evidence gathered from documentation is extracted from 
the following sources: secondary literature, descriptive statistics, and, primary literature 
which mainly implies newspaper articles and government documents. Grønmø (2004: 120-
121) makes a distinction between documents that are factually based and documents that are 
based on opinions. The main common characteristic of the documents applied in this thesis is 
that they are all factually based. As such, I consider them to be valuable supplements to the 
interviews which inevitably reflect certain degrees of subjectivity.  
4.6 Assessing the quality of the research design 
In evaluating the quality of empirical social research in general, and thus also for the case 
study design, four common tests are usually applied. These are the evaluation test of construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity, and, reliability (Yin 2009: 40). In the remainder 
for this section I will in order briefly presents the four test-components and relatedly give an 
assessment of my research design.   
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Construct validity refers to whether the study really investigates, or measures what it 
claims to do. The concept is linked to the various operational measures in the study. This 
aspect is arguably particularly important for case studies where the operationalization is far 
less rigid than in the case of statistical analysis and thus more difficult to evaluate the quality 
of. It is therefore crucial for case studies that they contain a lucid and thorough assessment of 
the key concepts in the study. To address this challenge a substantial part of chapter two is 
devoted to define and explain the most important concepts I utilize in the thesis.  
Internal validity regards the causal relationships a study claims to reveal. This test 
refers to two aspects. First, that the causal relationships indeed are causal, and not affected by 
other additional variables which the researcher has not considered. Second, that the broader 
scientific inferences are correct. Regarding the first test, I claim that the holistic aspirations of 
the case study design and the analytical procedure serves to present me with a broad specter 
of potential explanatory factors. This extensive investigation basis should grant me the 
opportunity to single out irrelevant explanations and in the next step reveal the decisive 
mechanisms at play. Compared to statistical methods, however, the major drawback with my 
qualitative research design is that it ultimately is dependent on my personal interpretation. As 
such the ‘objective’ quality of the findings in the thesis is naturally more difficult to evaluate. 
Nonetheless, through a thorough empirical presentation and theoretical discussion, I aspire to 
compensate for this. As a second measure, I will towards the end briefly discuss the potential 
for rival explanations.  
External validity refers to the aspect of generalization. For a case study to be valid to 
the domain to which the findings can be generalized must be convincingly presented and 
argued for. I regard this aspect to be particularly important in my research project which 
aspires to explore and present causal factors on a topic where this previously has proved to be 
challenging. With this in mind chapter two offers a thorough elaboration of the empirical 
scope of my thesis.  The primary purpose of this is to downscale the scope sufficiently so that 
a theoretical generalization is warranted. That being said, taking into account the complexity 
of the agenda put forward, any causal conclusions will naturally have to reflect a certain 
modesty.  
Reliability is about the verifiability of the formal aspects of the study. In Yin’s words 
the aim is that “(…)if a later investigator followed the same procedures as described by an 
earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all over again, the later investigator 
should arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin 2009: 45).” The research project 
should therefore aspire to document the various procedures in a clear and orderly fashion so 
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that a replica of the study could potentially be done. To deal with this I have attempted to give 
an accurate account of the underlying logic of my research design and a more practically 
oriented description of how the design analytically is applied. Furthermore, the data which the 
thesis is based on is primarily based on interviews. The empirical presentation reflects this 
through frequent citations to the transcriptions of the interviews.
25
 As a means to validate the 
interviews a list of the respondents with details about the interviews is included as an 
appendix together with a copy of the interview guide which the interviews were based on.        
4.7 Procedure of the analysis 
The analytical procedure of the thesis is inspired by two techniques. In the first and broader 
sense it serves as an historical explanation. Historical explanations intend to explain 
outcomes that have happened, either in the distant past or in the recent past. As such, they are 
inferences about the causes of specific outcomes in particular cases, and not too concerned 
with broader generalizations (Mahoney et al. 2009: 116). In understanding the secessionist 
mobilization processes in Scotland and Catalonia, and in relation to the holistic nature of the 
case study, I regard it as imperative to investigate the cases from a broad historical 
perspective. By linking recent triggering (proximate) factors to the contextual and pre-
conditional (remote) factors, I hope to give an adequate answer be given to the research 
question put forward. As such, the analytical procedure also draws on the logic of process 
tracing which can be depicted as an attempt to “(…)identify the intervening causal process – 
the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and 
the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005: 206).”  
More practically speaking my analytical emphasis can be summed in two steps. By 
comparing the developments of Basque minority nationalism and Catalan minority 
nationalism, and the Welsh with the Scottish, an explanation of why the Basque and Welsh 
cause has not taken a secessionist course can be given. Then, by seeing the positive cases of 
Scotland and Catalonia in relation to each other, provides me with the insights to assess how 
and to what extend the cases can be explained by common causal factors. Together these two 
steps should serve as an appropriate basis for drawing some general insights about how 
democratic secessionist mobilization within the empirical domain of the thesis works.  
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61 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: Empirical presentation of Scotland and Wales in the UK-context 
5.1 Scotland: review of Scottish nationalism and the secessionist mobilization process 
5.1.1 Scottish national identity and the pre-devolution political dimension   
Scottish identity is described as an archetypical civic form of identity being oriented towards 
social and economic goals (R3 McEwen). In the literature it is frequently argued that Scotland 
represents a paradigmatic case of civic rather than ethnic nationalism, insofar as conventional 
cultural features such as language or religion do not mark Scotland out as particularly 
distinctive from England (McCrone and Paterson 2002: 54). Keating (R2) points to the fact 
that in Scotland there lacks historic grievances which often is associated with minority 
nationalism elsewhere. The language issue has never been salient as Gaelic is spoken only by 
a tiny proportion of the people. MacMahon (R6) amplifies this point by stating; “I suppose 
that historians would say that after the act of union, that Scottish identity survived. Although 
Scotland became part of the UK, it didn’t ever become North-Britain. Although there is not a 
linguistic culture, there is a strong Scottish identity.” 
Entering the UK as an act of unionism, Scotland from the start had many of the 
defining characteristics of a state. Convery (R4) points out that this somewhat unusual 
combination of having separate legal system, but without a separate legislature, made that 
accommodation of Scottish distinctiveness in to the UK and inevitable issue on the political 
agenda. Thus, the idea that Scotland is a distinctive historic nation has never been disputed in 
the British political discourse (R3 McEwen). The traditional Scottish discourse has therefore 
never been driven by language, culture and a struggle for recognition, but rather by certain 
historical themes about Scotland being a nation and a self-governing community that 
embraces political and social values that set them apart from the inhabitants of England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland (R2 Keating; King 2012). McEwen (R3) expands on this by 
saying; 
“It has for long been focused on economic and social goals, and around resources – 
natural resources to a certain extent, but just human resources and economic 
resources. The idea has been that you need maximum self-government in order to 
address social and economic needs, priorities, goals and potential. So it has been a 
sort of social and economic basis for a very long time.” 
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Scotland formally had its national distinctiveness politically represented long before 
devolution through Scottish Office and the Scottish Secretary (later Secretary of State for 
Scotland), which in spite of  being offices of central government, implied a symbolic 
significance of representing Scotland within the UK (Mitchell 2003). The devolution of 1999 
entailed a formal transfer of powers to the Scottish parliament that largely were based upon 
administrative responsibilities that previously had been assigned to the Scottish Office. These 
included primary legislative power over an range of domestic policies, including health, 
education, rural affairs, the environment and economic development (McEwen 2013: 256-
258). 
This political dimension prior to devolution may help explain the fact that 
independence always has had a relatively broad support among the Scots. According to 
historical data, support was at about twenty percent when it was first measured in the 1960s. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s it came up to around thirty percent, where it has remained until 
the referendum campaign started (R2 Keating; Curtice and Heath 2000). 
5.1.2 The mobilization process 
The most important component in explaining the secessionist mobilization in Scotland is 
undoubtedly the SNP. The nationalist party has over the latter decades had an extraordinary 
development from a fringe party to a highly professional and effective mainstream party with 
broad support throughout Scotland. The evolution climaxed in 2011 when the SNP were 
elected into a majority government in the Scottish Parliament. The party was then in a 
position where they could initiate a bid for independence which further catalyzed a movement 
that culminated into the Scottish people rejecting independence by a narrow five percent 
margin in the referendum of September 18
th 
last year (BBC News 2014b). As Macnab (R5) 
emphasizes, this was a process no one would have forecasted in advance;  
“It was a big surprise. You wouldn’t thought going into that election that there was 
going to be a big drive for Scottish independence and that we were about to see 
something historic here. It didn’t feel like that. It looked like Labour would win a 
again, and then six months later the SNP won a majority and we are all talking about 
a independence referendum.” 
5.1.3 The rise of the SNP 
Although the SNP has a relatively long history and can be traced back to the 1930s when it 
became the first party to have Scottish independence as one of its objectives (R2 Keating), its 
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political influence was throughout the 20
th
 century modest. Figure 3 displays the development 
of the electoral results of the SNP in the UK general elections from 1950-2015 in the Scottish 
constituencies. Prior to the 2015-elections where their political fortunes astonishingly 
skyrocketed
26
, the graph confirms SNP’s marginal role in Scottish politics. Macnab (R5) 
portrays the SNP in UK politics in the following way; “Up to devolution they were nothing. 
They couldn’t win seats up in Westminster. They were sort of a bandwagon. A side show. 
They maybe had four or five MPs. They were like a guerilla-movement down at Westminster. 
They couldn’t do anything at all.” 
Figure 3: Evolution of the SNP in Westminster elections in the Scottish constituencies 
 
Source: (The Electoral Commission 2015) Notes: I have elaborated the graph on the basis of data on election 
results. 
Starting in the 70s the party starts to make some initial political headway. Prior to this 
though, MacMahon (R6) portrays the SNP as by the general public being looked upon as ‘a 
bit of a joke’; “They were sort of frowned upon – not regarded as serious politicians.” The 
boost in the 70s occurred on the back of the discovery of North-Sea oil, whereupon the SNP 
managed to make a good case of the economic argument for independence. Furthermore, a 
general wave of opposition to the Thatcher-government in the 1980s which emphasized a 
liberal economic doctrine and a centralized vision of British nationalism further galvanized a 
national awakening in Scotland and consequentially also an increase in electoral support for 
the SNP. Hepburn (R1) explains that these two contextual aspects also brought The Scottish 
Labour Party over to the pro-devolution side, together with the SNP and the Liberal 
Democrats, which eventually led to the establishment of the Scottish parliament in 1999. By 
                                                 
26
 The SNP won 56 out of 59 seats in an election that has been depicted as an “almost total Labour wipeout” 
(The Telegraph 2015)”. This represents a new climax of the evolution of the SNP, and might have future 
consequences for the Scottish independence-question. The development is, however, too recent to be treated in 
my analysis.  
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then the SNP had used its momentum to develop itself to a much more professional, well-
funded and disciplined party (R6 MacMahon).  
Once devolution was established, the SNP then had a whole new political playing 
field. It was not any longer a victim of being an insignificant party in the majoritarian first 
past the post Westminster system. As underscored by Hepburn (R1); “Suddenly it was the 
second biggest party within the Scottish parliament arguing on Scottish interests. That really 
changed the visibility and the electoral fortunes of the SNP.” Or as spelled out by Macnab 
(R5); “The creation of the Scottish parliament gave the SNP a sudden impetus that they never 
had before.” Figure 4 shows the development in electoral results for SNP in the four 
Holyrood-elections that have been held thus far. As I will elaborate bellow the latter two, and 
particularly the 2011-election, are vital in assessing Scotland’s secessionist mobilization. 
Figure 4: Evolution of the SNP in Holyrood elections 
 
Source: (The Electoral Commission 2015) Notes: I have elaborated the graph on the basis of data on election 
results. 
5.1.4 The 2011-Scottish election 
In the Scottish Parliament elections of 1999 and 2003 the SNP won substantial chunks of the 
Scottish vote; 27 percent in 1999 and 21 percent in 2003. It is, however, the 2007-election that 
is portrayed as the real turning point for the party and thus the first foreshadowing on what 
would play out about seven years later. In 2007 the SNP becomes the biggest party in 
Scotland with 31 % of the votes, and for the first time wins office in a minority government. 
The respondents depict the following four years as a term where the SNP did a splendid job in 
governing Scotland. It must also be noted that once in office they, following their manifesto 
commitment, attempted to put forward a referendum on independence. However, leading a 
minority coalition government they were not able to generate enough support from the 
parliament (R1 Hepburn). Coming up to the elections of 2011, they nevertheless could harvest 
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the rewards of a successful four year spell in office. Winning 44 % of the popular vote, giving 
them 69 out of 129 seats in the parliament (53%), the SNP suddenly led a majority 
government. This is a crucial event in explaining secessionist mobilization in Scotland. With a 
majority in the Parliament the SNP could unhindered bring the independence-referendum 
back on the political agenda. In Convery (R4) words; “The point when it comes on the 
political agenda and is definitely going to happen, is when the SNP wins a majority in 2011. 
That’s really when it becomes clear that it’s definitely going to be a referendum.”  
5.1.5 Explaining the electoral success of SNP 
The respondents point to two important explanatory factors in understanding SNP’s 
surprisingly massive election result of 2011. First they underscore that the popularity of SNP 
cannot be attributed to any general increase in support for independence. Convery (R4) and 
Hepburn (R1) emphasize that the biggest driver was that the SNP were perceived to be a very 
competent government;  
“So even amongst people, who primarily identify as British, the SNP won a majority. 
In no way could the elections in 2007 or 2011 be portrayed as elections were the 
mains subject was independence. The main issues were valence issues, and the SNP 
were perceived to be the best at handling them. That’s why they won (R4 Convery).” 
Hepburn (R1) expands on the argument by saying; “though support for SNP has gone 
up, support for independence has not gone up at the same time. Only 35 % of Scots preferred 
independence. It hadn’t really changed much since the 1970s.”As emphasized by Keating 
(R2), the electoral success can thus be said to have come in spite of their secessionist agenda, 
and not because of it;  
“When the SNP won their first minority government in 2007, support for independence 
was going down. When they won with a majority in 2011, support for independence 
was going down again. The victory had nothing to do with independence. They gained 
the victory because they said this is not a vote for independence.” 
In addition to being a good governing party, the respondents also set the SNP’s 
success in relation to a significant structural factor – the failure of previously significant 
statewide-parties in Scotland. In general terms, Keating (R2) emphasizes the traditional 
importance of statewide parties in Scotland; 
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“Parties in Scotland have historically been amongst the most important brokers 
between Scotland and the UK. Until the end of the 20
th
 century, these parties, all three 
of them really, but especially the Labour Party, have been able to play a British line in 
Scotland, but also look very Scottish. They have been ideological parties at center 
right and center left, but they have also been territorial brokerage parties, saying that 
they can get resources for Scotland, recognize Scotland in various ways through 
administrative devolution and therefore play Scottishness in to Britishness using all 
the identity arguments as pillars of Britishness. Since devolution they have lost the 
ability to do that. They have lost the plot somewhere.” 
The Scottish Labour Party was no longer seen as representing the interests of working 
class Scotland and as not having enough autonomy of the UK Labour Party. The success of 
the SNP can thus mainly be explained by the fact that they have overtaken the position Labour 
previously had in Scotland (R1 Hepburn). Additionally, the Liberal Democrats who usually 
have been relatively strong in Scotland entered an unpopular government coalition at the UK-
level and consequentially suffered for that in Scotland (R4 Convery). Lastly, the Conservative 
Party has since devolution gradually declined in Scotland as the social base of their electorate 
has declined (R2 Keating).  
In sum then, the combination of the SNP doing a solid job governing Scotland and the 
set-back of traditionally significant contenders to the party, meant that the SNP in 2011 was 
able to form a majority government. 
5.1.6 The Edinburgh-Agreement 
Once in majority government, it did not come as a surprise to anyone that there would be a 
referendum on independence in Scotland (R3 McEwen). Also, from the perspective of the 
UK-government there was not really ever any resistance against Scotland carrying out the 
referendum. To many outside observers, the emollient stand from the UK-government was 
rather surprising, as it contrasts state-reactions generally expected regarding issues 
challenging state-sovereignty. Through the Edinburgh-Agreement which was a formal 
agreement between The Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Moore, the Prime Minister 
of the UK, David Cameron, and Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, the powers to hold 
a referendum on independence was transferred from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament, 
and that the outcome of it would be respected (UK Government 2012). This smooth political 
process is by the respondents mainly attributed to three factors.  
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The first is related to the overarching recognition of Scotland as a distinctive nation 
that always has been apparent in British politics. Convery (R4) thus points out that there 
always has been an opinion in Westminster that Scotland theoretically has the possibility to 
secede; 
“Westminster implicitly accepts that Scotland has the right to secede. This was 
conceded at a time when Scottish independence was such a remote prospect that it 
cost nothing to concede. But also in terms of the thinking of the Westminster model 
and the Westminster way of thinking about the British constitution, there is always the 
possibility of secession.” 
Once the SNP had majority for the issue in parliament, the UK-government thus had a 
moral imperative to address and accommodate these demands; “ultimately, they have 
accepted that Scotland has a right to secede, and flowing from that; if you have the right to 
secede, you have the right to a referendum on it (R4 Convery).”  
The second aspect portrayed by the respondents is that, once a referendum was 
inevitable, it was in the interest of both Scotland and the UK that the referendum had 
legitimacy –  in other words that it would be legal, fair and decisive (R3 McEwen). Macnab 
(R5) emphasizes that there also without the Edinburgh-Agreement probably would have been 
a referendum in Scotland. Instead of being faced with the challenges to the legitimacy and 
formality of an unofficial vote, UK officials rather took the opportunity to partake in outlining 
the terms in which an official referendum would be carried out. These considerations included 
the timing of the referendum, that the ballot only included two options (yes and no), and that 
the British Electoral Commission had a role in oversight (R3 McEwen). 
The third factor explaining the Edinburgh-Agreement is depicted as simply being a 
matter of that the UK-government was confident that the no-camp would win by a clear 
majority. As emphasized above, there was, looking at the polls or weighing the general 
political climate, no indications of any increased appetite for independence among the 
Scottish electorate. According to McEwen (R3); “they were convinced that ‘No’ was winning 
big – Way way bigger than they did. So the political calculation was that this was a political 
opportunity for them too.” Keating (R2) further elaborates on this by explaining; 
“Support for independence was at the time less than 30 %, so Cameron thought it was 
a safe thing to do. They decided to do it because they thought they could gain an easy 
victory, call the nationalist bluff, discredit them, guarantee the UK, and take the 
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question off the agenda for another generation. Their assumption was that 
independence not would be viable and that people would be scared and vote no. Had 
they known that they would win by 55 % I’m not sure they would have done it.”  
5.1.7 The referendum debate 
The debate and the fierce mobilization that followed the initiation of the referendum being put 
on the political agenda have surprised the respondents. Prior to the referendum process 
McEwen (R3) describes that there was a general satisfaction with Scotland’s place in the UK; 
“people kind of liked devolution. That was clearly the preference of most people; stronger 
devolution perhaps, but still there was broad satisfaction.” Keating (R2) explains that with 
the referendum campaign, however, followed the unleashing of a process that was deeply 
democratizing; “whichever side you voted on, you would be involved deeply in a very 
prolonged debate about the future of the country. From the perspective of the UK-government 
that was not intended at all.” McEwen (R3) supplements by saying; “having the debate 
generated this large movement that went far beyond the SNP. It wasn’t really within their 
control. Furthermore, it generated an increased demand for independence.” 
Thus, it was not only the SNP who campaigned for independence. Hepburn (R2) 
highlights that the political dimension also included the Green party. More significantly, 
however, as the debate unfolded wider political and civic groups also latched on to the 
movement; “rather than just being a political campaign, it was a very broad social movement 
in favour of independence.” Keating (R2) further elaborates on the comprehensive nature of 
the movement, and how the movement appealed to elements way beyond the realm of 
nationalists’; 
“The referendum campaign drew in a lot of people who weren’t nationalists, but who 
supported independence for completely different reasons. Mainly they are on the left, 
they are social democrats, they are greens, and they are elements of the far left who 
think that in Scotland there will be a different political balance – a different type of 
social compromise. So this is an opportunity to do things differently. It includes 
sections of the trade union movement, it includes the voluntary sector and it includes 
sections of the Labour party.” 
5.1.8 The arguments of the debate 
The respondents emphasize that the pro-independence movement successfully managed to set 
the narrative of the public debate (R6 MacMahon). In general terms they depict this narrative 
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to entail mainly three arguments for an independent Scotland. The first is the equality 
argument which basically implies that the Scots are people further to the left on the political 
spectrum; thus a more equal society with a preference towards more welfare spending and 
higher taxes. The second is the prosperity argument, which implies that Scotland would be 
better off economically as independent – mainly because the economic potential can be 
fulfilled due to the access to oil-money. The third is the democratic argument, which entails 
that Scots would be better off if they could chose the governments they want, and not being 
marginalized by the rest of the UK who frequently votes the Conservatives into government 
(R3 McEwen; R4 Convery; R5 Macnab).  
It was not until the last couple of months of the campaign that the polls really started 
to show an increase in support for independence. In the days prior to the vote some polls even 
displayed the Yes-side marginally ahead (R1 Hepburn). As previously stated above, the final 
count showed a 55% victory to the unionist side. Regardless, the narrow loss was nonetheless 
seen as a great victory for the yes-side. As stated by Convery (R4); “It’s been a huge 
achievement for the SNP to get support for independence from a third to 45 percent.” 
5.1.9 The appeal of the Yes-side  
In explaining why the Yes-side managed to push the vote for support for independence up 
from around a third of the population to almost a half, the respondents emphasize the 
dynamics of the referendum debate. Especially decisive was the positive picture the Yes-
campaign managed to portray of an independent Scotland comparative to the No-side. 
Hepburn (R1) states that; “the short term explanations for this are the negativity of the no-
campaign and its inability to present a very positive portrait of Scotland within the Union; 
while the Yes-campaign did a very good job at presenting a positive and hopeful case of 
independent Scotland.” Furthermore, the fact that the main arguments of the debate were 
completely devoid of nationalist references is also imperative in explaining the success of the 
pro-independent campaign. McEwen (R3) explains; 
“Nationalism implies discomfort for some people. What the Yes-camp was quite 
successful in doing was presenting a case for independence that wasn’t on the surface 
about nationalism. That generated belief in that Scotland is a nation that is distinctive, 
that has a distinctive set of priorities, and that it should have maximum amount of 
control over those decisions.” 
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Rather than reflecting nationalism in the traditional sense, independence was rather 
linked to a particular political project. Hepburn (R1) and Keating (R2) portray this as being a 
pro-welfare project that ideologically opposed the much more neoliberal British track. 
Keating elaborates (R2); 
“The fact is that for the second time in forty years you have a government in London 
pursuing pretty radical and neo-liberal policies. Much more radical than they looked 
like when they came to power in 2010. It was radical changes to the welfare state. So 
people then focused on Scotland as a place where you can express opposition to that. 
There is probably as much opposition in England, but it can’t latch on to anything. 
Social cleavages don’t work anymore. Class doesn’t work anymore. The trade unions 
don’t work anymore. So what do you do to mobilize a pro-welfare project?  Well, you 
use territory and the national framework, because that’s available. You can then of 
course wrap it up with a few historical myths about us being naturally egalitarian, 
which is as true or false as any other kinds of myths. But you wrap it around being 
about Scotland. Scotland can be different. And you get this broad coalition.” 
Hepburn (R1) further summarizes the argument by saying; “if you are trying to 
explain the 45 % who voted yes, it had a lot to do with the disillusioned Labour-voters who 
were very attracted by the very hopeful vision of a more fair and egalitarian Scotland that the 
Yes-camp were able to present them at the time.” 
5.2 Wales: review of Welsh nationalism and the nationalist discourse  
Welsh nationalism is portrayed as less developed than Scottish nationalism, and as 
deliberately following in the footsteps of Scotland (R2 Keating). In a nutshell, this can be 
historically traced to how Wales entered the British Union. While Scotland entered as an act 
of unionism, and thus in many respects as a fully functioning state, Wales entered by conquest 
(R4 Convery). Convery (R4) elaborates on this by pointing out that; “there exists a legal 
entity of England and Wales. They had less distinctive institutions.” Thus, Wales have been 
subjected to more assimilation into the UK-context than Scotland has. This can be illustrated 
by looking at the feelings of national identity in the two regions (see figure 5). While a 
majority of the population in both regions expresses a strong regional identity, the proportion 
of people in Wales who feels no Welsh identity is significantly larger. With regards to 
nationalism the two cases thus had very different starting points. However, what typifies 
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Welsh nationalism during the course of the latter centuries, and especially post-devolution in 
1999, is rapid nation-building. I will further elaborate this point below.   
Figure 5: Feelings of national identity in Wales and Scotland  
 
Source:  (Scottish Government 2013; Welsh Government 2012) 
5.2.1 Language – an obstacle to nationalism 
Traditionally, one of the main characterizations of the Welsh nationalist discourse is the 
significance of the language and cultural dimension. This is a feature which makes it quite 
different in nature compared to the Scottish case, where language never has been a central 
theme (R1 Hepburn). Plaid Cymru, the main political party advocating Welsh nationalist 
demands today, grew out of language movements. However, contrary to the Catalan case for 
example, where language is the most important reference point to Catalan identity, language 
is in the Welsh discourse primarily seen as an obstacle to the promotion of a common 
nationalism. Primarily  Welsh, which only is spoken by a fifth of the population, gave 
national arguments based on the cultural dimension limited appeal among the majority of the 
population, and has thus been more dividing than uniting. Keating (R2) elaborates on this 
point;  
“Historically it was divided between North-Wales and South-Wales, which was a 
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South-Wales, and you can’t do it without going through England, so it’s a very divided 
pace. It wasn’t a natural unit functionally.” 
A term used in the literature, is the Three-Wales model, which emphasizes that there in 
Wales existed three distinct political divisions reflecting the broad social and linguistic 
differences in the region (Scully and Jones 2012: 657). However, Keating (R2) explains that 
these internal tensions now pretty much have been settled, and that this has contributed to 
consolidating Wales as a political community. 
“There is a kind of agreement. Everybody in Wales just likes the idea of preserving the 
language. Most of them don’t want to learn it, but they are not opposed to the 
language being present in public places. They compromise. They got their Welsh TV-
channels. The middle class people in South-Wales send their children to Welsh-
speaking schools because they are better than the English speaking schools. There is 
not the same fierce language arguments as there were in the 1960s. So that brings 
Wales together as a political community. They are able to share more in common. 
Then the agenda is focused on questions about economic development and institution-
building which people can share. That is not to say that there still are tensions 
between North and South-Wales. There is a lot, but it hasn’t stopped Wales being built 
as a political community or the development of Welsh institutions.” 
5.2.2 Welsh nationalism: a process of nation-building  
Both Wales and Scotland attained devolved political arrangements in 1999. The devolution 
settlements, however, are quite different in terms of how much powers the two sub-national 
political institutions have and thus resemble a highly asymmetrical British political system. 
Furthermore, Welsh devolution was even, at least partly, a mechanism to counterweight and 
limit the potential territorial impact of Scottish devolution, and hence contribution to better 
integrate Scotland into a reformed UK-state (McEwen 2013: 257). While the Scottish 
nationalist parliament enjoys quite large degrees of power through a ‘reserved powers’- 
model
27
, the Welsh nationalist Assembly is designed oppositely and initially lacked direct 
primary legislative powers. This asymmetry can thus be seen as a reflection of the maturity of 
the two national movements. Welsh devolution has always and still remains more limited than 
the Scottish devolution. Thus, contemporary welsh nationalism has been characterized by its 
                                                 
27
 The Scottish parliament has legislative competence over everything which is no explicitly reserved in the 
agreement (McEwen 2013: 273). 
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focus on nation-building with Scotland as a point of reference. The political discourse is 
described by its aspirations of parity with Scotland, seeking a model of devolution on a 
similar basis (R3 McEwen). Convery (R4) consents with this; “a lot of arguments in Wales 
center around; ‘we ought to have as much power as Scotland’.”  
In the course of the new millennium devolution has been gradually strengthened. In 
2007 Plaid Cymru formed a coalition government with the Welsh Labour Party, where they 
expressed an objective to design a better system of devolution (R3 McEwen). Following a 
referendum in 2011, the Welsh parliament currently has legislative powers in twenty 
designated fields, including health, education and training, and other wider issues of domestic 
policy (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012). Nonetheless, Welsh independence in terms of devolved 
powers is still trailing substantially behind Scottish. The Regional Authority Index developed 
by Hooghe and his colleagues (2010), underscore this. On a scale of self-rule, ranging from 1-
15, Scotland scores 13, whereas Wales only scores 8 (see appendix 3 for details).   
5.2.3 Catching up with Scotland 
Regardless, Welsh political devolution has to a much larger degree been subject to a more 
positive development since its introduction than the Scottish. Welsh nationalism can thus in 
this sense be regarded as more prosperous than Scottish, especially after devolution. In 
McEwen’s (R3) words; “there have been more changes in Wales since the establishment of 
the national assembly in 1999. There have been more changes in the devolution settlement 
than there has been in Scotland.” 
Convery (R4) explains the dynamics more specifically by emphasizing the Welsh 
devolution as a complex and ineffective system which needed to be revised.  
“If you look at the history of devolution in Wales they say that it is this extremely 
convoluted system of the Wales Assembly having to as permission of the Westminster 
parliament to legislate on things. It was an extremely complicated system, and Wales 
they got bogged down in a lot of that. So the job of Plaid Cymru and the other parties 
was not to talk about independence, but rather to complete the devolution settlement. 
So I think it’s true that they are a step behind in many ways.” 
Keating (R2) concurs and further elaborates by describing the Welsh nation-building 
project as a surprisingly successful story.    
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“What has happened to Wales is that it has been strengthened institutionally. 
Institutions have gained legitimacy through to a surprising degree considering the 
history of the last 40 years. They have come a lot further than Scotland, because they 
started so far behind. Now devolution has become accepted as part of the Welsh 
institutional landscape and nation building has continued. Wales has been created as 
a political community also since the 1880s, but at a much slower pace than Scotland. 
That has really accelerated since devolution.” 
5.2.4 The weak secessionist discourse  
Because of Wales’ preoccupation with nation building and consolidating itself as a political 
community, secessionism has thus played a marginal role in the national discourse. McEwen 
(R3) explains;   
“Independence has never been an important element of Welsh politics. Even for Plaid 
Cymru, its objective has never really been expressed as independence in the radical 
sense. They used to prefer the language of self-government, because they felt it was 
more ambiguous and they meant something that was linked more to self-government 
within the UK.”  
Plaid Cymru is a smaller force in Wales than the SNP, CiU or the PNV are in 
Scotland, Catalonia and The Basque Country respectively. This can in large parts be 
explained by the role the Welsh Labour Party has succeeded in playing, what McEwen (R3) 
describes as, a ‘small nationalist party’; “it has been able to use some of the rhetoric of 
autonomy and self-government to strengthen devolution in Wales.” Hepburn (R1) thus 
emphasize that Plaid Cymru has had a much stronger rival for the votes than what  is the case 
for the SNP in Scotland, where the Scottish Labour Party has weakened significantly over the 
latter years as they have failed to represent the working interests in the Scottish electorate. 
“The statewide parties in Wales have also played quite a different role compared to 
Scotland. In Wales the Welsh Labour Party drew a clear red line between Wales and 
the rest of the UK in terms of the orientations of the Labour movement which tried to 
maintain its representation of working class interest much more strongly than the 
Scottish Labour party.”  
Furthermore, Keating (R2) also highlights the socioeconomic considerations which 
also contribute to restrain a secessionist discourse in Wales. Looking at the numbers it is 
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apparent that Wales is substantially weaker economically than Scotland, both within the UK 
and EU-framework (see table 2). Regarding this Keating explains that; “Wales simply 
wouldn’t be economically viable as an independent country. Everybody knows that. The 
dependency is huge. Wales has never been in that position to say ‘we can do without London 
now because we have the resource to manage more or less on our own’.” 
Table 2: Welsh fiscal strength in 2011. GDP (in PPS per inhabitant) and EU-average compared to Scotland and 
UK. 
  
Regional gross domestic product (PPS per 
inhabitant)  
 
Regional gross domestic product (PPS per inhabitant 
in % of the EU28 average) 
 
Wales 
 
 
19,500 * 
 
75 % 
 
Scotland 
 
 
26,700 * 
 
103 % 
 
UK 
 
 
29,500 
 
113,5 % 
 
EU-average 
 
 
26,000 
 
100 % 
Source: (Eurostat 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d) Notes: * the regional GDP in Scotland and Wales are 
aggregated numbers measured by the author on the basis of smaller regional sub-units displayed by Eurostat.     
For these reasons Plaid Cymru has historically been quite ambiguous with regards to 
its position on Welsh independence. Hepburn (H1) describes its position as highly ‘post-
sovereign’ in the sense that it did not consider the sovereign nation state model as a route 
Welsh self-determination should take. During the course of the last ten to fifteen years, 
however, the party has explicitly adopted the goal of independence. 
“It was very much, and still is, in favor of European integration more principally. 
Much more than the SNP who has used Europe quite instrumentally. Plaid Cymru has 
always been in favor of a Europe of the regions or a Europe of self-governing regions 
and has only recently decided to support a stronger form of constitutional change.”  
However, as long as Plaid Cymru does not have the electoral support to be the agenda-
setting force the SNP has become in Scotland, it is difficult to assess how real these 
aspirations of independence are. Convery (R4) describes Plaid Cymru political discourse as 
“(…) still fudging the question of whether they actually believe in independence. They have a 
much nuanced view of what independence is.” 
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5.2.5 Future outlooks 
In portraying the future outlooks of Welsh nationalism the experts emphasizes a continued 
course of nation building concentrated on broadening devolution. If this is a development that 
can lead to an institutional autonomy on the same terms as Scotland, and subsequently a more 
salient discourse with regards to secessionism, the viewpoints are more modest. Convery (R4) 
emphasizes Labour’s strong position in Wales as the main obstacle to more Welsh autonomy;  
“I don’t see there is any practical reason why Wales shouldn’t have a parliament with 
the same powers as Scotland. I think it’s more about political constraints in terms of 
the Labour Party, particularly Labour MPs in Wales, who are not keen on the Wales 
Assembly having more power.”  
Considering the potential for Wales following Scotland in a secessionist bid, Keating 
(R2) again stresses the economic aspect; “they follow whatever Scotland gets, so they are 
consciously catching up. But they are not following that far because they know it’s just not 
economically viable. This viewpoint is supported by McEwen (R3) who also stresses the 
difference of the Welsh context;  ”if Scotland had voted yes to independence or votes yes in 
the future, that doesn’t necessarily mean that Wales would want to follow. The debate in 
Wales has its own dynamic as well.” 
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CHAPTER SIX: Empirical presentation of Catalonia and the Basque Country in the 
Spanish context 
6.1 Catalonia: review of Catalan nationalism and the secessionist mobilization process 
6.1.1 Catalan national identity and the constitutional settlement 
Spain has for most of its history been a highly centralized unitary state that has not recognized 
the regional diversity of the country. It was not until the start of the democratic transition in 
1978 that the regions of Spain were politically empowered (Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez 
2013: 196). Thus, generally speaking Catalan identity is historically anchored in a struggle for 
recognition within the Spanish framework. More specifically, this struggle is strongly linked 
to the preservation and promotion of the Catalan language which has been subject to much 
suppression throughout the history of Spain. The era of Franco’s 2nd republic, where Catalan 
speaking people were harshly repressed and the language was threatened by extinction, is 
particularly important in understanding the Catalan nationalist discourse of today. Catalan is 
understood by 95 percent of the population and spoken by 73 percent (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2011). It serves as the most important factor in group identity and social cohesion 
without raising insurmountable obstacles between Catalan population groups. Although 
proficiency is much lower among the immigration population, strong social incentives to learn 
it makes it an important vehicle for assimilation and as a Latin-based language its 
accessibility is high (Keating 2001d: 222). As such, language is looked upon as the key 
denominator in understanding feelings of cultural distinctiveness of Catalonia, and the aspect 
whereupon the most important political arguments relating autonomy flows out from. Nagel 
(R8) underscores this point by saying; “In Catalonia, the national movement from the start 
was a language movement, and respect for the language was the main issue. This hasn’t 
changed until very recently.” 
In the process of negotiations of the Spanish democratic constitution in 1978, the 
general focus is described as being on solving four aspects; the religious problem, the agrarian 
problem, the military problem, and the territorial problem (R7 Liñeira). The latter refers to the 
accommodation of various regional nationalities in the country. Liñeira (R7) elaborates;  
“It was about separation of the state and the church; that Spain had a big agrarian 
population with no access to land and living in very poor conditions; that the military 
constantly interfered in the political process and doing coup d’état from time to time. 
These three first problems have mainly been solved during the transition. The 
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territorial problem, however, was the most difficult to solve. At the end of the day the 
constitution does not solve it at all, because it leaves it open to the political process. 
It’s a problem that started in the 19th century and which wasn’t solved during the 
transition.” 
Catalonia were alongside The Basque country and Navarre granted autonomy almost 
immediately through a fast and simplified process (Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez 2013: 
198). Following the first democratic election after Francoism in 1980, CiU, led by Jordi Pujol, 
won incumbency. Once in power, the CiU endorsed a nation-building process focused upon 
the re-establishment of Catalan institutions, the promotion of the Catalan language, and the 
construction of a novel Catalan identity (Guibernau 2013: 374) Liñeira (R7) elaborates by 
explaining that the Catalan movements in this period mainly were concerned about the 
protection of the Catalan language which had been forbidden under Franco, and that this was 
the main driver in the establishment of the governmental institutions; “when democracy was 
established, the main driver is recognition, and the main motivation to have government 
institutions was to have mechanisms that protected the language, and that even ensured some 
positive discrimination in favor of Catalan.” 
6.1.2 Seeking recognition and accommodation  
In the period of democracy support for independence has historically been fluctuating 
between 15 and 20 percent (R2 Keating). From 2010 the number starts to escalate 
dramatically and starts showing a support between 45 and 55 percent (R8 Nagel). Prior to this 
Catalan nationalism was very much focused on accommodation within Spain. Partal (R9) 
elaborates;  
“When the Franco-dictatorship ended there was sort of a pact; that Catalonia will 
help Spain becoming a full democracy. In the 70s the first thing was to win democracy 
even if came with a price. Secession was thus not an option. Pro-independenists’ were 
in a great minority. Most of the country respected that the Catalan nation could stay 
within a democratic and plurinational Spain.” 
Looking at the two main regionalist parties of Catalonia, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC) and CiU, they have traditionally both not been oriented towards 
secessionism. ERC, which in terms of traditional nationalist rhetoric’s has been the most 
visible party in the Catalan framework, changed is political ambition towards independence as 
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late as in in the early 1990s (R2 Keating). CiU which historically by far has been the most 
popular party in Catalonia, and has won six out of eight regional elections held in Catalonia 
(Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez 2013: 200), has up until 2012 been classified as a 
autonomist party emphasizing decentralization within Spain (Dandoy 2010). However, as I 
will elaborate below, this changed in 2012 when the party explicitly altered their political goal 
to include the option of independence. 
In sum, Catalan nationalism has for the vast majority of the democratic era been 
concerned with accommodation within Spain. The salience of the issue of independence has 
thus been very moderate. The qualitative shift in popular support for independence in 
Catalonia is by the respondents first and foremost traced to Catalonia’s attempt to acquire a 
new Statute of autonomy granting the region a deeper formal recognition, and also increased 
fiscal powers. This is a process that started in 2003 (R8 Nagel). It catalyzed a chain of events 
that together ignites and powers the secessionist mobilization process in Catalonia. Figure 6 
illustrates this development and shows that support for independence has increased quite 
dramatically over the years following 2010 as the preferred option of what the political status 
of Catalonia should have.  
Figure 6: Development from 2010-2014 in preferences on what the political status of Catalonia should be. 
 
Source: (Generalitat de Catalunya 2015) 
From an analytical perspective these chain of events can be narrowed down to three 
triggering aspects. The first is the proposed Catalan Statute of Autonomy being finally 
rejected in 2010. The second is the cycle of popular mobilization, which is signified by the 
various mass demonstrations that derived from the Statute being rejected. The third is the CiU 
changing its political orientation towards independence in 2012, ultimately as a response to 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
A region of Spain
An autonomous community
of Spain (status quo)
A state in a federal Spain
An independent state
80 
 
the will of the people, whereupon it in the Catalan parliament was agreed to hold a 
referendum on independence.   
6.1.3 The rejected bid for a new Statute of autonomy 
The two main parties in Spain contesting at the national level are the PP and the PSOE. The 
two parties also compete at the sub-national level through regional affiliation parties. 
Generally speaking, in the regional political context of Catalonia, the PP has the reputation as 
a supporter of the Spanish national party, and as a defender of a centralized and homogenous 
state, whereas the PSOE has a reputation for advocating a decentralized vision of Spain 
(Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez 2013: 197).  Following the Catalan election of 2003 and the 
Spanish general election of 2004, the PSOE were the biggest party in terms of electoral 
support in both tiers, and held office at the Spanish level. Catalan politicians then saw a 
window of opportunity to get a new Statute of Autonomy. The legal process to implement a 
new statute is as follows: first it must be accepted in the Catalan parliament; then it needs to 
be approved in the Spanish parliament and in the Spanish senate. When it has been approved 
by both chambers of the Spanish government, a final referendum over whether to accept the 
Statute is held in Catalonia. In 2006, after a languid political process, the Statute-document 
had been through the scrutiny of the Spanish governmental institutions – its initial content had 
been considerably watered down. However, this restricted version was nonetheless politically 
approved by Spain, and subsequently ratified in a Catalan referendum by an overwhelming 
majority of 78 percent. However, mainly as an initiative by the PP, who at the time was in 
opposition, the Statute was challenged for being unconstitutional whereupon it was sent to the 
Constitutional Court for revision. Another four years passed as the statute was under 
deliberation by Constitutional Court. Finally, in 2010 the verdict of the court was ready – the 
Statute was judged to be unconstitutional and thus widely curtailed (R8 Nagel; R10 Lopez). 
Lopez further explains that four central aspects were removed from the Statute; the 
recognition of Catalonia as a ‘nation’ and not as ‘nationality’; a modified economic 
agreement; a clear outline of Catalonia’s political competences; and, protection of the status 
of the Catalan language. Regarding the latter, Lopez (R10) explains that; “we wanted it not 
only to be a right, but a duty for all civil servants, regardless of their origin, to be able to 
express themselves in Catalan.” 
Nagel (R8) emphasizes that with the ruling, the Constitutional Court established a very 
hard rule in how to interpret the Spanish constitution: “Especially after the sentence there is 
really not any leeway of interpretation. That is at least what it seems. And I think it is not 
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casual that the Catalan nationalist movement, that had not been separatist, after this sentence 
changed opinion.” Partal (R9) agrees and further sums up the general sentiment in Catalonia 
with regards to process;  
“The Statute was greatly amended by the Madrid-government, but even if there was a 
strong disappointment in the Catalan population about this they voted yes in the 
referendum. The big surprise came after when the Constitutional Court decided to 
further amend the Statute. They said no to almost everything. They absolutely blew up 
the basics of the Statute. That triggered the first big demonstrations for independence, 
and this is really the beginning of the secessionist process.” 
6.1.4 The first demonstrations   
The second important factor for understanding the secessionist mobilization process in 
Catalonia is the various mass protests that have unfolded at various stages in the bid for 
getting the new Statute of Autonomy. The first significant protests were carried out in the 
wake of the Spanish government amending the Statute in 2006 (R10 Lopez). As a mechanism 
of protest there were also informal plebiscites at the local level. This process started in 2009 
and spread from village from village before it ended in 2012 (R7 Liñeira; Muñoz and 
Guinjoan 2010). However, the most important demonstration with relevance for the Catalan 
independence project is a mass demonstration reacting to the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court in 2010. This protest clearly marks the change in emphasis in nationalist political 
discourse – from an autonomist to a secessionist orientation. The Statute of 2006 can in this 
way be seen as the main political attempt to move the Spanish constitution into a more 
federalist direction.  When this failed, the secessionist option gained momentum (R7 Liñeira). 
Serrano (R12) explains that a collective perception that Catalonia was unable to reach a 
sufficient level of self-government within the existing framework took form; “thus, the only 
alternative to reach a significant level of self-rule is through independence.” Partal (R9) 
further elaborates on the popular implications of the 2010-demonstration;  
“People said; we have for decades been trying to accommodate within Spain. This has 
proved impossible. We must now find a way to become an independent country, 
because it is absolutely clear that Spain doesn’t want to accept anything coming from 
Catalonia.” 
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In 2012 the broad civic movement Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) was 
constituted. This is an organization with ties to ERC and CiU, but which formally is 
politically independent (R7 Liñeira). The ANC initiated three vast demonstrations in the 
course of 2012 to 2014, including the famous ‘human chain’ in 2013. These three 
demonstrations are also important in understanding the dynamics of the Catalan debate, which 
by the respondents is depicted as a grass root movement.     
6.1.5 CiU’s change of preference and the ‘right to decide’  
The third and final triggering cause is, as outlined above, related to the political standpoint of 
CiU. After the Catalan Statue finally fell apart with the ruling of the Spanish constitutional 
court, CiU, the incumbent party at the time, initiated a redefined goal to instead attain a new 
fiscal arrangement similar to the Basque ‘concierto’. A meeting between Mariano Rajoy and 
Artur Mas, the respective heads of government in Spain and Catalonia was held in September 
2012, but was from a Catalan perspective a massive failure (R7 Liñeira). As a consequence of 
the failed proposal, and also due to the broad discontent of the general public massively 
protesting, the CiU called for early elections the same year where they campaigned on the 
promise to deliver a referendum on Catalan independence (Martí 2013). The goal was to 
exploit the situation to strengthen their position as the main regionalist party in Catalonia (R9 
Partal). Nagel (R8) explains that;  
“CiU, which never had stood for independence, changed their platforms to include a 
referendum on independence, and therefore, Artur Mas, who stood for autonomy and 
against independence before, now is leading in a way the campaign to have a 
referendum on independence.” 
In this sense it is important to note that CiU did not change their electoral platform to 
pro-independence. However, as independence gained visibility in the political debate as the 
only alternative in front of the state putting a very limited outlook of an autonomous 
Catalonia, there was an agreement between various regionalist parties on the necessity to hold 
a referendum for the Catalan society to express their preferences (R12 Serrano). This 
campaign has been popularly branded with the slogan ‘the right to decide’ (R10 Lopez). The 
election, however, was not the great success the CiU anticipated. An important factor for this, 
and also a factor in explaining why CiU changed their perspective on the self-determination 
question in the first place, is the political revival of ERC’s political fortunes, which had been 
very low in the mid-2000s (R2 Keating). Being a pro-independence party since the early 
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1990s ERC managed to exploit the situation and through the image of being ‘the true 
defenders of independence’ achieved a remarkably good election result (Martí 2013: 511). 
While CiU rather surprisingly suffered a set-back loosing 12 seats in the parliament, ERC 
gained 11 seats, and hence had important agenda-setting powers as a significant opposition 
party (Reuters 2012). Thus, CiU, still the biggest party, attempted to form a coalition 
government with ERC. After negotiations the offer was rejected by ERC. Instead a deal was 
made that kept ERC outside government, but guaranteed parliamentary stability and support 
to the government in crucial votes (Martí 2013: 513-514).Thus, CiU now led a government 
where the main agenda was set to hold a referendum on independence and had majority 
support for the issue in parliament. Partal (R9) sums up his interpretation of the election 
result; “people expressed that they want to go for independence, but that they didn’t want CiU 
alone to lead the process.”  
6.1.6 The referendum-process 
Throughout the years following 2010, support for independence has figured around 50 percent 
(R8 Nagel; R2 Keating).
28
 Furthermore, after the judgement of the Constitutional court 
rejecting the statue of autonomy and the Catalan snap elections whereupon there was a 
majority in the Catalan parliament of regionalist parties opting for a referendum on 
independence, the CiU- led government went to the Spanish government stating they had the 
legitimacy to be transferred the competences to hold a referendum on independence. The 
proposal was clearly rejected on the grounds that the Spanish constitution does not permit 
that. The next and last possible step from a Catalan perspective was then to go by a law of 
consultation. Hence, the Catalan parliament legislated for a law on holding a non-binding 
consultation, and agreed that it was to be held the November 9
th
 2014. The Spanish 
government reacted by sending the proposal to the constitutional court, who ruled that the law 
as well as the consultation, was unconstitutional (R8 Nagel). The respondents emphasize that 
after this the Spanish government in reality has blocked all pathways to any element of 
Catalan self-determination. This development, of course, further fuels the intensity of the 
mobilization movement. Capdevila (R11) explains that the process now is at its climax and 
that any political solution short of independence seems improbable; “When you have 50, 60, 
70 % of the people who have been through the rational process of realizing that it is better to 
                                                 
28
 For instance, the political opinion barometer of the Catalan government in 2014 show that 45, 3 percent prefer 
for Catalonia to be ‘an independent state’ (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014a). 
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split up, it is very difficult to come back. We are now far beyond the point of no return. There 
is no going back now.”  
The consultation was held according to plan the November 9
th
 last year. However, in 
formal terms the Catalan government rebranded the vote to being an unofficial poll where 
Catalans could express their opinions. As the Constitutional Court order implied a suspension 
of all official campaigning and preparations of a referendum, the vote was organized by 
volunteers without any formal electoral role (The Guardian 2014b). The results of a vote 
showed 80 percent voting yes to independence, but the turnout was reported to only be around 
37 percent (El País 2014).   
6.1.7 The ‘pre-referendum debate’ 
Due to the fact that the referendum in Catalonia not at any point has been considered as 
legitimate, the nature of the debate is of course quite different compared to the Scottish case. 
As such, Serrano (R12) refers to the dynamics of the Catalan process as a ‘pre-referendum’ 
debate. Thus, the debate is depicted to concern the right to hold a referendum, rather than 
more practical pros and cons of independence. More specifically, the characteristics of the 
debate can be narrowed down to two main aspects; the heterogeneity of the groups supporting 
independence, and the of lack practical arguments for and against an independent Catalonia. 
6.1.7.1 The broad nature of the independence-seeking coalition 
Regarding the first aspect, Keating (R2) explains that;  
“Catalonia is an extremely heterogeneous coalition. All the way from the center-right 
to the far left. There is nothing terribly cohesive about it except the demand for 
constitutional change and the demand for independence which would clearly provide 
more resources that could be used for all kinds of things.” 
Partal (R9) elaborates by highlighting the uniqueness of the Catalan pro-independence 
coalition;  
“In Catalonia we have a coalition supporting the process that goes from the Christian 
Democrats to the anti-capitalists. That is unique. Nowhere else in the world has that 
happened before. You have CiU which is a coalition of Christian Democrats and 
liberal democrats, you have the ERC who are social democrats, you have the Greens 
and the former communists, and you have the anti-capitalists.” 
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Furthermore, Capdevila (R11) emphasizes the popular dimension of the Catalan 
movement and highlights the civic nature of this. In similar veins as the Scottish discourse he 
explains that the issue of immigration is important in understanding the Catalan demands for 
self-government; “There are lots of immigrants who are participating in this process because 
they see it as a way of being part of a historical moment; we are building a new country, so 
they see it has an opportunity to integrate themselves quicker and in easier ways.” According 
to Capdevila (R11), the immigration aspect is especially forceful when regarding the Spanish 
population of Catalonia;  
“You’ll find lots of people who are not Catalan, but who feel themselves Catalan and 
feels that Spain is not treating Catalonia well.  So they are joining the independence 
movement. There is an association called ‘Sumate’ campaigning for an independent 
state; they are people of Spanish origin and they are Spanish speakers.”  
6.1.7.2 The arguments of the debate 
Regarding the concrete contents of the discourse relating the referendum, the respondents, as 
noted above, emphasize that the political climate is too charged and polarized for it to have 
room for practical arguments to any large extent. However, looking beneath this, some 
parallels can be drawn to the general arguments dominating the Scottish debate. Most 
significant is perhaps the fact that the arguments referring to cultural or linguistic 
distinctiveness also in the Catalan case are minor. More important arguments invoked by 
supporters of independence is the desire for increased fiscal autonomy and the wish for 
greater prosperity and freedom (Guibernau 2013: 387) In relation to the latter, Nagel (R8) 
stresses that, although the traditional culturalist discourse still is present, the most visible 
arguments are politically motivated in the sense that they emphasize Catalonia as the rightful 
political demos in competition with the Spanish demos;  
“The idea of the nation based on language, the cultural nation, and so on, is still 
around. I’m not saying that. It is in the discourse. However, while before the first thing 
was always language; the respect for the language and the possibility for survival of 
the language, this emphasis is not as high anymore. It has gone down in the political 
discourse, while the other argument; we are the relevant demos, we should have the 
right to decide on our own and so on, is more important.” 
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In relation Nagel’s argument Lopez (R10) and Partal (R9) explain that they see the 
Catalan movement basically as a reactive movement and as protest against a dysfunctional 
Spanish democracy. In the words of Lopez (R10); 
“Our unity is not based on the Catalan language. Here there are people who speak 
Spanish and people who speak Catalan. Our unity is the feeling that we are people, 
and from the Spanish state we are not recognized as we want.  It’s not a basic and 
historical right. It’s about the democratic right to decide.” 
The economic argument for independence is of course linked to Catalonia’s second-
rate fiscal arrangement compared to the ‘conciertos’ of The Basque Country and Navarra. The 
aspect really gained visibility in the Catalan discourse during the finical crisis which hit the 
Spanish economy hard, and has thus been brought in to the independence discourse (R2 
Keating). Looking at the figures, Catalonia is as the Basque country a relative rich region both 
compared to the rest of Spain and in the EU (see table 3). The crux in the economic argument 
is that after tax redistribution Catalonia suffers an annual loss of about 8 percent of their GDP 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2014b; Guibernau 2013). The argument is frequently referred to as 
the ‘fiscal deficit’ of Catalonia. The white paper on Catalan independence spells out that; 
“this tax deficit, which seriously hinders Catalan institutions’ leeway for action, has 
prompted an overall loss in competiveness in Catalan society and has triggered tensions in 
the provision of public services to the people.” (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014b: 11) 
Table 3: Catalan fiscal strength in 2011. GDP (in PPS per inhabitant) and EU-average compared to the Basque 
Country and Spain  
  
Regional gross domestic 
product  
 
Regional gross domestic 
product (PPS per inhabitant in 
% of the EU28 average) 
 
Catalonia 
 
 
28,400 
 
109 % 
 
The Basque Country 
 
 
32,500 
 
125 % 
 
Spain 
 
 
23,000 
 
88,6 % 
 
EU-average 
 
 
26,000 
 
100 % 
Source: (Eurostat 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d) 
Liñeira (R7) emphasizes that the argument hardly can be described as compounding a 
proper deliberation on the advantages and disadvantages independence; 
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“Some have promoted the argument; if we have our own state, we don’t have to 
contribute so much to solidarity. However, up until now this has been the main 
discussion related to the economic advantages of having an own state. The discussion 
hasn’t evolved very much, because the discussion right now is not about advantages 
and disadvantages of an own state, but about the right of having a consultation on the 
future of Catalonia.”  
6.2 The Basque Country: review of Basque nationalism and the nationalist discourse 
In the traditional academic discourse the Basque Country has often been presented as one of 
the most forceful cases with regards to pursuing independence. Much more so than what is the 
case in Catalonia where claims in the democratic era generally have been more modest and 
focused on self-determination within the Spanish state. Parties advocating independence has 
for long been influential in the Basque political landscape (R9 Partal). Moreover, Basque 
nationalism has received much attention due to ETA’s terrorist agenda throughout the second 
half of the last century and up to 2011 when the organization declared a final cessation of all 
violent activity. Subsequently, the organization of ETA and its sympathizers has gone on to 
advocate its agenda peacefully in the political institutional framework. This development has, 
however, not been without controversies as their party Batasuna was banned as an illegal 
party by Spanish Supreme Court. Later succeeding parties such as Sortu and Bildu have also 
been subject to the same controversy, thus having difficulties competing in Basque 
elections.
29
 
As emphasized in chapter two, political initiatives, which at least in formal terms had 
resemblances to the ongoing political dispute between the governments of Catalonia and 
Spain today, was taken in 2002 by officials of the PNV. This process, however, is by the 
respondents depicted as a ‘top-down’ political initiative where the main goal was to appease 
the violent forces of nationalism (R9 Partal; R10 Lopez). The initiative thus lacked the 
popular democratic support as the case is in Catalonia where the bid for a referendum derives 
from a demand in the Catalan society (R7 Liñeira). 
Thus, secessionist sentiments arguably have a strong presence in the Basque country. 
However, comparative to the present Catalan situation, demands have never managed to 
generate the amount of support needed for a forceful mobilization for secession. While 
Basque identity has proved extremely persistent and strong in the democratic era, support for 
                                                 
29
 In 2011 just before the election campaign started the Constitutional Court of Spain lifted the election ban of 
Bildu and the party was allowed to partake in the parliament elections of 2012. 
88 
 
independence has been a lot more fluctuating. Perhaps having its heyday in 2005, which 
probably can be explained by sentiments attached to the Spanish government blocking 
Ibarretxe’s referendum bid, the momentum of proponents advocating independence may 
today seem to have fizzled out a bit (see table 4). Capdevila (R11) sums this up in the 
following way; “If you go to the Basque country, you will realize that the vast majority of 
Basque people feel themselves Basque. They are not Spanish, but they are comfortable 
enough not to push for independence right now.” 
Table 4: Basque identity and support for independence 2005 and 2014 
  
Basque Identity (Moreno question) 
 
Support for independence 
 
 
May 2005 
 
 
Only Basque: 34 % 
More Basque than Spanish: 34 % 
 
 
37 % 
 
November 2014 
 
 
Only Basque: 33 % 
More Basque than Spanish: 35 % 
 
 
22 % 
 Source: (Euskobarometro 2005, 2014) 
6.2.1 The traditional characteristics 
In describing Basque nationalism historically comparatively to Catalan the respondents 
describes two discourses based in quite different principles. Partal (R9) describes this in the 
following way; “The Basque nationalists you can say were something like the Irish nationalist 
– very catholic and very conservative. The Catalan nationalism has always been more 
popular – more left oriented. These differences were very big from the beginning.” A related 
issue is how the Basque nationalism defines itself in terms of membership and territoriality. 
Regarding membership, the Basque discourse emphasizes a combination of language and 
ethnicity (Zabalo 2008). Capdevila (R11) underscores this aspect; “You cannot be Basque if 
you want to. You can be there, you can live with them, you can be part of their society, but if 
you are not Basque you can’t be Basque.”  
The question of what constitutes Basque territory is also a much more disputed matter 
in The Basque Country than in Catalonia. Lopez (R10) links this issue to the failure of the 
Ibarretxe-plan; 
“In Catalonia the definition of the nation with borders coincides with that of the 
autonomous community. That is something that happened quite naturally in Catalonia, 
while it in the Basque country still is an objective for the future. You won’t almost find 
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anyone who claims that the autonomous community and the Basque nation coincides. 
So they could not apply for a referendum, even if it was legal, because you only ask 
part of the people. In fact, that was some of the major criticism regarding the 
Ibarretxe-plan:” 
An additional factor distinguishing Basque nationalism from Catalan is the relevance 
of the Basque language as an identity marker (R7 Liñeira). In contrast to Catalonia, where the 
language is imperative, Basque, plays a much smaller role and is spoken by a minority of the 
people (around 30%). It can thus be compared to the significance of the Welsh language in 
Wales as being a clear secondary language, and thus more of symbolic value.   
6.2.2 The history of violence and the divisions of nationalism 
In portraying the difference between Basque and Catalan nationalism in the democratic era 
the issue of violence reveals itself as the most prominent issue (Horowitz 1985: 231), and is 
among the respondents depicted as the main factor explaining why democratic secessionist 
mobilization in the Basque country thus far has been unsuccessful. Serrano (R12) states that; 
“Historically, one of the key differences has been the presence of a violent factor.” ETA’s 
violent history of terrorism in pursuing the Basque cause of independence has left 
considerable scars in the political landscape of the Basque Country. The violent past has 
hence split Basque nationalism mainly into two political divisions. On the one hand, it is the 
various parties superseding ETA. These parties, often referred to as the ‘patriotic left’ 
(izquierda abertzale) because of their leftist political ideology combined with a secessionist 
agenda, have as mentioned been subjects of much controversies because of their alleged 
affiliations to the ETA. This division can be depicted as somewhat nebulous and unstable in 
terms of party composition as new parties and coalitions constantly have emerged and 
superseded each other. On the other hand, the second division is primarily associated with 
PNV, the main regionalist party in the Basque with long traditions. The PNV is a center-right 
party advocating less radical nationalist demands. Partal (R10) elaborates on the relationship 
between the two division;  
“There are two big divisions – the ones who exercised violence and the ones who 
suffered violence. It’s very difficult for them to join. One is related to the Basque 
national party in power. They are traditionally rightwing and moderates and against 
violence. The other follows the ETA’s political wing. It is on the leftwing and consists 
of people who traditionally supported violence. It is very difficult for them to join 
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because if you are a member of the Basque national party you probably know someone 
who was killed by ETA, and if you are member of Sortu, or the Batasuna-wing, you 
probably know someone who was tortured or killed by the police.” 
This can be illustrated by the results in the last Basque parliament elections of 2012 
where the two main regional parties both won the votes of a significant proportion of the 
electorate (see table 5). In addition to the two main nationalist parties, the two main statewide-
parties PP and PSOE traditionally also wins significant numbers of the votes in the regional 
elections. Political preferences in the Basque Country must therefore be portrayed as quite 
wide-ranging, both with respect to the territorial cleavage and right-left cleavage.   
Table 5: Electoral results of PNV and Bildu in the Basque Parliament election of 2012 
 
Regionalist party 
 
 
Vote share of regional  election 
 
PNV 
 
 
34.6 % 
 
 
 BILDU 
 
 
25,0 %  
 
PSE-EE (PSOE)* 
 
 
19,13 % 
 
 
PP 
 
 
11,73 % 
Source: El País (2012) Notes: * Partido Socialista de Euskadi – Euskadiko Ezkerra, is the regional affiliate of 
the statewide party, PSOE. 
6.2.3 Basque fiscal autonomy: the ‘concierto’   
The ‘concierto económico’ is a special economic agreement the autonomous communities of 
The Basque Country and Navarre have with the Spanish state. Basically, it is a deal which 
allows them full control in collecting and spending taxes within their regions. They only pay 
the central government for certain services (e.g. for defense and the foreign ministry) (Gómez 
Fortes and Cabeza Perez 2013: 199). This arrangement dates back to the negotiations of the 
Spanish constitution of 1978 and stems from complex historical circumstances related to The 
Basque Country’s and Navarre’s relationship with Spain prior to the democratic transition. 
For the other autonomous communities, including Catalonia, it is the Spanish central 
government who controls taxes and decides the distribution of fiscal revenues throughout the 
country. The ‘concierto’ thus makes the regional government of the Basque Country a more 
profitable regime (R8 Nagel). 
The respondents emphasize this aspect in comparing the economic grievances in the 
Basque country and Catalonia. Lopez (R10) says that; “they don’t have the same economic 
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problems as in Catalonia. They can’t claim a new deal, because they already have the best 
deal.” Partal (R9) supplements this by a link to the financial crisis in Europe, which has 
affected the Basque Country less relative to Catalonia;  
“The Basques have a control over there financing that Catalonia don’t have. This is a 
reason why they are not moving towards independence. They don’t need so much. 
They are almost independent today. For instance, if you see the unemployment rate in 
the Basque country, they are lower than in Spain because they have the instruments to 
tackle the problems. In Catalonia we don’t have those instruments.” 
6.2.4 Future outlooks 
In a comparative perspective with Catalonia, the main feature characterizing Basque 
nationalism and its discourse is the salience of the terrorist-issue. This history of violence has 
contributed to split Basque nationalism into two distinct divisions which of course makes 
forceful mobilization for nationalist demands more difficult. Demands for independence in 
the Basque country thus lack a popular dimension. Another central aspect that is brought up 
by the respondents is the that the Basque Country has substantially more political freedoms, 
particularly on the fiscal dimension. This is an important issue in dampening cultural 
grievances. For these reasons the respondents does not believe that similar popular demands 
can emerge in The Basque Country as in Catalonia in the immediate future. Referring to the 
special economic agreement, Capdevila (R9) states that; “They have things that Catalans 
don’t have. This makes it easier for them, and makes independence less vital for their future.” 
Serrano (R12) agrees and thinks the ‘concierto’ can be an important explanatory factor in 
understanding the relative modest demands for secession; “the truth is that because the 
Basque country has a higher level of autonomy maybe that has prevented pro-independence 
to advance at the same level as it has in Catalonia. Liñeira (R7) supplements this and states; 
“I would say that maybe the sense of lacking recognition is more spread among Catalans than 
among Basques.” 
The respondents also point to the fact that the Basque polity must come to terms with 
its violent past in order to unite the forces of nationalism. Partal (R9) explains that the 
political constellations supporting secession in the Basque country is very different from the 
Catalan picture which draws its supporters from a broad ideological spectrum ranging from 
Christian democrats to anti-capitalist’s; “it is absolute the contrary in the Basque Country 
who are very much split. I think they need to clean all the memories of violence before they 
can do anything.”  
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Lastly, Liñeira (R7) emphasize that Basque nationalists are quite ambivalent to the 
mobilization process unfolding in Catalonia. He explains that although they principally 
support the process, it is also a process that may damage Basque autonomy in the long run; 
“it’s a movement that is challenging the status-quo, and the status-quo doesn’t look so bad 
for the Basque Country.” He grounds this in Basque concerns about the outcome of the 
Catalan process and the potential for a political settlement short of independence;   
“They are aware of that maybe at some point the Catalan and the Spanish government 
will go into bargains for some constitutional change, and maybe that this is something 
that they are not so comfortable with. If the Catalans were to get some kind of fiscal 
arrangement similar to the Basque, it is not clear that the Spanish state is very 
sustainable in the long term. It is not clear that that is a policy that can be spread. 
Also, there are some concerns by the EU-institutions about the fiscal arrangements 
that the Basques enjoy. So they don’t like very much that these things are being 
discussed in Catalonia.” 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Theoretical discussion and broader outlooks 
7.1 The ‘negative’ cases: Wales and the Basque Country 
7.1.1 Case summaries 
Welsh minority nationalism is in comparative terms to Scotland much less developed. This is 
reflected both in terms of a weaker sense national identity and less radical demands for self-
government. Internal tensions, particularly the role of the Welsh language, were for long 
obstacles for Welsh nationalism to prosper. In recent years, however, and particularly after 
devolution, many of the conflicting aspects have been resolved. Wales has thus gone on to a 
path of nation-building and is taking the shape of a political community. A reflection of this is 
the increased powers the Welsh Assembly (parliament) has gained throughout the 2000s. 
Welsh Labour is the most prominent party with regards to the territorial management of 
Wales, and Plaid Cymru, the main regionalist party, has a less significant role. Comparing it 
with the role of the SNP in Scotland, who has overtaken the role statewide-parties had in 
Scotland, Plaid Cumry does not have the same power to influence Welsh demands for self-
government. Hence, the Welsh political discourse is largely centered on increased autonomy 
within the UK-framework. Support for independence and the significance of the issue in the 
political discourse is thus marginal. From an historical outlook, this can mainly be traced to 
three factors. First, Wales entered the UK by conquest and was thus from the start deeper 
integrated into the political entity of the UK than what was the case with Scotland, which 
joined the UK as an act of unionism. Welsh national distinctiveness has as such to larger 
extent been assimilated into British nationalism. Moreover, this also limited the functionality 
of Wales as a political entity. Second, the Welsh language has played a large part in the Welsh 
national discourse. However, not as a uniting component like in the Catalan case. Rather, the 
English speaking and Welsh speaking parts of the region have quarreled about what the role 
of the language should have. This has been a dividing struggle that has hindered Welsh 
nationalism to progress as a united force. Third, Wales is a relatively poor region within the 
UK and dependent on fiscal transfers. The economic dependency makes an independent 
Wales an unviable prospect for the unforeseeable future.  
The Basque case, on the other hand, has for long been among the most prominent 
cases of minority nationalism in Europe. However, Basque secessionism from traditional 
perspective distinguishes itself from Catalan nationalism in at least two important aspects. 
First, the Basque language is an important identity marker but is nonetheless of secondary 
importance in everyday use in competition with Spanish. Second, what the ‘Basque nation’ 
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essentially implies, both in terms of territorial extensiveness and national membership, is 
largely disputed. Traditional romantic visions connote the nationalist discourse to larger 
extent than the more civic Catalan discourse where territory and membership coincides with 
the borders of the Autonomous Community. Furthermore, the secessionist profile of the 
Basque Country has primarily been driven by the agenda set out by the ETA with their 
terrorist means, which has given the cause much attention both academically and popularly. 
As a tangible democratic political project, however, Basque secessionism has not been 
coherently salient. The Ibarretxe-plan was an initiative set out by the PNV-led Basque 
government in 2003 to hold a referendum on renegotiating the Basque status within Spain. 
The Spanish government reacted by blocking the initiative on the grounds that it was 
unconstitutional. Thus, in strictly formal terms this process has clear resemblances to the 
Catalan case. However, the initiative, referred to as the Ibarretxe-plan, has later been depicted 
as top-down project led by the Basque regional president of the time. It was primarily 
motivated by a means to appease the terrorist division of Basque nationalism. Thus, it lacked 
the popular dimension apparent in the Catalan case and faded of the political agenda soon 
after the Spanish government had reacted. Furthermore, the Ibarretxe-plan may be seen as a 
reflection of the main problem facing Basque independence-seekers – namely, a split 
nationalist division. At present the two divisions are reflected through the two national parties, 
PNV and Bildu who both had strong elections in 2012, winning 34.6 percent and 25 percent of 
the votes respectively. While PNV represents a mainstream, conservative and more moderate 
rank of Basque nationalism, Bildu, which frequently is linked to ETA, represents a leftist and 
radical nationalist rank. Due to the violent backdrop there is much antagonism between the 
two divisions – very simplistically stated, a relationship where the one side represents the 
executants of violence, whereas the other represents the enforcers of the Spanish law. Aside 
from a split political national discourse, secessionism is also held in check by a fiscal 
arrangement which grants the region large freedoms and flexibility in comparison to other 
autonomous communities. 
7.1.2 Theoretical discussion 
By linking the empirical presentation of the two negative cases to the analytical framework 
put forward in chapter three, some inferences with regards to why the secessionist agenda in 
these two cases not has been able establish itself sufficiently as force for a democratic 
mobilization process to occur, can be made. Regarding the expectations reflecting remote 
factors, (1) strong regional identity and (2) viability of a potential independent state, there are 
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some crucial differences between the positive and the negative cases. Furthermore, by 
elaborating these differences, natural links can be drawn to why neither (3) dissatisfaction 
with statewide parties, nor (4) popular support is sufficiently prominent for the nationalist 
political discourse to tip over to a democratic secessionist mobilization process. The Welsh 
and the Basque cases of minority nationalism are hence good supplementary cases in 
understanding the secessionist mobilization processes in Scotland and Catalonia. 
In Wales, regional identity is weaker and less united than in Scotland. That is not to 
say that there is not a strong Welsh identity. Studies show that the Welsh identity is extensive. 
However, comparative to Scotland, Wales is significantly more assimilated into the UK-
framework both functionally, politically and economically. These factors make Wales 
unviable as an independent state. With regards to this, the economic situation in the region is 
particularly important and helps explain why support for independence has not increased 
although nation-building has progressed significantly. Wales is, in relative terms to the other 
cases in the study, a poor European region. Looking at the Catalan and the Scottish case, the 
arguments of economic self-sustainability, and that independence potentially will lead to 
increased prosperity in the regions, are vital for understanding the secessionist push. The 
distinct Welsh identity can therefore be assumed to primarily be of symbolic value. Thus, the 
salience of the independence issue in the political discourse is marginal and support 
correspondingly very modest. The element of popular support for the secessionist project is 
therefore missing and it’s very difficult for advocates of independence to mobilize. When 
arguments about independence obviously cannot convincingly be put forward, it is natural 
that the nation-building project has been politically oriented towards increased autonomy. 
These demands, however, have largely been articulated by Welsh Labour, who as an affiliated 
statewide party, plays the brokerage role between Wales and the UK. While Scottish 
nationalism and in turn secessionism mainly is explained by the rise of the SNP at the expense 
of statewide parties in the region, Welsh Labour has since devolution by far been the most 
influential party in the Welsh assembly. There is thus not a particular dissatisfaction with 
statewide parties or central governmental policies in the Welsh political discourse. 
Whereas Wales can be portrayed as representing a novel form of civic minority 
nationalism, the preconditions for a secessionist movement should in the Basque case be 
significantly stronger. Basque identity is similarly to the Catalan identity dominant and 
culturally rooted where language and historical grievances vis-à-vis Spain are important. 
Moreover, the region is among the richest in Spain. The aspect of the economic viability of a 
potential independent state is thus unquestionable. However, whereas nation-building in 
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Catalonia is characterized for its clear civic development, the Basque national identity can 
still be said to be connoted by more ethnic and romantic sentiments. First, Basque-
membership is conditioned by race. In the modern EU-context where the movement of people 
and immigration is characteristic, this ethnical emphasis is an unfeasible basis for rallying 
support for independence. Second, territorially, the perception of the Basque area is closely 
linked to historical myths of prior Basque influence, and does not coincide very well with the 
Spanish or European border-configurations of today. Because there is no agreement in the 
modern nationalist discourse of what a Basque state in practice would imply, the territorial 
viability of a secessionist project is limited. Again, looking at the Catalan case, this point is 
significant. The scope of Catalan nationalism has also been subjected to different discourses 
which include various constellations of Catalan speaking regions
30
, however, in the 
secessionist discourse of today, these are insignificant. 
Assessing the expectations of (3) dissatisfaction of statewide parties and (4) popular 
support, it can regarding the former be noted that dissatisfaction is present, but that it not is as 
prominent as in the Catalan cause. PP and PSOE both play important roles in Basque party 
politics. Moreover, the most popular regional party, PNV, has never been promoting 
independence in any radical sense, but rather been focused on Basque accommodation within 
the Spanish state. PNV can thus be compared to the role CiU traditionally has had in the 
Catalan case. Independence-seeking parties in the Basque country are mainly centered around 
the left on the political spectrum, and supporting parties that have emerged after the 
dissolution of ETA. In electoral terms this dimension is quite significant, but the antagonist 
relationship with the less radical PNV-camp hinders a sufficient popular basis for secessionist 
mobilization to occur. In a scenario where similar catalyst factors as in the Catalan case were 
to transpire, this could perhaps change – PNV would alter its political goal, hence bringing the 
two nationalist camps closer together.  In contrast to the Welsh case, the potential for a 
democratic secessionist movement in the Basque country is arguably present. However, on 
the other hand it can be argued that the potential for such catalysts to emerge is rather limited. 
This has to do with general financial situation in the region and the political freedoms the 
Basque country already possess – particularly with regards to financial management. In a 
European environment which for recent years has been marred by recession, the Basque 
Country, largely because of its flexibility in managing the economy, has been able to steer 
clear of the worst of it. This can help explain why support for independence has decreased in 
                                                 
30
 These include the Spanish regions of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, and also areas in France and Andorra 
(Enciclopèdia Catalan 2015). 
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recent years. In light of the Basque Country’s comfortable economic position, mobilizing for 
independence which challenges the status-quo might be deemed as a risky strategy when, 
after all, the status quo does look quite appealing. It may thus be concluded that the Spanish 
territorial management of the Basque Country in general has been more successful than that 
of Catalonia.   
7.2 The ‘positive’ cases: Scotland and Catalonia 
 
7.2.1 Case summaries  
Scottish nationalism is portrayed as paradigmatic case of civic nationalism. Primarily this is 
because cultural and linguistic arguments are marginal in the nationalist discourse. Moreover, 
the recognition of Scotland as a distinct nation has never been disputed in the UK-context. 
Scotland entered UK through an act of unionism, and thus in many respects as a fully 
functional political entity. The discourse of nationalism has therefore for long been centered 
on the political dimension, and arguments have been rooted in the practical concerns about 
Scottish accommodation within the UK. Support for independence has always been 
significant and stable around 30 percent – hence, the preference of a clear minority in the 
population. However, once the referendum on independence was put on the political agenda, 
the debate that followed boosted support.  This process culminated with the Scots voting no to 
independence by a marginal 55 percent vote. In assessing the chain of events leading up the 
narrow no-vote, the single most important explanatory driver is the tremendous development 
of the SNP, a party traditionally committed to Scottish independence, has had over the last 
decade. It has evolved from a fringe party with marginal influence, to a mainstream party, 
which has overtaken the role Scottish Labour previously had as the main political advocate 
with regards to territorial management. Gradually, and especially since devolution, the SNP 
has increased its support in the Scottish electorate. It governed Scotland in a minority 
government from 2007 until 2011 with great success, and reaped the awards for this in the 
2011-Scottish elections, winning a landslide victory whereupon they formed a majority 
government. With a majority in Holyrood they could put the independence-referendum on the 
political agenda. The Edinburgh-Agreement with the UK-government made sure that the legal 
competences for holding the vote were transferred from Westminster to Holyrood, and that the 
outcome of the referendum was to be respected by both parts. The reasons for this apparently 
emollient stand from Westminster-officials can be explained mainly by three factors; the 
informal recognition of Scotland as distinct nation; the unwritten constitution which gave 
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much flexibility in dealing with the issue; and, that the UK-government was convinced that 
the no-side would win a comfortable victory, thus settling the issue for the foreseeable future.  
However, the Yes-campaign was very successful in initiating broad debates across Scotland 
where a hopeful and viable future for an independent Scotland became the main narrative. 
The arguments in the narrative can be narrowed down to mainly three aspects; that 
independence will fulfill Scotland’s potential as an essentially more equal society than the 
bulk of the UK; that an independent Scotland will prosper economically; and, that an 
independent Scotland will leave democratic decision making to Scotland and not be subjected 
to the Westminster-government.  
In Catalonia there has always been a strong sense of regional identity and claims for 
increased self-government have persistently been high. The nationalist discourse, and 
especially following the fall of the Francoism, has been rooted in cultural and linguistic 
recognition. Support for independence, however, has in the democratic era been quite modest 
around 20 percent. Nationalist claims have rather been oriented towards autonomy within the 
Spanish state. The general idea from a Catalan perspective was to contribute to the initial 
functioning of Spain after the transition to democracy, and then, gradually push for a federal 
transformation of the state-framework granting Catalonia increased recognition and political 
freedoms. The main attempt with regards to this trajectory can be traced to 2003 when an 
effort to revise the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was made. Several amendments emphasizing 
national recognition and increased fiscal and political freedoms were suggested. After an 
extensive and at times heated process ending in 2010, the Spanish government, and ultimately 
the Spanish Constitutional Court, had curtailed the initial proposition so that the changes 
compared to the already existing statute were very scarce. By the Catalonians, this was 
considered as an outright rejection of Catalan autonomy and the federalist route was thus 
regarded as closed. In the wake of the rejection, broad grassroots-movements protesting for 
the ‘the right to decide’, started emerging. This forced a reaction from the CiU who sat in 
government at the time. As a means to answer the popular demands and as an opportunity to 
win a massive victory, they called for early elections. The campaign message was clear – a 
promise to deliver a referendum on independence. As CiU earlier never had advocated 
independence, this was an important step in the secessionist mobilization cycle. The election, 
however, did not quite go as anticipated for CiU who were set back 12 seats in the parliament. 
On the other hand, ERC, the second biggest regionalist party pursuing more radical demands 
with regards to independence, obtained a massive result, gaining 11 seats. For the first time it 
became the main opposition party. Thus, with a government seeking an independence-
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referendum, and with a majority for the issue in parliament, a law of holding the referendum 
was passed and the referendum date set to November 9
th
 2014. The two major statewide 
parties, PP and PSOE both opposed the referendum plans, and sent the matter to the 
Constitutional Court to deal with it. The newly passed referendum law and the referendum 
itself were both judged as unconstitutional. This last stage in the process contributed to a 
further fuel polarization between the Catalan referendum-movement and the Spanish 
government. The cries for independence have correspondingly gained added intensity. The 
formal process ended up in the Catalan government rebranding the referendum to an 
‘unofficial poll’ carried out by volunteers. The result counted a massive win to the Yes-side. 
However, the turnout was modest, which underscores the illegitimate nature of the vote.      
7.2.2 Theoretical discussion 
In theoretically assessing the ‘positive’ cases of Scotland and Catalonia, they both can say to 
reflect the theoretical expectations. This is rather unsurprisingly, as the expectations draw on 
relatively general assumptions. What is more striking is how each factor is based on and 
activated through quite different empirical explanations. Looking at regional identity in both 
the cases, the Scottish mainly reflects a social political dimension of minority nationalism, 
whereas the Catalan predominantly is culturally based. Nevertheless, both discourses have 
moved on to a trajectory emphasizing nation building based on civic values. Furthermore, 
both cases, in contrast to the Basque and Welsh, reflect both territorial and economic viability 
with regards to the independence project. Thus, it can be argued that both cases possess pre-
conditions that make them more prone to secessionist mobilization.  
The tip over to democratic secessionist mobilization, however, is in the cases 
characterized by taking significantly different routes. However, I argue that both processes 
broadly are driven by the same interconnected agendas. Namely, that dissatisfaction with 
statewide parties and state government accelerates popular support for independence, 
whereupon a mobilization process emerges. Moreover, the referendum process in Scotland 
had legitimacy. Thus, the connected debate was naturally more mature, reflecting practical 
arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of independence. The “illegitimate” 
Catalan process, on the other hand, was more of a ‘pre-referendum’ debate emphasizing the 
right of having a legitimate referendum. Therefore it reflected rather unfledged arguments 
with regards to independence. Nonetheless, the rational core in the arguments does in both 
cases echo the same basics – economy and decision making. More precisely, they imply that 
state independence will bring about a fair proximity of political decision making and an 
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improved economy – domains that currently are being constrained by central governments in 
London and Madrid. However, the trigger mechanisms – that is the proximate factors – are 
very different in nature. Moreover, they can largely be said to derive from and be activated 
through opposite reactions from state governments to the popular demands uniting the 
respective mobilization movements.  
In the Scottish case mobilization started as a consequence of the UK-government’s 
emollient response towards SNP’s agenda. Prior to the Edinburgh-Agreement there was no 
particular demand for secession. As I have emphasized above, the rise of the SNP had nothing 
to with any increase in Scottish sentiments for independence. However, once the issue of 
secession was put on the political agenda, the prospect became tangible. In the debate that 
followed a growing perception of independence as practically viable and feasible 
materialized. From this, a secessionist momentum emerged and gained strength. Thus, 
popular mobilization sprung out of an initiative set out by a political party. 
The appetite for independence was also in the Catalonia initially modest. As the 
mobilization cycle also entail a state rejection of a bid for increased autonomy prior the 
secessionist bid, the chain of proximate factors are in the Catalan case more complex. 
Nevertheless, it can generally be argued that secessionist mobilization derives from the 
obstructive response of the state – first with regards to the proposed Statute of Autonomy, 
then with regards to the referendum. Furthermore, the empirical analysis shows that political 
initiatives for a referendum were motivated by mobilization from the Catalan people. In other 
words, the secessionist agenda set out by the political parties was a reaction to popular 
mobilization from the grassroots. 
In sum then, the mobilization processes in the two positive cases are explained by 
opposite dynamics. In the Scottish case the explanatory factors reflect a top-down process, 
whereas in the Catalan case it can surely be depicted as a bottom-up process. This is 
interesting considering that both cases possess the same outcomes derived from the same 
overarching theoretical agendas, and that they both in the broad sense build on the same 
arguments.        
7.3 Causal assessment  
As I emphasized in the analytical framework, secessionism, and particularly secessionism in a 
democratic context, is often explained through special catalysts or critical events (Dion 1996: 
275; De Winter 1998: 221). Such catalysts must be regarded as historical unprecedented and 
thus as empirically unreproducible. Considering my empirical findings of the two positive 
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cases, perhaps the most important reflection to be made, is that the chain of events which I 
have traced in explaining the advancement of the mobilization processes, are in each of the 
cases highly complex, contingent and unique. I argue that these empirical explanations are 
valuable in two ways. First, it serves as a descriptive account of the dynamics of the 
mobilization processes in the particular cases. As such, it is a contribution to clarify and 
understand two separate cases of secessionist mobilization. Second, it contributes to shed light 
on the phenomena of democratic secessionist mobilization which the thesis more broadly 
aims to explore. However, invoking causal inferences that are commonly valid for the two 
cases, not to say a broader universe of cases, does seem unwarranted.  
Regardless, as emphasized above, I hold that the mobilization processes both are built 
on the same agendas reflecting a common overarching argumentative dynamic between 
region and state that ultimately fostered the same outcome. From a methodological theoretical 
point of view, a compelling assessment is hence to treat the cases as representing a causal 
relationship of equifinality; that is a term used when several different combinations of factors 
each proves to be causally sufficient for explaining the outcome (Mahoney 2007: 135), or put 
in Braumoeller’s words (Braumoeller 2003: 210) , when, “(…) similar ends can be achieved 
via different means”.  
7.4 Summary and broader implications  
I will in the following section take a step back and return to the initial puzzle motiving my 
research project. In the introduction I raised the following research question; Compared to 
minority nationalist regions with similar basic features, what factors explain the successful 
minority nationalist mobilization for a referendum on secession in Scotland and Catalonia 
within the political framework of the EU?  
In chapter two I assessed the impact globalization and the EU has on the functioning 
of the nation state. Although depicting the development of the nation state as becoming 
redundant perhaps is exaggerated, it is warranted to state that its basic functions have been 
eroded by transnational and supranational mechanisms. As a consequence, a new opportunity 
structure has arisen for minority nationalism. We have seen a wave of such regions emerging 
through processes reflecting nation building practices and manifesting themselves as political 
units demanding self-rule. However, in most cases these demands have not emphasized 
independence, but rather increased autonomy within a state-framework. This is a logical 
observation considering the decreasing significance of the traditional nation state 
composition. What is the point of forming a new state in an environment unhospitable for 
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state sovereignty? Still, in Scotland and Catalonia the processes have tipped over in forceful 
mobilization for independent statehood. Essentially, it is this tip-over I have attempted to 
explain. 
Above I have descriptively answered the research question by linking a remote 
historical basis with more proximate chains of explanatory factors and discussing them in 
relation to theoretical expectations. On the basis of this, I emphasized that the empirical 
factors in the positive cases respectively are too unique for any clear causal conclusions to be 
drawn. With regards to the aim of establishing causality, it is as such difficult to conclude 
more precisely than, as initially projected , that “various preconditions and conducive 
circumstances can result in the emergence of secessionist tendencies (Navaratna-Bandara 
1995: 11).” However, I nevertheless argued that some broader implications emphasizing the 
general dynamic between region and state-government plausibly can be made. This is that 
dissatisfaction with statewide parties, rooted in economic and decision-making arguments, 
gains sufficient popular support in the democratic discourse, whereupon a secessionist 
mobilization process manifests itself. Further, the cases reveal that secessionist mobilization 
has derived from two completely opposite central government-responds to minority 
nationalist demands. This is interesting with respects to the field of territorial management. It 
underscores the difficulty nation states are presented with in dealing with heterogeneous 
tensions and highlights that no thumb rule can be applied with regards to how to prevent such 
movements.     
7.4.1 Discussing the role of the EU 
There is, however, one theoretical agenda which I in the analysis did not touch upon. That is 
the agenda reflecting the theoretical expectation about the role of the EU, or more precisely 
that; (6) successful democratic mobilization presupposes a general perception of the EU as an 
ally. This agenda meant to reflect a broader dimension of democratic secessionist 
mobilization – namely, the confidence in entering the EU-framework as an independent state 
implies more sovereignty than the status-quo of staying put as a region of a member state. The 
reason why I have left this issue aside in the empirical analysis is that the agenda reflects quite 
ambiguous implications, and hence obliges to be discussed separately. To the degree the EU 
and the international community more broadly involved itself in the unfolding of the 
processes in Scotland and Catalonia, the point of views it presented must be regarded as 
favoring the central governments. Formally, the EU did not have an opinion, nor does it have 
a legal process for dealing with these challenges. Thus, one would have had to be invented. 
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Reflecting this, the few public statements that were made regarding the processes insinuated 
that a region breaking away from member state would not automatically entail EU-inclusion. 
Moreover, particularly with reference to the Scottish case when opinion polls started to show 
a ‘perilous’ figures of support for independence, the international community expressed an 
opinion that that they preferred that the UK stayed together (R3 McEwen; Walker 2014). 
However, as highlighted by McEwen (R3), these calls did not seem to have any significant 
effect on the secessionist momentum;  
“We had interventions from country after country, saying that they hoped the UK 
stayed together – stayed strong. From Obama to the Swedish foreign minister, 
countries big and small talked about why they thought the UK was fine as it is. The 
interesting thing to note about those interventions is that it appears, as far as we can 
tell, that they had absolutely no impact what so ever on the decision (R3 McEwen).” 
Also in the Catalan case, where the debate has been far less practically oriented, there 
are also evidence that international ‘fear tactics’ does not hinder the appetite for independence 
too much. Polling numbers show that support for independence only drop by 5 percent in a 
potential scenario of an independent Catalonia on the outside of the EU (BBC News 2014a). 
Thus, on the one hand, the opportunity structure and the theoretical politically 
repositioning the EU offers minority nationalist regions are important in understanding the 
broader incentives for secessionist mobilization. On the other hand, when confronted with the 
EU resembling the role of an antagonistic arbiter with regards to the independence project, it 
does not seem discourage secessionist mobilization. There are two possible interpretation of 
this apparent ambiguity. One is that independence seekers believe that the challenges of 
accommodation within the EU will be solved once the EU de facto is presented with the 
problem. The other is that it reflects a loss in faith in the EU as an advocate of regional 
interests. The EU itself – as a political unit where minority regions seek influence – is thus not 
any longer the main motivating factor for independent statehood, and hence cannot be directly 
linked to the advancement of secessionist mobilization within its domain.  On the contrary, it 
can perhaps plausibly also be argued that it is the perceived demise of the integration project 
that contributes to fuel the secessionist agenda.  
7.5 Conclusion 
It may seem like the idea of the traditional nation state has dodged the bullet for this time. The 
Scots said no when given the opportunity to vote for independence and in Catalonia it seems 
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as the Madrid-government has managed to quell the referendum bid. However, although the 
formal referendum processes may be regarded as over, the secessionist agenda is far from 
settled in either case. In the general elections of the UK this year the SNP won a landslide 
victory winning 56 of 59 of the Scottish seats in the parliament. The detailed interpretations of 
this I will leave to others, but it can be no doubt that the result figures as a massive declaration 
of protest against a UK-government on ideological crashing course. Moreover, with the newly 
re-elected Conservative- Prime minister, David Cameron, on the one hand pledging the 
promise to deliver a state-wide referendum on UK-membership in the EU by the end of 2017 
(BBC News 2015), and the Scottish electorate, on the other hand, withholding their much 
more Euro-enthusiastic sentiment, new secessionist agendas are evidently brewing. 
Meanwhile in Catalonia, independence seekers are maintaining the secessionist momentum 
and the polarized tensions are not to diminish any time soon. Recently, Catalan President, 
Artur Mas, declared a new route to Catalan independence whereupon he called for early 
elections later this year. The election which initially was not to be held until 2016 has been 
moved to September, a few weeks before the Spanish general elections. The intention is to 
take advantage of the nation-wide decreasing support for Spanish prime minster, Mariano 
Rajoy, and his conservative government. The Catalan secessionist political division claim that 
they can call for a unilateral declaration of independence for Spain if a majority is won in the 
parliament (EU Observer 2015).  
I have above made the general argument that the mobilization processes in Scotland 
and Catalonia cases commonly have emerged through the dissatisfaction with statewide 
parties and state government. This dissatisfaction has been democratically articulated 
whereupon different, and unique case-specific mechanisms, have accelerate popular support 
for independence. More research is needed on detangling the mechanisms at play when 
minority nationalist regions mobilize for independence in the democratic and globalized 
context of the EU. Scotland and Catalonia thus far stands as the only cases where demands for 
autonomy have taken the secessionist route in such forceful manners. However, the potential 
of candidates to follow suit are many. As the processes evolve, the outcomes will revealed 
themselves and also what the broader repercussions with regards to regions with similar 
potential will be. Perhaps only if the cases of Scotland and Catalonia in time no longer stand 
out as rare events, but rather cases reflecting a wider historical trend, can political scientists be 
presented with sufficient empirical firepower so that a general theoretical framework based in 
cross-case causal inferences can be established.   
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Appendix 1: Regional autonomy in Scotland and Wales 
  
Self-Rule (1-15) 
 
The authority 
exercised by a 
regional 
government over 
those who live in 
the region  (sum 
of institutional 
depth, policy 
scope, fiscal 
autonomy, and 
representation) 
 
 
Policy scope (0-4) 
 
Range of policies 
for which a 
regional 
government is 
responsible 
 
 
Institutional 
depth (0-3) 
 
Extent to which a 
regional 
government is 
autonomous rather 
than 
deconcentrated 
 
 
Representation 
assembly + 
executive (0-4) 
 
Extent to which a 
region is endowed 
with an 
independent 
legislature and 
executive 
 
 
Fiscal Autonomy 
(0-4) 
 
Extent to which a 
regional 
government can 
independently tax 
its population  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wales 
 
8 
 
2 
 
Authoritative 
competencies in at 
least two areas: 
economic policy, 
cultural-
educational 
policy, welfare 
state policy 
 
3 
 
Non-
deconcentrated, 
general–purpose, 
administration not 
subject to central 
government veto 
 
3 (2+1) 
 
Assembly (2): 
directly elected 
assembly 
 
Executive (1): 
dual executives 
appointed by 
central 
government and 
the regional 
assembly 
 
 
0 
 
The central 
government sets 
base and rate of 
all regional taxes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scotland 
 
13 
 
3 
 
Authoritative 
competencies in at 
least two areas 
above, and in at 
least two of the 
following: 
residual powers, 
police, authority 
over own 
institutional set-
up, local 
government 
 
 
3 
 
Non-
deconcentrated, 
general–purpose, 
administration not 
subject to central 
government veto 
 
4 (2+2) 
 
Assembly (2): 
directly elected 
assembly 
 
Executive (2): the 
regional executive 
is appointed by a 
regional assembly 
or directly elected 
 
 
3 
 
The regional 
government sets 
the rate of at least 
one major tax: 
personal income, 
corporate, value 
added or sales tax 
 
Source: (Hooghe et al. 2010) 
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Appendix 2: List of respondents (name, tittle, date, place, type and duration of interview)  
Respondent 1 (R1): Eve Hepburn, Senior Lecturer in politics and international relations at 
the University of Edinburgh. Oct 7
th
 2014, Edinburgh. Personal interview, Duration: 52 min. 
Respondent 2 (R2): Michael Keating, Professor of Politics at University of Aberdeen and 
Director of ESRC Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change. Oct 7
th 
2014, Edinburgh. 
Personal interview, Duration: 59 min. 
Respondent 3 (R3): Nicola McEwen, Professor of territorial politics at the University of 
Edinburgh and Associate Director of the ESRC Centre on Constitutional Change. Oct 8
th 
2014, Edinburgh. Personal interview, Duration: 55 min.
 
Respondent 4 (R4): Alan Convery, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Edinburgh. Oct 
10
th
 2014, Edinburgh. Personal interview, Duration: 41 min. 
Respondent 5 (R5): Scott Macnab, Political journalist for The Scotsman. Oct 10
th
 2014, 
Edinburgh. Personal interview, Duration: 27 min.  
Respondent 6 (R6): Peter MacMahon, Political editor for ITV Border’s. Oct 10th 2014, 
Edinburgh. Personal interview, Duration: 54 min. 
Respondent 7 (R7): Robert Liñeira, Research fellow in politics and international relations at 
the University of Edinburgh. Oct 9
th
 20014, Edinburgh. Personal interview, Duration: 56 min.  
Respondent 8 (R8): Klaus-Jürgen Nagel, Professor of in political science at Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra. Oct 13
th
 2014, Barcelona. Personal interview, Duration: 74 min. 
Respondent 9 (R9): Vicent Partal, Journalist and manager of VilaWeb. Oct 13
th
 2014, 
Barcelona. Personal interview, Duration: 83 min. 
Respondent 10 (R10): Jaume Lopez, Adjunct professor in political science. Oct 14
th
 2014, 
Barcelona. Personal interview, Duration: 64 min. 
Respondent 11 (R11): Germa Capdevila, Editor at Revista Esguard. Oct 15
th
 2014, 
Barcelona. Personal interview, Duration: 78 min. 
Respondent 12 (R12): Ivan Serrano, Adjunct professor in political science at Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra. Oct 15
th
 2014, Barcelona, Personal interview, Duration: 57 min. 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide 
 
 Thank you 
 
 How much time do we have? 
 
 Introduction of my project/ What I want to investigate/ How I define dependent 
variable 
 
 Structure of the interview 
1. Case-specific: Scotland or Catalonia 
2. External comparison: Scotland vs. Catalonia (possibly Flanders) 
3. Internal comparison: Scotland/Catalonia vs. Wales/Basque Country 
4. The context: Globalization/The EU 
5. Domestic institutional playing field 
1. Specifically on the cases 
Scotland: 
1) I would like to talk about the (short-term) process leading up to the referendum. 
a. When did it get on a path towards secessionism? 
b. If you look at a referendum on secession as the end of a nationalistic 
mobilization continuum. How will you describe the chain of events leading up 
to it? 
c. In short, what are the key factors that have paved way? 
d. What are the trigger mechanisms? 
 
2) Historically, what are the factors that constitute Scottish nationalism?   
 
3) Key moment: SNP’s election victory 2011. How will you explain this massive 
victory? 
a. In general, what factors do you pin the electoral performance of SNP on? 
 
4) The Edinburgh-Agreement 
a. Under what circumstances was the Edinburgh-Agreement negotiated? 
b. From the states perspective. What options did British government have? 
 
5) Leading up to the referendum. What have been the Yes-camp’s main arguments for 
secession? 
a. Any new arguments vis-a-vis traditional rhetoric?   
 
6) Theoretically; power-sharing arrangements can either dampen or fuel secessionist 
movements; what has devolution had to say for Scottish nationalism? (Has devolution 
fueled Scottish nationalism?) 
 
Catalonia:  
1) I would like to talk about the (short-term) process leading up to the referendum. 
a. When did it get on a path towards secessionism? 
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b. If you look at a referendum on secession as the end of a nationalistic 
mobilization continuum. How will you describe the chain of events? 
c. In short, what are the key factors? 
d. What are the trigger mechanisms? 
 
2) Historically, what are the factors that constitute Catalan nationalism? 
 
3) Key moment. 2012: Mass protest in Barcelona  Snap elections New government.  
How can this be explained? (Culmination of a process or turning point?) 
a. In general, what factors do you pin the electoral performance of CiU on? 
 
4) The central government blocking of the proposed referendum. How has this effected 
the mobilization? 
 
5) Leading up to the referendum. What have been the Yes-camp’s main arguments for 
secession? 
a. Any new arguments vis-à-vis the traditional rhetoric?   
 
6) Theoretically, power-sharing arrangements can either dampen or fuel secessionist 
movements; what has devolution had to say for Catalan nationalism? (Has devolution 
fueled Catalan nationalism?) 
2. External comparison: Scotland vs. Catalonia 
1) In your view, what are the main differences between the processes in Scotland and 
Catalonia? 
a. (Flanders?) 
 
2) I have an impression that Scottish secessionism is driven by ‘a wish to take the last 
step out’ (pragmatic/mutual recognition with GB) vs. Catalan secessionism is driven 
by not being granted enough autonomy and recognition (hostility and frustration with 
Spain)? 
a. Do you agree with this? 
b. Would a more generous Spanish state have staggered the mobilization or in 
Scotland a stricter central-state done the same, or is secessionism and 
inevitable road in these cases?  
 
3) Considering the two countries democratic history, Is there any difference in the 
democratic quality of GB and Spain? 
a. How has it affected the processes? 
 
3. Internal comparison: Scotland/Catalonia vs. Welsh/Basque case 
Wales:  
1) How will you compare Welsh and Scottish nationalism? 
a. What are the main differences? 
 
2) If the referendum is a measure of national success: Why hasn’t the movement in 
Wales been as successful? 
a. Why have there been weaker demands for secessionism in Wales?  
117 
 
b. Why has cultural distinctiveness in Wales not expressed itself politically as it 
has in Scotland? 
 
The Basque Country: 
1) How will you compare Basque and Catalan nationalism? 
 
2) If the referendum is a measure of success: Why haven’t the movements in the Basque 
country been as successful? 
a. Why do you think it is the case that Catalans have pushed for a referendum 
more forcefully than the Basques?  
b. What explains the difference of outcome on the referendum variable? 
4. The context: Globalization and the EU 
1) How has Globalization changed the playfield for regional/secessionist parties in 
Scotland/Catalonia? 
 
2) How has the EU affected the mobilization processes in Scotland/Catalonia? 
a. How has the EU been used actively in the political discourse? 
  
3) ‘Emancipatory nationalism’ (Gubiernau 2013) * 
a. Do you agree that Scottish/Catalan secessionism can be regarded as a product 
of ‘Emancipatory nationalism’? 
5. The domestic institutional playing field 
1) Are there political institutional arrangements that are more viable for the success of 
secessionist/regionalist parties?  
2) Is the institutional framework of GB/Spain more viable for secessionist/regionalist 
parties than institutional frameworks in countries with similar challenges? 
Concluding remarks 
 Thank you very much for your time. 
 Would you mind if I contact you again if I have further questions? 
 Can I ask you if you can recommend me anyone else I can talk to regarding these 
matters? 
 
 
* “(…) a step forward in the deepening of democracy by accepting the principle of consent. 
(…) nation’s right to decide upon its political future by democratic means and (…) includes 
the right to secession. (…) nation evolving from adolescence to adulthood.   
 
 
